State of Indiana ex rel. Tyler v. Gobin

Citation94 F. 48
Decision Date16 May 1899
Docket Number9,668 .
PartiesSTATE OF INDIANA ex rel. TYLER v. GOBIN et al.
CourtD. Indiana

W. V Rooker, for plaintiff.

Joseph H. Shea and Smith & Korbly, for defendants.

BAKER District Judge.

This is an action to recover damages for the death of Marion Tyler by the alleged wrongful acts and omissions of James F. Gobin sheriff of Scott county, Ind. The deceased was a prisoner confined in the jail of that county awaiting trial, and in the lawful custody of the sheriff, as the keeper of the jail. The action is upon the bond of the sheriff, and is against him, and five other persons, as sureties thereon. Separate demurrers for want of facts have been filed, one by the defendant Gobin, and the other by his co-defendants, the sureties on his official bond.

The condition of the bond copied in the complaint is 'that if the said James F. Gobin shall well and faithfully perform the duties of said office, in accordance with the law governing the administration thereof, and at the end of said term account for and turn over to his successor in office, or to whoever may be legally appointed to receive the same, all moneys, books, papers, and other property whatever, which shall come into his hands as said officer, then this obligation to be void; else to remain in full force and effect. ' The wrongful acts charged are that the sheriff carelessly and negligently suffered and permitted a mob of persons to collect for the purpose of committing acts of violence against the person of the deceased, and that he carelessly and wrongfully permitted the jail in which the deceased was confined to be and remain without a sufficient guard to protect the same against the acts of violence of the mob, and that, in further disregard of his duty, he aided and abetted the mob in accomplishing their unlawful conspiracy by delivering to the mob the keys of the cell house of the jail in which the deceased was confined, by presenting to the mob a lighted lamp, by means of which they were the better enabled to accomplish their unlawful purpose, by informing the mob as to the location of the cell occupied by the deceased, by failing to make an outcry or to give any alarm whereby assistance could have been obtained, and by failing and refusing to make any resistance or to interpose any obstruction to the mob. It is also alleged that the mob thereupon removed the deceased from the jail to a place near by, and hanged him with a rope by the neck until he was thereby strangled to death. It is also alleged that after the mob had removed the deceased from the jail, and after they had suspended him with a rope by the neck from a tree, the sheriff was guilty of further neglect in that he failed and refused to cut down the body of the deceased before life was extinct, and failed and refused to resuscitate the deceased from the strangulation which was then and there destroying his life.

It is contended that the acts and omissions of the sheriff were not done or permitted by him by virtue of, or under color of, his office, because the acts and omissions charged against him amount to a charge of aiding and abetting in the commission of a murder; and that if the acts of the sheriff were not done by virtue of, and under color of, his office as sheriff then neither he nor his sureties are liable on his official bond.

It is firmly settled that an officer may be held personally responsible for any and all wrongs committed by him; but when an action is brought upon the bond he gave for the performance of his official duty, he and his sureties can only be held responsible for a breach of duty covered by the bond. The supreme court in South v. Maryland, 18 How. 396, 402, say: 'To entitle a citizen to sue on this bond to his own use, he must show such a default as would entitle him to recover against the sheriff in an action on the case. ' Could the deceased, if alive, have maintained an action on the case against the sheriff for the acts of omission and...

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30 cases
  • Ingo v. Koch
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (2nd Circuit)
    • 15 d3 Abril d3 1942
    ...Iowa 740, 35 N.W. 427, 7 Am.St.Rep. 508; Powell v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 1932, 45 Ga.App. 88, 163 S.E. 239; Indiana ex rel. Tyler v. Gobin, C.C., 94 F. 48; Greenberg v. People to Use of Balaban, 225 Ill. 174, 80 N.E. 100, 8 L.R.A.,N.S., 1223, 116 Am.St.Rep. 127; Commonwealth v......
  • Bogard v. Cook
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)
    • 15 d5 Dezembro d5 1978
    ...that the sheriff's failure resulted in the prisoner's death. The Mississippi Supreme Court adopted the position of Indiana ex rel. Tyler v. Gobin, 94 F. 48, 50 (C.C.Ind.1899), which upheld a complaint brought against a county sheriff alleging that the sheriff permitted, aided and abetted a ......
  • Winston v. United States, 84
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (2nd Circuit)
    • 27 d2 Fevereiro d2 1962
    ...capacities for negligent treatment of prisoners, see Magenheimer v. State, 120 Ind.App. 128, 90 N.E.2d 813 (1950); Indiana ex rel. Tyler v. Gobin, 94 F. 48 (C.C.Ind. 1899). The present case thus comes squarely within the plain meaning of the The Act lists thirteen kinds of claims as to whic......
  • Jones v. Diamond
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)
    • 29 d4 Janeiro d4 1981
    ...in his custody by virtue of his office ...." Farmer v. State, 224 Miss. 96, 105, 79 So.2d 528, 531 (1955) (quoting Indiana ex rel. Tyler v. Gobin, 94 F. 48, 50 (1899). In adopting the prevailing standard, the Mississippi Supreme Court expressly rejected a minority view providing a lower sta......
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