State of Kan. v. Beaman
| Decision Date | 19 October 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 103,361.,103,361. |
| Citation | 286 P.3d 876,295 Kan. 853 |
| Parties | STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Karl BEAMAN, Appellant. |
| Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Syllabus by the Court
1. Ordinarily, constitutional grounds for reversal asserted for the first time on appeal are not properly before an appellate court for review. But certain exceptions are recognized to this general rule, one of which is when consideration of a new theory is necessary to serve the ends of justice or to prevent a denial of fundamental rights.
2. In a felony prosecution, the right to a jury trial may be waived. But to be valid, the waiver must be knowingly and voluntarily made in writing or in open court for the record. The presiding judge has a duty to ensure that a defendant's rights have been adequately protected.
3. In a criminal case, the decision to grant a continuance lies within the sound discretion of the district court.
4. An appellate court reviews under an abuse of discretion standard a district court's determination whether mitigating circumstances presented under K.S.A. 21–4643(d) are substantial and compelling reasons for a departure sentence.
5. Judicial discretion is abused if judicial action is (a) arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, i.e., no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court; (b) based on an error of law, i.e., the discretion is guided by an erroneous legal conclusion; or (c) based on an error of fact, i.e., substantial competent evidence does not support a factual finding on which a prerequisite conclusion of law or the exercise of discretion is based.
Heather R. Cessna, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant.
Sheryl L. Lidtke, deputy district attorney, argued the cause, and Jerome A. Gorman, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with her on the brief for appellee.
Karl Beaman directly appeals his convictions for rape under K.S.A. 21–3502(a)(2) and aggravated indecent liberties with a child under K.S.A. 21–3504(a)(1). He argues the district court erred by: (1) allowing him to improperly waive his right to a jury trial; (2) refusing to grant defense counsel a continuance to research Jessica's Law sentencing issues; (3) denying his departure motion; (4) sentencing him to a life sentence with no parole for 25 years when another statute permits parole after 20 years; (5) imposing lifetime postrelease supervision; (6) imposing electronic monitoring; and (7) sentencing him to the aggravated sentence without having the aggravating factors submitted to a jury. We affirm Beaman's convictions. We vacate that portion of his sentence imposing postrelease supervision for the rape conviction. We also remand to the district court for a nunc pro tunc order to correct a portion of the journal entry to delete reference to electronic monitoring, but we affirm the remainder of his sentence.
Beaman was charged in a two-count complaint with rape and aggravated indecent liberties with a child. He admitted the criminal conduct but disputed the date of the rape because he claimed it occurred after the victim had turned 14. On the morning of jury trial, Beaman informed the court that against the advice of his attorney, he wanted to waive his right to a jury trial and proceed with a bench trial instead. The record reflects the following exchange:
Beaman's reply was lengthy and reflective about what his experiences had been since his arrest and included that he understood he was responsible for his actions even if he believed at the time that the victim consented to the sexual act. Beaman told the court that because he admitted everything, there was no sense in taking the victim or her family through a jury trial. He also told the court, “You've been on the bench long enough to be able to make the decision, so, you know, I put it in your hands because I'm not trying to hide from what I did.” The court soon replied:
The State agreed to waive the jury trial, and the court accepted Beaman's waiver. After a bench trial, the district court convicted Beaman of rape and aggravated indecent liberties with a child.
Beaman filed a motion for new trial as to the rape count only, claiming the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim was under the age of 14 at the time the crime occurred. A few weeks later, Beaman filed a departure motion, asking the district court to grant him a dispositional or downward departure on sentencing because, among other reasons, he waived his right to a jury trial to “avoid trauma and embarrassment to the victim.”
That same day, Beaman filed a motion to continue sentencing, claiming the State would need more time to respond to his departure motion and that his defense counsel wished to do additional research on departure and sentencing issues. The continuance motion did not specify what the additional research entailed, nor did it explain why counsel was unable to complete the research or determine whether the additional motion had merit during the time since Beaman's conviction.
