State of Maryland v. Chapman

Decision Date08 June 1951
Docket NumberCr. A. 22145,22146,22147.
Citation101 F. Supp. 335
PartiesSTATE OF MARYLAND v. CHAPMAN (three cases).
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Maryland

Carlyle J. Lancaster, State's Atty. for Prince George's County, Upper Marlboro, Md., for State of Maryland for plaintiff.

Bernard J. Flynn, U. S. Atty. and Frederick J. Green, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., Baltimore, Md., for defendant.

CHESNUT, District Judge.

These three cases, by agreement tried concurrently, present a very unusual set of facts resulting in the unintentional death of two small children and one adult who were occupants of a house in a settlement known as Morningside, just north of the United States Air Force Base known as Andrews Field, situated in Prince George's County, Maryland, about four miles distant from the District of Columbia Line. The deaths of these three persons resulted from the abandonment of a B-25 type of aircraft belonging to the United States Government and stationed at Andrews Field. The pilot of the plane was Captain Paul V. Chapman, a regular officer of the United States Air Force and an experienced pilot with prior service of about 1,700 hours of flying time and who had been for some years past actively engaged as an officer of the Air Force. The Grand Jury of Prince George's County indicted Captain Chapman in the three separate cases for manslaughter. Under the applicable federal statute the cases were removed to this court for trial, on the ground that the acts performed by the defendant were in the course of his official duties as a federal officer. There has been no question raised as to the propriety of this removal of the cases. They have been tried without a jury by the request of the defendant, concurred in by counsel for both parties.

In a removal case of this nature the substantive law of the State of Maryland must be applied by the court. The procedure, however, is in accordance with federal rules. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure contemplate that in a case tried by the court without a jury, the court may make a general finding only or in addition, find special facts. Rule 23(c), 18 U.S.C.A. As the case is of an unusual nature, I think it desirable to state concisely the main facts established by the evidence. There is practically no controversy as to any of the facts. The question in the case is whether the facts establish a case of manslaughter.

Andrews Field was established by the United States during the last war, after condemnation of the land in Prince George's County. Since then, and possibly as a result of activities at the Air Base, a considerable residential settlement has grown up just north of the Field, consisting of nearly 400 separate houses with a population of about 1,800.

The B-25 involved in this case had been stationed at Andrews Field for a year or more prior to the occurrence of the events on April 8, 1951, which are the subject of this case. It was a bomber type of plane which had recently been in use for continued training flights by officers of the Army, mostly stationed in the Pentagon Building in or near Washington, D. C. The day before April 8, 1951, a mechanical defect had been noticed with respect to the operation of the landing gear of this plane. The landing gear consisted of two wheels at the rear of the plane and one front wheel, constituting what is called a tricycle formation arrangement. As is well known, as soon as the airplane takes off and is air borne, these wheels are retracted upwards into the body of the plane and when the plane alights they are released to form a cushion for the landing. They are actuated by cylinders which are operated with hydraulic fluid. A mechanic repaired the landing gear equipment on Saturday, April 7, and in accordance with usual practice before it was released for general flight it was necessary to ascertain by a test flight if it was in operating condition. Such a test flight for this plane was authorized in writing on April 8. Capt. Sander, an experienced pilot with 2,000 hours of flying time, was directed to make the test flight. The regulations provided that he be accompanied by a co-pilot and an engineer. On request, Capt. Chapman, who was available at the time, was asked to and agreed to make the test flight for this particular plane and two other planes which were to be tested.

