State Of Ind. v. Richardson, No. 49S02-0910-CR-428.
| Docket Nº | No. 49S02-0910-CR-428. |
| Citation | 927 N.E.2d 379 |
| Case Date | June 03, 2010 |
| Court | Supreme Court of Indiana |
927 N.E.2d 379
STATE of Indiana, Appellant (Plaintiff below),
v.
Robert RICHARDSON, Appellee (Defendant below).
No. 49S02-0910-CR-428.
Supreme Court of Indiana.
June 3, 2010.
Defendant Robert Richardson was stopped for driving his pickup truck without wearing a seatbelt. The police officer's subsequent inquiry regarding a “large, unusual bulge” in his pocket led to the discovery of cocaine. The trial court concluded that this inquiry went beyond that authorized by Indiana's Seatbelt Enforcement Act. We agree with the trial court's determination.
On July 10, 2007, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Officer Tanya Eastwood was working an overtime shift when she drove past a pickup truck stopped at a stop sign and noticed that the driver, Robert Richardson, was not wearing a seat belt.1 Officer Eastwood approached the truck and recognized Richardson from a prior traffic stop, during which she had encountered no problems with him. Richardson was immediately cooperative with Officer Eastwood and admitted that he did not have his seat belt on. While speaking to the passenger, Officer Eastwood noticed “a very large, unusual bulge” in Richardson's pocket. Officer Eastwood asked Richardson what was in his pocket, and he told her that it was his handgun. Officer Eastwood requested Richardson's handgun permit and asked him to exit the vehicle so she could retrieve his gun.
Richardson's handgun permit appeared tattered and wrinkled. The issue date of the permit was “06/12/2006,” but the last digit of the year of the expiration date was illegible.2 Officer Eastwood's personal routine was to perform a criminal background check on anyone with a handgun, regardless of the presence of a permit, so she radioed headquarters.3
Headquarters initially informed Officer Eastwood that Richardson had a “prior conviction for possession of cocaine and public intox.” (Tr. at 22.) Richardson told Officer Eastwood that his prior conviction was a misdemeanor, and Officer Eastwood therefore asked two sources at headquarters if Richardson's prior conviction was a felony or a misdemeanor. Despite three inquiries, headquarters was unable to respond definitively, ultimately telling Officer Eastwood:
it shows up that it is a felony D possession of cocaine and the strange thing is I looked under sentencing and I know he got probation, it doesn't tell me what probation he got. [B]ut it shows him only serving 20 days so I don't know how accurate that is.
Id. Officer Eastwood did not use her laptop computer in her patrol car to check Richardson's criminal history, nor did she check the validity of Richardson's handgun permit with headquarters.
Officer Eastwood then placed Richardson under arrest for “having a firearm with a prior felony conviction within the last fifteen years.” (Tr. at 33.) Another police officer who had arrived to assist Officer Eastwood started to pat down Richardson and felt a large object in Richardson's underwear. Richardson began to struggle with the officers and attempted to flee. The officers forced Richardson down onto an embankment where he continued to resist and attempted to place his hands in his pants. During the struggle, Richardson kicked Officer Eastwood in the chest, and Officer Eastwood attempted to use a taser on him. Although this proved ineffective, the officers were eventually able to subdue Richardson. The object in Richardson's underwear was later determined to be cocaine.
On July 11, 2007, the State charged Richardson with Class A felony dealing in cocaine, Class C felony possession of cocaine, Class C felony possession of cocaine and a firearm, Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement, and Class A misdemeanor battery on a law enforcement officer. Richardson filed a motion to suppress the evidence, and the trial court held a hearing on this motion and subsequently granted Richardson's motion to suppress.
The State appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the officer's questions and actions were reasonable under the totality of the circumstances and that the trial court erred in granting Richardson's motion to suppress the evidence seized in connection with the seat belt violation. State v. Richardson, 906 N.E.2d 263 (Ind.Ct.App.2009). Richardson sought, and we granted, transfer. Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).
