State Of Iowa v. Hanes
| Decision Date | 12 November 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 08-1231.,08-1231. |
| Parties | STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Robert L. HANES, Appellant. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Martha J. Lucey, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Darrel L. Mullins and Cristen Douglass (until withdrawal) and then Elisabeth Reynoldson, Assistant Attorneys General, Thomas J. Ferguson, County Attorney, and Kim Griffith, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Robert Hanes was convicted by a jury of willful injury causing serious injury. At trial, the jury was instructed that potential penalties would include fines; community service; supervised or unsupervised probation; placement in a residential, correctional, or violator facility; or confinement in a county jail or prison. The jury instruction was improper and prejudiced Hanes. We reverse and remand.
Robert Hanes was convicted after a jury trial of willful injury causing serious injury in violation of Iowa Code section 708.4(1) (2005). The verdict is based on an incident between Hanes and Nathanial Taylor on the morning of April 28, 2007. According to Taylor, he was walking to a cigar store to redeem bottles and cans. Taylor claims one week earlier Hanes had given him $2.25 to purchase gizzards for Hanes, and Taylor did not purchase the gizzards or return the money. Hanes asked about the money and was angry and yelling. Taylor offered Hanes his cans, but Hanes pulled out a knife and said “I'm going to kill you” and “stabbed [Taylor] in the face.” Taylor then grabbed Hanes's hand holding the knife, hit Hanes in the head, and kicked Hanes until Hanes said “stop.” Hanes picked up a bottle of whiskey and walked into the park.
Hanes claimed he did not know Taylor and encountered him while walking home. Hanes testified Taylor struck him with the bag of cans and bottles, and Hanes struck back. Hanes testified he was defending himself, and he had previous boxing experience.
Hanes filed a direct appeal and alleged a number of trial errors. First, Hanes complains a jury instruction improperly and incorrectly referenced potential penalties. Second, Hanes argues the district court improperly excluded hearsay testimony that should have been admitted under the exception for statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis. The State argues this issue was not preserved.
Third, Hanes raises a number of issues through the mechanism of ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel did not object to certain matters. Hanes complains his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the instruction regarding serious injury and for failing to object to the instruction regarding specific intent. Hanes raises ten additional issues pro se, including an argument that he was prejudiced by the prosecuting attorney's statement that the defense could have called additional witnesses if they had any information helpful to the defense. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction. Hanes sought further review.
This court reviews challenges to jury instructions for correction of errors at law. Boyle v. Alum-Line, Inc., 710 N.W.2d 741, 748 (Iowa 2006). Our review is to determine whether the challenged instruction accurately states the law and is supported by substantial evidence. State v. Predka, 555 N.W.2d 202, 204 (Iowa 1996). Error in a particular instruction does not require reversal unless the error was prejudicial to the complaining party. State v. Spates, 779 N.W.2d 770, 775 (Iowa 2010). When an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim is raised on direct appeal, we may choose to reach the issue if the record is adequate to decide the claim, or we may choose to preserve the claim for postconviction proceedings. State v. Straw, 709 N.W.2d 128, 133 (Iowa 2006).
A. Jury Instruction Regarding Punishment. The district court gave a
jury instruction regarding penalty-instruction number one-which stated:
The duty of the jury is to determine if the defendant is guilty or not guilty.
In the event of a guilty verdict, you have nothing to do with punishment.
Criminal offenses may be punished by fines or community service; by supervised or unsupervised probation; by placement in a residential, correctional or violator facility; or by confinement in a county jail or prison; depending on the circumstances of the case. Accordingly, you may neither speculate on what any punishment in this case might be nor let it influence your verdict.
The district court explained the penalty instruction as follows:
And it's the stock instruction except that the second-or the last paragraph is one that I've added and have been using because of questions that have come up from people during jury selection, whether they're concerned about punishment in one case or another. Frequently it comes up with drug crimes where people are concerned about issues and disparity in sentencing and so forth. But I think it's just emphasizing to the jury that they shouldn't speculate on any possible punishments.
Defense counsel objected to the instruction, arguing the instruction invites speculation on the part of the jury. Defense counsel also noted that community service, probation, or placement in a residential facility are not sentencing options for a forcible felony. The district court responded:
Well that's why I put in the language depending on the circumstances of the case because that is absolutely right what you said in forcible felonies, there isn't community service and that's one of those cases. And so I am going to leave it in. I don't think it's a misstatement of the law. And I disagree with you that it causes speculation. It would be fruitless to speculate in cases like that. So the objection is overruled.
It is well-settled that juries should not be instructed regarding the statutory penalty for the charged offenses. See State v. Purcell, 195 Iowa 272, 274, 191 N.W. 849, 850 (1923) (); State v. O'Meara, 190 Iowa 613, 625-26, 177 N.W. 563, 569 (1920) (); State v. Hatter, 381 N.W.2d 370, 375 (Iowa Ct.App.1985). As the court of appeals has explained, “a trial has one purpose-to seek the truth,” and “[p]enalties have nothing to do with the factual determination that a defendant did or did not commit a crime.” Hatter, 381 N.W.2d at 375. It is the legislature, and not the jury, that determines the appropriate penalty for the crime. Id. “[K]nowledge of the penalty would only serve to confuse and distract the jury from its unique and important judicial function.” Id.
The State argues the penalty instruction is consistent with the rule prohibiting jury instruction on punishment because it “merely instructed the jury that penalties for crimes in general range from fines to imprisonment.” We do not find this logic persuasive. The issue of punishment is not for the jury to consider or speculate about and knowledge about punishment can serve to confuse or distract the jury. Id. A generalized explanation of potential penalties wades into a topic about which the “ ‘jury had no concern.’ ” Purcell, 195 Iowa at 274, 191 N.W. at 850 (quoting O'Meara, 190 Iowa at 625-26, 177 N.W. at 569). Therefore, we hold the penalty instruction was improper.
The State argues even if the jury instruction was improper, reversal is not warranted under harmless-error analysis because Hanes was not prejudiced. We will not reverse unless an error in giving a particular instruction was prejudicial to the complaining party. Spates, 779 N.W.2d at 775. Prior case law regarding the showing required to establish prejudice has been, at times, contradictory. Compare State v. Piper, 663 N.W.2d 894, 914 (Iowa 2003) (), with State v. Davis, 228 N.W.2d 67, 73 (Iowa 1975) ().
The requirement that a jury instruction error result in prejudice before a conviction will be reversed mirrors the harmless-error analysis this court undertakes for any alleged error in a criminal trial. See State v. Jordan, 779 N.W.2d 751, 756 (Iowa 2010). This court has established standards for conducting harmless-error analysis based on whether the alleged error is of a constitutional magnitude. When an error is of a constitutional dimension, the State must show beyond a reasonable doubt the error did not result in prejudice. State v. Traywick, 468 N.W.2d 452, 455 (Iowa 1991). Courts have applied this standard to errors of a constitutional dimension in jury instructions. 1 See Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 583, 106 S.Ct. 3101, 3109, 92 L.Ed.2d 460, 474 (1986) (); see also State v. Schuler, 774 N.W.2d 294, 299-300 (Iowa 2009) ().
Similarly, the proper harmless-error analysis for errors in jury instructions that are not of a constitutional dimension,...
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