The court denied the motion for new trial, stating it had found beyond a reasonable doubt that the rape occurred when the victim was still 13. It also denied the motions for continuance and departure. Beaman was sentenced to life with a mandatory minimum of 25 years in prison and lifetime postrelease supervision for the rape conviction. Beaman was also sentenced to a concurrent 61 months in prison for the aggravated indecent liberties conviction and lifetime postrelease supervision. The sentencing journal entry indicates Beaman was sentenced to lifetime electronic monitoring and lifetime registration.
Beaman filed a timely notice of appeal. Our jurisdiction is proper under K.S.A. 22–3601(b)(1) ().
Beaman argues he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his jury trial right because the district court failed to fully inform him of what that right entailed. Before considering the merits of Beaman's jury waiver claim, there is a threshold question concerning issue preservation.
Beaman concedes he did not challenge the jury trial waiver in district court and acknowledges that generally issues not raised below are not preserved for appeal. But he claims an exception applies because consideration of his argument and the potential error is necessary to prevent the denial of his fundamental right to a jury trial. See State v. Anderson, 294 Kan. 450, 464–65, 276 P.3d 200 (2012) ().
The State claims there is an inconsistency among Kansas appellate courts concerning whether this issue may be raised for the first time on appeal. The State argues this court may have established a bright-line rule that a jury trial waiver issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal in State v. Luna, 271 Kan. 573, 577, 24 P.3d 125 (2001). In contrast, the State notes the Court of Appeals subsequently reviewed a waiver issue after concluding it involved a fundamental right in State v. Bowers, 42 Kan.App.2d 739, 216 P.3d 715 (2009). Bowers did not cite or otherwise acknowledge Luna.
This court recently addressed whether our Luna decision created a bright-line rule regarding preservation of jury waiver issues in State v. Frye, 294 Kan. 364, 370, 277 P.3d 1091 (2012). In Frye, we noted that Luna continued to acknowledge there are exceptions to the general preservation rule, emphasizing that the preservation requirement is prudential rather than jurisdictional. We held that Luna was not intended to make a bright-line rule that jury trial waiver questions could never be heard on appeal. Frye, 294 Kan. at 370, 277 P.3d 1091. Implementing that premise, the court noted several issues arose in Frye warranting review of the defendant's handwritten jury trial waiver, including the district court's failure to ascertain the waiver's validity. Based on those issues, we held the Court of Appeals did not err in finding an exception to the preservation rule in order to hear the issue on appeal. Frye, 294 Kan. at 371, 277 P.3d 1091.
In keeping with Frye, we must determine whether Beaman should be permitted to raise the jury trial waiver issue for the first time on appeal. Beaman claims this issue...
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State v. Dunn
...Kan. 1041, 1043, 350 P.3d 1068 (2015). But preservation is a prudential consideration, not an invariable rule. See State v. Beaman , 295 Kan. 853, 857, 286 P.3d 876 (2012).In the case of challenges to alleged defects in institution of criminal proceedings, as with evidentiary rulings under ......
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State v. Lewis
...cause. K.S.A. 22–3401. A district court's ruling on a motion to continue is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Beaman, 295 Kan. 853, 862–63, 286 P.3d 876 (2012) (citing State v. Stevens, 285 Kan. 307, 322–23, 172 P.3d 570 [2007], and State v. Carter, 284 Kan. 312, 318, 160 P.3d 4......
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State v. Chavez-Majors
...voluntarily and knowingly waived the jury trial right is a legal inquiry subject to unlimited appellate review.’ [ State v. ] Beaman , 295 Kan. [853,] 858[, 286 P.3d 876 (2012) ]." Rizo , 304 Kan. at 979, 377 P.3d 419.As mentioned earlier, the facts are undisputed as to this issue so our re......
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State v. Robison
...to the fundamental right to a trial by a jury under the Kansas Constitution and the United States Constitution. See State v. Beaman , 295 Kan. 853, 858, 286 P.3d 876 (2012). Accordingly, we find that a decision on the merits would serve the ends of justice. ANALYSIS Section 5 of the Kansas ......
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Appellate Decisions
...review, (2) waiver of jury trial, (3) Motion for departure sentence HELD: Rizo's claim is analogous to issue reviewed in State v. Beaman, 295 Kan. 853 (2012), and is likewise considered in this case. Rizo was advised in open court of his right to a jury trial. Cases were cited as upholding ......