State of Maryland v. Capital Airlines, Inc.

• Decision Date: 26 February 1964
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 152-260 and related actions.
• Citation: State of Maryland v. Capital Airlines, Inc., 280 F.Supp. 648 (S.D. N.Y. 1964)
• Parties: STATE OF MARYLAND et al., Plaintiffs, v. CAPITAL AIRLINES, INC., Vickers-Armstrongs, Limited: Vickers-Armstrongs, (Aircraft) Limited: and Vickers-Armstrongs, Incorporated, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

280 F. Supp. 648

STATE OF MARYLAND et al., Plaintiffs, v.CAPITAL AIRLINES, INC., Vickers-Armstrongs, Limited: Vickers-Armstrongs, (Aircraft) Limited: and Vickers-Armstrongs, Incorporated, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 152-260 and related actions.

United States District Court S. D. New York.

February 26, 1964.

Haight, Gardner, Poor & Havens, New York City for Vickers-Armstrongs, Limited; William J. Junkerman, New York City, of counsel.

Bigham, Englar, Jones & Houston, New York City, for Capital Airlines, Inc.; John J. Martin, New York City, of counsel.

MEMORANDUM

THOMAS F. MURPHY, District Judge.

These actions arose out of the crash of a Capital Airlines airplane near Chase, Maryland, in 1959.Subsequent to joinder of issue Capital Airlines, one of the defendants, proceeded to settle all claims against it, receiving in return covenants not to sue in most cases and general releases in favor of all defendants in the rest.Shortly before the last of these settlements (several years after the Vickers interests had answered) the Vickers interests moved for leave to serve third party complaints in those cases in which Capital had already been let out and cross claims in those cases in which settlements had not yet been finalized.

By order dated August 1, 1963, we allowed the assertion of these claims without prejudice to Capital's right to move against them at some later time.The intention of that order was to preserve for a single motion any and all objections which Capital thought appropriate.We are now presented with those objections.

Both the cross claims and the third party complaints proceed on identical theories, to wit, indemnity predicated on passive or secondary negligence and contribution among joint tortfeasors.The basic problem, very simply phrased, is whether or not these claims may properly be asserted in this case.There is, however, a conflict of laws problem which requires us preliminarily to make a choice of law.

Being a diversity case, we are bound to the choice of law which New York would make.It would appear that New York has abandoned the traditional rule that the law of the place of the tort invariably governs and has replaced it with one based on a jurisdiction's interest in the outcome of an issue.The mechanics of determining interest is known as the grouping of contacts or "center of gravity" doctrine.The rationale, as expressed in Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 191 N.E.2d 279(1963) is that "justice, fairness and the `best practical result' * * * may best be achieved by giving controlling effect to the law of the jurisdiction which, because of its relationship or contact with the occurrence or the parties, has the greatest concern with the specific issue raised in the litigation."

The only parties involved on the issue now before us are Capital and Vickers.The only issue before us is whether or not Vickers shall be permitted to assert a right of contribution against Capital by way of cross claims or third party complaint.(We eliminate the issue raised by Vickers' claim for indemnity, for we find that under both Maryland and New York law the complaint in this case precludes the assertion of any right to indemnity.In other words both would preclude an alleged active tortfeasor to claim indemnity.Southern Md. Oil Co. v. Texas Co., 203 F.Supp. 449(1962);Baltimore & O. R. R. v. Howard County Com'rs, 113 Md. 404, 77 A. 930(1910);Bush Term. Bldgs. v. Luckenbach S. S. Co., 9 N.Y.2d 426, 214 N.Y.S.2d 428, 174 N.E.2d 516(1961);Dick v. Sunbright Steam Laundry Corp., 307 N.Y. 422, 121 N.E.2d 399(1954).)

Maryland can claim at most two contacts with this case; the plane crashed there and these actions were commenced under the Maryland death statute.Perhaps as the place of the tort it has an interest in the issue of liability as it might exist between these defendants and the plaintiffs for on that issue conduct within its borders might come to light.Cf.Babcock v. Jackson, supra, 12 N.Y.2d at p. 483, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 191 N.E.2d 279.Even this is doubtful, however, since any acts or omissions alleged to constitute negligence in this case more than likely would have occurred beyond the borders of Maryland.

Be that as it may, we find that Maryland's contacts with these defendants are nil and its contacts with the occurrence afford no basis of interest in the instant problem between them.

Perhaps we need go no further for by eliminating Maryland we are impliedly saying that the choice of law must be New York, and this without discussing its contacts with the occurrence and with the parties.We would note, however, that its...