State Of Ind. v. Schlechty, 38S04-0905-CR-246.

Citation926 N.E.2d 1
Decision Date30 June 2010
Docket NumberNo. 38S04-0905-CR-246.,38S04-0905-CR-246.
PartiesSTATE of Indiana, Appellant (Plaintiff below),v.Allan M. SCHLECHTY, Appellee (Defendant below).
CourtSupreme Court of Indiana

Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Cynthia L. Ploughe, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.

Dale W. Arnett, Winchester, IN, Attorney for Appellee.

On Petition To Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 38A04-0810-CR-572

RUCKER, Justice.

We conclude that a warrantless search of a probationer's property that is conducted reasonably, supported by a probation search term and reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, complies with the dictates of the Fourth Amendment.

Facts and Procedural History

On September 20, 2005, Allan M. Schlechty was convicted of burglary as a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced Schlechty to eight years imprisonment with six years suspended to probation, two conditions of which were that he “shall behave well” and not “commit any other criminal offense.” Tr. Ex. 1. As an additional condition of probation, Schlechty agreed to submit to “reasonable warrantless searches” of his person and/or property by his probation officer in conjunction with other law enforcement officers. Id.

Responding to a report on the morning of June 10, 2008, that Schlechty was driving his car around a neighborhood: attempting to “pick up” a thirteen-year-old girl as she was on her way to a school bus stop, Tr. at 5; that he was “trying to make contact with her waiving [sic] at her[,] Tr. at 6; that he had told the young girl “to get into a car[,] Tr. at 55; that the frightened young girl ran away and called her mother and grandmother by cell phone as Schlechty told her to “come here or come back here[,] Tr. at 59; and that the day before on June 9, 2009, the young girl had observed Schlechty and she was extremely scared, [and] nervous about someone trying to get her into the car[,] Tr. at 54, Jay County Probation Officer Ron May with the assistance of State Trooper Jeremy Woods and Portland Police Officer James Baughman confronted Schlechty and conducted a warrantless search of his car. The search revealed a green leafy substance, later identified as marijuana, along with drug paraphernalia. Tr. at 43. In consequence, the State charged Schlechty with possession of marijuana as a Class A misdemeanor. There is no indication in the record whether Schlechty was also charged with a probation violation.

Schlechty filed a pre-trial motion to suppress the evidence contending that the items taken from his vehicle were illegally seized. Schlechty did not challenge the validity of his terms of probation regarding his submission to reasonable and warrantless searches of his person and/or property; rather he argued the search itself was unreasonable. After a hearing and declaring that the “State has the burden of proving that a warrantless search of a probationer was a probation search and not an investigatory search” (citing Allen v. State, 743 N.E.2d 1222 (Ind.Ct.App.2001) trans. denied ) the trial court granted the motion concluding in part:

While the authorities were conducting an investigation into the Defendant's possible inappropriate interaction with a minor female child, there was no evidence that the child ever entered the Defendant's vehicle or that any property of the female child was likely to be found in the vehicle. The Court thus concludes that even after applying the lower standard applicable to a probation search, the State of Indiana has not presented any specific and articulable facts from which it could be concluded that there was reasonable suspicion that a search of the Defendant's vehicle was necessary under the regulatory scheme of probation enforcement.

Appellant's Br. at 20. The State appealed. And in an unpublished memorandum decision a divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court. State v. Schlechty, No. 38A04-0810-CR-572, 2009 WL 367402 (Ind.Ct.App. Feb. 12, 2009). Having previously granted transfer, we now reverse the trial court's judgment.

Discussion

Citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987) the State argues, [t]he probation officer had sufficient information to search Defendant's car.” Appellant's Pet. to Trans. at 3. Schlechty counters the instant case is easily distinguishable from Griffin. Br. in Resp. to Pet. to Trans. at 2. Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 1 and Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution 2 require in general that searches should be conducted pursuant to a warrant supported by probable cause. And both this jurisdiction and the federal courts have recognized various exceptions to the warrant requirement. But this Court has consistently held, [n]otwithstanding the textual similarity of Article I, § 11 of the Indiana Constitution to that of the federal Fourth Amendment, Section 11 is interpreted separately and independently from Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.” State v. Washington, 898 N.E.2d 1200, 1205-06 (Ind.2008) (citing Mitchell v. State, 745 N.E.2d 775, 786 (Ind.2001)). In this case neither party tells us whether it is advancing a federal or state constitutional claim. However, because both sides rely heavily on Griffin, we address the facts here under federal Fourth Amendment jurisprudence only and express no opinion on whether the result would be the same under Article I, § 11 of the Indiana Constitution.

