State Of Md. v. Prue
Decision Date | 08 June 2010 |
Docket Number | 2009.,No. 21,21 |
Parties | STATE of Marylandv.Andre Lynn PRUE. |
Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Sharon Stanley Street, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Douglas F. Gansler, Atty. Gen. of Maryland, of Baltimore, MD), on brief, for petitioner.
Kellie M. Black, Asst. Public Defender (Elizabeth L. Julian, Acting Public Defender, of Baltimore, MD), on brief, for respondent.
Argued before BELL, C.J., HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, GREENE, MURPHY, ADKINS and JOHN C. ELDRIDGE (Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ.
The controversy before the Court in this criminal case arises because the trial judge, as the trier of facts, failed to announce verdicts on six counts of the nine-count indictment against the respondent, Andre Lynn Prue. The Court of Special Appeals held that the trial judge's silence amounted to acquittals on the six counts. This Court granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari which challenged that holding by the Court of Special Appeals.
The facts pertinent to the issue before us are as follows. The respondent Andre Lynn Prue and his girlfriend, Barbara Kidd, were riding on a motorcycle on Smallwood Drive in Waldorf, Maryland. The trial judge, at the conclusion of Prue's nonjury trial, found as a fact that Prue and Kidd were jointly operating the motorcycle when it careened into the guardrail and curb of a bridge on Smallwood Drive. Kidd was killed and Prue was severely injured.
Prue was charged, in the Circuit Court for Charles County, with the following nine offenses: vehicular manslaughter (count 1), vehicular homicide while under the influence of alcohol per se (count 2), vehicular homicide while under the influence of alcohol (count 3), vehicular homicide while impaired by alcohol (count 4), driving while under the influence of alcohol per se (count 5), driving while under the influence of alcohol (count 6), driving while impaired by alcohol (count 7), reckless driving (count 8), and possession of marijuana (count 9). Prue waived his right to a jury trial, and his nonjury trial in the Circuit Court for Charles County took place over several days in March 2007.
On the last day of the trial, prior to closing arguments, the prosecuting attorney raised with the trial judge an issue concerning the possible merger of certain charges, stating:
The prosecuting attorney then proceeded to review the evidence relating to the marijuana charge. While the attorney for the State was concluding his review of this evidence, the court interrupted him and asked whether count 2, vehicular homicide while under the influence of alcohol per se, would merge into count 1, the manslaughter charge. The record reflects the following exchange:
The attorney for the State then continued his review of the evidence, pointing out that the defendant had admitted to drinking alcohol on the night of the accident. Defense counsel made no comment regarding the possible merger of charges.
Following closing arguments by both the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel, the trial judge rendered findings of fact on the contested factual issues. The judge ultimately concluded that Prue's “conduct evidence[d] a wanton or reckless disregard for human life.”
The trial judge then announced the verdicts as follows:
There were no verdicts announced with respect to counts 3 through 8. Although the transcript does not reflect any mention of counts 3 through 8 by the trial judge during his rendition of the verdicts or thereafter during the final day of the trial, the docket entry for that day of the trial reads (corrected for typographical errors):
On May 11, 2007, Prue was sentenced on count 1 to ten years in prison with all but four years suspended. On count 2, charging vehicular homicide while under the influence of alcohol per se, Prue was sentenced to serve two years incarceration concurrent with the sentence on count 1. Finally, he received a suspended sentence on count 9, the possession of marijuana charge. Prue was also ordered to serve four years of supervised probation upon his release from prison.
Prue noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, arguing that, because the trial court did not render verdicts on counts 3 through 8, the docket entries should be corrected to reflect an acquittal on those charges. Prue also argued that the trial court erred by imposing separate sentences for vehicular manslaughter (count 1), and vehicular homicide while under the influence of alcohol per se (count 2). He further contended that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions.
In an unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals rejected Prue's claim that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, but agreed with Prue's two other allegations of error. The Court of Special Appeals held that the trial judge's silence on counts 3 through 8 amounted to acquittals on those counts and ordered that the docket entries be corrected to reflect this. The intermediate appellate court also held that the two-year sentence on count 2 should have merged into the ten-year sentence for vehicular manslaughter. Accordingly, the Court of Special Appeals vacated the sentence on count 2.
The State petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari, challenging the Court of Special Appeals' holding that the trial court's silence on counts 3 through 8 constituted an acquittal on each of those counts. The State did not challenge the Court of Special Appeals' decision with regard to count 2, and Prue did not file a cross-petition for a writ of certiorari. This Court granted the State's petition. State v. Andre Lynn Prue, 407 Md. 529, 967 A.2d 182 (2009).
The Court of Special Appeals and both parties in this Court correctly viewed this case as one where the trier of facts failed to render verdicts on counts 3 through 8. Where the trier of facts in a criminal case fails to render verdicts on certain counts, Maryland law is firmly settled. Unless one of a few well-established exceptions apply, when rendering verdicts in a multicount charging document, silence by a trial judge or jury on one count is equivalent to an acquittal on that count.
Initially under Maryland law, when the trier of facts rendered a guilty verdict on one or more counts of a multicount indictment but failed to render a verdict on one or more other counts in the same indictment the action by the trier of facts was treated as a complete nullity as to all of the counts, and the defendant could be tried again on all of the counts in the indictment. Thus, in The State v. Sutton, 4 Gill. 494 (1846), involving a two-count indictment, the jury found the defendant guilty on one count but omitted to render a verdict on the other count. This Court, in deciding that the action of the jury was a nullity but that the defendant could be retried on both counts, held as follows (4 Gill. at 497-498):
State v. Flannigan, 6 Md. 167, 171-172 (1854).
The holding in The State v. Sutton, supra, remained the law of Maryland for more than 50 years. In Hechter v. State, 94 Md. 429, 442, 50 A. 1041, 1043 (1902), however, this Court overruled Sutton and held that silence by the trier of facts on some counts, when the formal verdicts are rendered,...
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