State Of Md. v. Jerme. Carroll Camper
| Decision Date | 15 July 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 82,2008.,82 |
| Parties | STATE of Marylandv.Jermaine Carroll CAMPER. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Cathleen C. Brockmeyer, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Douglas F. Gansler, Atty. Gen. of Maryland, and Gary E. O'Connor, Asst. Atty. Gen., of Baltimore, MD), on brief, for petitioner.
Amy E. Brennan, Asst. Public Defender (Nancy S. Forster, Public Defender, of Baltimore, MD), on brief, for respondent.
Argued before BELL, C.J., HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, GREENE, MURPHY, ADKINS and BARBERA, JJ.
Respondent Jermaine Carroll Camper was tried before a jury in the Circuit Court for Talbot County and convicted of the charges of attempted distribution of cocaine and conspiracy to distribute cocaine. Respondent represented himself at trial, following the court's pretrial ruling, pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-215(d), that he had waived his right to counsel by inaction. Because Respondent had a prior conviction of a drug offense, the trial court sentenced him to a mandatory ten years' imprisonment without the possibility of parole, pursuant to Maryland Code (2002, 2008 Cum.Supp.), § 5-609 of the Criminal Law Article.1
On appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, Respondent argued, among other claims, that, before ruling that he had waived his right to counsel, the Circuit Court did not comply with the requirement of Rule 4-215(d) that the court first ensure the defendant has been informed of, among other matters, “the nature of the charges in the charging document, and the allowable penalties, including mandatory penalties, if any.” 2 See Rule 4-215(d); (a)(3). Respondent argued in particular that the Circuit Court was required but failed to inform him that, if he were a subsequent offender, and if he were convicted of either pending drug charge, then he might face a mandatory ten-year sentence without possibility of parole.
The Court of Special Appeals, in an unreported opinion, agreed with Respondent. That court, applying Knox v. State, 404 Md. 76, 78, 945 A.2d 638, 639 (2008), concluded that the Circuit Court was required to, but did not, inform Respondent as part of the Rule 4-215(a) colloquy that he might face subsequent offender penalties. The Court of Special Appeals held that a trial court's failure to comply strictly with the Rule 4-215(a) requirements “can never be deemed harmless error.” Consequently, the court reversed the convictions and remanded the case for a new trial.
We granted the State's petition for certiorari to consider whether the trial court's error in failing to advise Respondent under Rule 4-215(a)(3) was harmless error because Respondent had actual knowledge of the information that must be disclosed pursuant to that provision of the Rule. Like the Court of Special Appeals, we reject the State's harmless error argument. We therefore affirm the judgment of that court.
Respondent was charged on March 29, 2006, in the District Court of Maryland sitting in Talbot County, with one count each of attempted distribution of cocaine and conspiracy to distribute cocaine. Respondent demanded a jury trial, and the case was transferred to the Circuit Court for Talbot County. 3
Respondent first appeared in the Circuit Court on June 7, 2006, without an attorney. At that time, the court ascertained that Respondent had a copy of the charging document. The court explained the charges, stating: “[T]hese are serious charges as you can see, 20 years and $25,000.” The court did not inform Respondent that he could be subject to a mandatory minimum sentence if he were convicted of either charge and the State were to seek an enhanced sentence. The court, however, informed Respondent of his right to representation by an attorney and the benefits of retaining one. In addition, the court stated: “[I]f you appear for the hearing, the next hearing or trial without a lawyer I can determine that you have waived your right to a lawyer.” The court further informed Respondent that, if he could not afford an attorney, he could apply for representation through the Office of the Public Defender.
On July 28, 2006, at another pretrial hearing, Respondent appeared without counsel and acknowledged that he had not contacted an attorney to represent him. The prosecutor informed the court that Respondent was due in court the following week in a different matter, in which he was represented by a public defender. The prosecutor suggested postponing the case to give Respondent a chance to confer with that public defender regarding the present case. The court agreed to reschedule the hearing and again advised Respondent that he should obtain a lawyer to represent him in the present case.