On inspecting the B-25 prior to the test flight some further difficulty was noticed with respect to the operation of the landing gear. A mechanic was called to make the necessary adjustment and in the meantime Sander and Chapman and the engineer tested and found satisfactory another plane. On returning to the B-25, inspection indicated that the adjustment had been satisfactorily made. They immediately proceeded to test it. Capt. Sander suggested to Capt. Chapman that as the latter was in a measure voluntarily assuming extra duty he might prefer to act as pilot and get the credit for additional flying time, and Chapman so agreed and did act as pilot on the test flight. Almost immediately after the plane was airborne it was noticed that the landing gear did not properly retract and release. This fact was at once communicated by radio-telephone to the officer on duty in the Control Tower at the Field. He advised trying various customary procedures to overcome the difficulty. These were unsuccessful and later the Control Tower advised the plane to try so-called "violent" maneuvers, which also proved unsuccessful, but resulted in shaking down the left wheel to the landing position but causing it to be locked in that position so that it could not be again retracted; while the right wheel was only half released and could not be either retracted or fully lowered; nor could the front wheel be released. This condition of the two rear wheels was observed by the pilot and co-pilot on their respective sides of the plane. They concluded that the trouble was with loss or non-functioning of hydraulic fluid. The Control Tower then ordered another plane to attempt to lower a can of needed hydraulic fluid. This very difficult maneuver was unsuccessful because the rope first used was too short. The second attempt with a longer rope was later tried also unsuccessfully.

The test flight had begun at 11 A. M., and these various maneuvers had occupied several hours. In the meantime the plane had been flown over and several miles away from the Field. Chapman and Sander discussed various possibilities which the situation presented. They were in almost constant radio contact with the Tower. The latter suggested that a crash landing might be possible but both Chapman and Sander concluded on their best judgment, with their immediate knowledge of the condition of the landing gear, that this would be very hazardous. The Tower's suggestion that a crash landing might be feasible was apparently based on the supposition that the pilots were provided with shoulder harnesses, which however, they did not have. Both pilots testified that in the condition of the landing gear a crash landing would be extremely dangerous to all three occupants of the plane and likely fatal to one or more of them.

Information that a plane in the air was in serious trouble soon became known to other superior officers of the Air Force at Andrews Field and six of them assembled in the Tower and after consultation directed replies and advice to be given from time to time to the plane. It is recognized that the ultimate responsibility for final action rests with the pilot of the plane, but advice from the Tower is naturally carefully heeded and considered by the pilot.

At 3:45 P. M., the plane was near Annapolis, about 30 miles from Andrews Field, and the gas supply was running low. The pilots had lost nearly all hope of repairing the landing gear and decided to return to the Field for further instructions. On nearing the Field and coming into radio contact with the Tower the recorded messages between the Tower and the plane were as follows: The plane said: "We are five miles north of ADW (Andrews Field), 2300 feet, we are now attempting to force some gasoline into the hydraulic system in a final effort to get this gear down. We plan to abandon the aircraft, request you figure out a proper heading so that we will miss the populated area."

Tower — "ADW tower advises that after you make a final attempt to...

To continue reading

Request your trial
23 cases
  • Pagotto v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • July 7, 1999
    ...sufficient to support a finding of simple negligence is not of itself sufficient to support a manslaughter verdict: In State of Maryland v. Chapman, 101 F.Supp. 335, Judge Chesnut in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, declared that proof of simple negligence will......
  • State v. Pagotto
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • November 16, 2000
    ...to `wanton or reckless disregard for human life.'" Duren v. State, 203 Md. 584, 589, 102 A.2d 277, 280 (1954) (quoting Maryland v. Chapman, 101 F.Supp. 335, 341 (1951)). See Albrecht, 336 Md. at 500,649 A.2d at 348. As such, we must determine if the State produced sufficient evidence from w......
  • Nero v. Mosby, CIVIL ACTION NO. MJG–16–1288
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Maryland
    • January 27, 2017
    ...life." State v. Gibson , 4 Md.App. 236, 242 A.2d 575, 579 (1968), aff'd , 254 Md. 399, 254 A.2d 691 (1969) (citing State of Maryland v. Chapman , 101 F.Supp. 335 (D. Md. 1951) ). The Application assertion central to the involuntary manslaughter charges, as well as the misconduct in office c......
  • Tolen v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • August 28, 2019
    ...a conviction must be gross or criminal, viz., such as manifests a wanton or reckless disregard of human life. State of Maryland v. Chapman, 101 F.Supp. 335 (D.C.Md.[1961]) ; Palmer v. State, 223 Md. 341, 164 A.2d 467 [ (1960) ]; C[r]aig v. State, 220 Md. 590, 155 A.2d 684 (1959) ; Chase v. ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT