State Of Md. v. Hardy.
| Decision Date | 19 October 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 148, Sept. Term, 2009.,148, Sept. Term, 2009. |
| Citation | 4 A.3d 908,415 Md. 612 |
| Parties | STATE of Maryland v. Wilbert HARDY. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Cathleen C. Brockmeyer, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Douglas F. Gansler, Atty. Gen. of Maryland, of Baltimore, MD), on brief, for Petitioner.
Brian M. Saccenti, Asst. Public Defender (Paul B. DeWolfe, Public Defender, of Baltimore, MD), on brief, for Respondent.
Argued before BELL, C.J., HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, GREENE, MURPHY, ADKINS and BARBERA, JJ.
During the jury voir dire stage of his trial in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City on charges, among others, of carjacking, robbery, first degree assault, and reckless endangerment, Respondent, Wilbert Hardy, informed the judge that he was “thinking about changing [his] attorney or something.”
Hardy explained the reasons underlying his dissatisfaction with his trial counsel. The court remonstrated that Hardy discharging his present counsel might prove deleterious to his defense. In response, Hardy abandoned any initiative to change his trial counsel and the trial continued, resulting in convictions on the above charges. Upon appellate review, we are asked to determine whether Hardy's statement that he was “ thinking about changing [his] attorney or something” qualified as a request to discharge counsel under Maryland law and rules and, if so, whether the trial court addressed properly the request. For reasons we shall explain, we hold that: (1) Hardy's statement constituted a request to discharge defense counsel; (2) Maryland Rule 4-215(e), 1 which dictates the procedure a trial court must follow in response to a request to discharge counsel, does not apply after voir dire begins; and, (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in how it addressed Hardy's request to discharge his counsel during trial. As such, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals that held, in pertinent part, to the contrary.
On 19 February 2006, around 1:30 a.m., an officer of the Baltimore City Police Department discovered Emmitt Camm leaning against a gas station pump in the 2500 block of Liberty Heights Avenue in Baltimore. Camm appeared to have been beaten severely. Paramedics transported him to Sinai Hospital for treatment. Camm informed police that he had been driving his Ford Explorer when two men, one of whom he identified as an acquaintance, “Will,” stopped him and asked for a ride. At some point during their travels thereafter, the men told Camm to pull over. Camm stopped the car and stepped out, at which time the men advanced on him and demanded his “property.” The men threatened Camm with a knife, beat him, and threw him into the trunk of his car. Camm “got out somehow” and stumbled to the gas station where the police found him. All in all, the men stole Camm's wallet, cell phone, car keys, and vehicle. Approximately a month after the attack, Camm identified from a police photo array “Will” as the Respondent, Wilbert Hardy. Police arrested Hardy on 20 June 2006.
At the outset of Hardy's trial in the Circuit Court on 19 March 2007, immediately prior to the colloquy at issue in this appeal, the court swore the venire panel, introduced the factual allegations of the case to the venire, and proceeded to ask the venirepersons several questions and receive their responses. The court then asked counsel and Hardy to approach the bench to discuss further voir dire inquiries. At the bench, the following exchange commenced the colloquy that we consider pointedly in this case:
(Emphasis added.)
The judge revisited the matter of Hardy's earlier expressed dissatisfaction with his defense counsel at the close of voir dire. The court asked counsel and Hardy to approach the bench to note any exceptions to the voir dire questions it had asked. After he gave the lawyers the opportunity to note these exceptions, the judge addressed Hardy:
Hardy did not make any further statements during trial bearing on dissatisfaction with or discharging his counsel. The jury convicted Hardy on the specific counts mentioned at the outset of this opinion. 4
After he was sentenced, Hardy noted timely an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, in which he alleged that four errors in the proceedings before the Circuit Court merited reversal of his convictions. 5 In an unreported opinion, the intermediate appellate court reversed Hardy's convictions and remanded the case to the Circuit Court for a new trial, holding that the trial court, in addressing Hardy's concerns regarding his trial counsel, failed to adhere to the mandatory procedures for consideration of requests to discharge counsel contained in Rule 4-215(e). 6
The State filed timely a petition for writ of certiorari, which we granted, 411 Md. 740, 985 A.2d 538 (2009), to consider the following issues: (1) whether Hardy's statement that he was “thinking about changing the attorney or something” qualified as a request to discharge his counsel, (2) if so, whether Rule 4-215(e) applies to such requests after voir dire begins, and (3) if Rule 4-215(e) applies, whether the trial court's colloquy with Hardy complied with the Rule's mandates.
When applicable, Rule 4-215(e) demands strict compliance. “The provisions of the rule are mandatory” and a trial court's departure from them constitutes reversible error. Williams v. State, 321 Md. 266, 272, 582 A.2d 803, 806 (1990). Where a motion to discharge counsel is made during trial, however, Rule 4-215(e) does not apply, and we evaluate the trial court's ruling on a motion to discharge counsel under the far more lenient abuse of discretion standard. State v. Brown (hereinafter “ Brown ”), 342 Md. 404, 429, 676 A.2d 513, 525 (1996). We have noted that a court abuses its discretion in this regard only when it acts “ ‘without reference to any guiding rules or principles,’ ” Brown v. State, 373 Md. 234, 250, 817 A.2d 241, 250 (2003) (quoting In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 347 Md. 295, 312, 701 A.2d 110, 118 (1997)), 7 and that we find an abuse of discretion only when the court's act is so untenable as to place it “ ‘beyond the fringe of what the court deems minimally acceptable,’ ” Brown v. State, 373 Md. at 250, 817 A.2d at 250 (quoting North v. North, 102 Md.App. 1, 14, 648 A.2d 1025,...
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