In Griffin, the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a warrantless search performed by a probation officer pursuant to a state regulation that authorized such searches on the basis of reasonable suspicion and articulated factors to be considered in determining the existence of reasonable suspicion. See 483 U.S. at 872-80, 107 S.Ct. 3164. The Court concluded that the “special needs” of the probationary system, particularly the need to supervise probationers closely, justified warrantless searches based on reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause. See id. at 875, 107 S.Ct. 3164 (noting [s]upervision, then, is a ‘special need’ of the State permitting a degree of impingement upon privacy that would not be constitutional if applied to the public at large.”). Accordingly, the Court determined that the search of the probationer's residence was reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because it was conducted pursuant to a valid regulation governing probationers. Id. at 880, 107 S.Ct. 3164.

Although the search in Griffin was executed as part of a state regulatory scheme, a number of federal circuits have held that ‘reasonableness' can also be established by narrowly tailored restrictions included within a probation agreement. See, e.g., United States v. Wryn, 952 F.2d 1122, 1124 (9th Cir.1991) ([H]ad the warrantless search of the probationer Wryn's home been authorized by either Montana state law or by Wryn's probation agreement we would consider the search ‘reasonable’ under the [F]ourth amendment.”); United States v. Giannetta, 909 F.2d 571, 575 (1st Cir.1990) (noting, we do not read Griffin as approving only probation searches conducted pursuant to a legislative or administrative framework[ ] [and that] [s]imilar guidance and constraints ... are provided where ... a sentencing judge narrowly tailors the need for and scope of any probation search conditions to the circumstances of an individual case.”); United States v. Schoenrock, 868 F.2d 289, 293 (8th Cir.1989) (remarking that [u]nlike the general search terms approved in Griffin, a sentencing judge is able to narrowly tailor probation terms to fit the needs of a particular individual.”) (citation omitted). We agree with this view and conclude that the condition of Schlechty's probation that he submit to reasonable warrantless searches of his person and/or property by the probation officer in conjunction with law enforcement officers, represents a reasonable and valid restriction upon Schlechty's liberty. In addition we also observe that Griffin has grounded much of this jurisdiction's understanding of federal jurisprudence in this area. See, e.g., George v. State, 901 N.E.2d 590, 594 n.3 (Ind.Ct.App.2009) trans. denied, (citing Griffin for the proposition that “the so-called ‘special needs' doctrine, relieves law enforcement of both [warrant and probable cause] requirements.”); Bonner v. State, 776 N.E.2d 1244, 1249 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) trans. denied, (citing Griffin for the proposition that “the ‘special needs' of the probation system may require warrantless searches.”); Purdy v. State, 708 N.E.2d 20, 22 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) (citing Griffin for the proposition that [t]he State's operation of the probation system presents a special needs situation beyond the normal need for law enforcement that justifies such a departure from the usual warrant and probable cause requirements.”).

However, in United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 122 S.Ct. 587, 151 L.Ed.2d 497 (2001) the United States Supreme Court expanded its holding in Griffin by declaring that searches performed in compliance with a search provision contained within a valid probation agreement may be constitutional even if they were not “conducted by a probation officer monitoring whether the probationer is complying with probation restrictions.” Id. at 117, 122 S.Ct. 587. In Knights, the defendant was a probationer who challenged the constitutionality of the search of his home without a warrant.3 As a condition of probation the defendant had signed a document that provided for police access to his “person, property, place of residence, vehicle, personal effects, to search at anytime, with or without a search warrant, warrant for arrest or reasonable cause by any probation officer or law enforcement officer.” Id. at 114, 122 S.Ct. 587. The defendant argued that the search was unconstitutional because police did not have a “special need” beyond...

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