The court reset the pretrial hearing for August 11, 2006. Respondent did not appear at that hearing. The court then reset the hearing for September 15, 2006.
Respondent appeared without counsel at the September 15 hearing, evidently pursuant to a bench warrant. He informed the court that he had spoken with the attorney who was representing him in the other matter. According to Respondent, that attorney suggested the possibility of a plea bargain in the present case, which Respondent was not willing to accept. The court re-advised Respondent of the maximum penalties he faced on the charges, but, as before, did not inform him of the sentence enhancement he might face upon conviction. The court again encouraged Respondent to obtain counsel, directed him to the Office of the Public Defender, and admonished him that, “if you come in at that trial without a lawyer, I'm going to determine that you waived your right to a lawyer and we're going to go forward with the trial.” The court released Respondent from custody on the requirement that he go to the Office of the Public Defender and make an appointment to obtain counsel.
A fourth hearing was held on October 6, 2006.4 At that time, the court asked Respondent about his efforts to obtain counsel. Respondent explained that he had sustained a foot injury that made it difficult for him to get around but he had seen a private attorney whom he hoped to retain to handle the case. Respondent added that, although he had not seen the public defender, he definitely wanted an attorney to represent him in this case.
Evidently referring to Maryland's so-called Hicks rule,5 the State noted that the case must be tried by early December. The State agreed to one more postponement of the pretrial hearing. The court warned Respondent that, if he appeared at the next hearing without an attorney, he might well be given a trial date. The court then informed Respondent that, under those circumstances, he would be going to trial with or without a lawyer. The court further informed Respondent that, if he went immediately to the Office of the Public Defender, he could probably obtain an attorney to represent him at trial. The court reset the pretrial hearing for October 13, 2006.
On that date, Respondent appeared without counsel. The court asked Respondent why he was not represented. Respondent explained that he did not have an attorney but was ready to go forward with trial because he had been given ample time to get one. Respondent added: “I know the serious double charges and you have definitely been fair with me and gave me ample time to get” an attorney. The court referred Respondent to the telephone book to find a private attorney, or to the Public Defender's office if he could not afford one. As was done in the past, the court gave Respondent an advice form, which included advice to retain a lawyer and the address of the Office of the Public Defender. The court set the trial date for November 13, 2006, and advised Respondent that, if he came to court without a lawyer on the trial date, the court could find that he had waived his right to counsel.
For some reason not made clear in the record, the trial date was moved to November 20, 2006. Respondent appeared in court on that date, without counsel. In response to the court's inquiry, Respondent stated that he could not afford an attorney and that the public defender had urged him to plead guilty. Respondent explained that he originally turned down the services of a public defender because he “didn't think that the public defender was going to represent [him] at his best ability.” He changed his mind, however, and returned to the Office of the Public Defender two weeks before trial. By that time, however, it was too late to obtain representation.
After listening to Respondent, the court stated: “And I take it you're prepared to go forward with a jury trial today?” To that, Respondent answered, “Well, I have no choice, because you told me, you know, when I came back, you know, I have no choice but to go with it cause you told me when I came back that I needed to be prepared to go forward.” The court then reviewed for the record all of Respondent's appearances without counsel and the advice the court had given Respondent at each of those appearances concerning the importance of obtaining an attorney. The court found that Respondent did not have a meritorious reason for appearing without a lawyer, and that he therefore had waived his right to counsel by inaction.
Trial commenced soon thereafter. Trial concluded later that day, upon the jury's return of a verdict finding Respondent guilty of the charged offenses.
Respondent was represented by a public defender at sentencing, which occurred on January 19, 2007. The State directed the court to the presentence investigation reflecting that Respondent had a prior distribution conviction from Queen Anne's County. The parties and the court then discussed the State's intention to seek an enhanced sentence. The State recalled that, just before the start of trial, and after the court found that Respondent had waived his right to counsel by inaction, the State and Respondent had discussed a plea. The State recounted that discussion for the court:
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