Richardson contends that the search incident to arrest offends the proscriptions on unreasonable searches and seizures contained in the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 11 (“Section 11”), of the Indiana Constitution. Because we resolve Richardson's claim on statutory grounds, we do not address Richardson's constitutional arguments.
Indiana Code section 9-19-10-3.1, also known as the Seatbelt Enforcement Act (“Act”), provides that “a vehicle may be stopped to determine compliance with this chapter. However, a vehicle, the contents of a vehicle, the driver of a vehicle, or a passenger in a vehicle may not be inspected, searched, or detained solely because of a violation of this chapter.” In Baldwin v. Reagan, 715 N.E.2d 332 (Ind.1999), we upheld the constitutionality of Indiana Code section 9-19-10-34 against a challenge that the statute unconstitutionally provided authority for entirely pretextual traffic stops. We reasoned that the statute could be constitutionally applied because under it law enforcement officers could stop motorists only where they had reasonable...
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Weisheit v. State, Supreme Court Cause No. 10S00-1507-PD-413
...substance by an offer of proof, allowing for meaningful review on appeal. Ind. Evidence Rule 103(a)(2) ; see State v. Richardson , 927 N.E.2d 379, 385 (Ind. 2010) ; Von Almen v. State , 496 N.E.2d 55, 57 (Ind. 1986) ("The importance of establishing a record as a prerequisite to appellate re......
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Bell v. State, Court of Appeals Case No. 49A05-1606-CR-1390
...stop should not have continued after Officer Gough found Bell did not have active warrants. In support, he cites State v. Richardson , 927 N.E.2d 379, 384 (Ind. 2010), in which our Indiana Supreme Court held observation of an "unusual bulge" is not enough to provide reasonable suspicion. Th......
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McIlquham v. State, No. 49S05–1401–CR–28.
...the evidence, there is “substantial evidence of probative value that supports the trial court's decision.” State v. Richardson, 927 N.E.2d 379, 385 (Ind.2010). However, we not only “consider the evidence favorable to the trial court's ruling,” but also “substantial uncontradicted evidence t......
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State v. Vance, Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-1746
...value that supports the trial court's decision." McIlquham v. State , 10 N.E.3d 506, 511 (Ind. 2014) (citing State v. Richardson , 927 N.E.2d 379, 385 (Ind. 2010) ). We consider evidence favorable to the trial court's ruling and "substantial uncontradicted evidence to the contrary." Id. (ci......
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Weisheit v. State, Supreme Court Cause No. 10S00-1507-PD-413
...substance by an offer of proof, allowing for meaningful review on appeal. Ind. Evidence Rule 103(a)(2) ; see State v. Richardson , 927 N.E.2d 379, 385 (Ind. 2010) ; Von Almen v. State , 496 N.E.2d 55, 57 (Ind. 1986) ("The importance of establishing a record as a prerequisite to appellate re......
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Bell v. State, Court of Appeals Case No. 49A05-1606-CR-1390
...stop should not have continued after Officer Gough found Bell did not have active warrants. In support, he cites State v. Richardson , 927 N.E.2d 379, 384 (Ind. 2010), in which our Indiana Supreme Court held observation of an "unusual bulge" is not enough to provide reasonable suspicion. Th......
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McIlquham v. State, 49S05–1401–CR–28.
...the evidence, there is “substantial evidence of probative value that supports the trial court's decision.” State v. Richardson, 927 N.E.2d 379, 385 (Ind.2010). However, we not only “consider the evidence favorable to the trial court's ruling,” but also “substantial uncontradicted evidence t......
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Beiler v. State , 38A02–1109–CR–839.
...to the jury over the objection of Beiler. “At common law, a person was privileged to resist an unlawful arrest.” State v. Richardson, 927 N.E.2d 379, 384 (Ind.2010) (citing Gross v. State, 186 Ind. 581, 583, 117 N.E. 562, 564 (1917)). “Our courts, however, have uniformly accepted that this ......