State of Michigan v. Morton Salt Company
| Decision Date | 11 August 1966 |
| Docket Number | and 4-66-Civ. 138.,No. 4-64-Civ. 423,4-65-Civ. 1,4-65-Civ. 398 to 4-65-Civ. 400,4-66-Civ. 17,4-65-Civ. 197,4-65-Civ. 402,4-65-Civ. 388,4-66-Civ. 69,4-64-Civ. 422,4-64-Civ. 423 |
| Parties | STATE OF MICHIGAN and all Related Cases Pending in the District of Minnesota, Fourth Division, Plaintiffs, v. MORTON SALT COMPANY et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
Frank J. Kelly, Atty. Gen., Maxine Boord Virtue, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lansing, Mich., Robert A. Albrecht and Faricy, Moore, Costello & Hart, St. Paul, Minn., for plaintiff State of Michigan .
Robert W. Mattson, Atty. Gen., and Kenneth J. Fitzpatrick, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, Minn., for plaintiffs in State of Minnesota case (Raymond M. Lazar, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, Minn., on the brief).
Bronson C. La Follette, Atty. Gen., George F. Sieker, Asst. Atty. Gen., and James D. Jeffries, Asst. Atty. Gen., Madison, Wis., for plaintiffs in State of Wisconsin case.
Lawrence F. Scalise, Atty. Gen., Des Moines, Iowa, William E. Mullin and
Mullin, Galinson & Swirnoff, Minneapolis, Minn., for plaintiffs in State of Iowa case (Nolden Gentry, Asst. Atty. Gen., Verne C. Lawyer, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Des Moines, Iowa, and Raymond T. Walton, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Iowa State Highway Comm'n, Ames, Iowa, on the brief; Douglas E. Miller, Asst. Atty. Gen., Iowa State Highway Comm'n, Ames, Iowa, of counsel).
Charles S. Rhyne, Brice W. Rhyne, Anthony L. Joseph and Rhyne & Rhyne, Washington, D. C., for plaintiff City of Milwaukee (John J. Fleming, City Atty., Milwaukee and Ray T. McCann, Milwaukee, Wis., on the brief; Maslon, Kaplan, Edelman, Joseph & Borman, Minneapolis, Minn., of counsel).
Robert L. Hyder, Chief Counsel, and Robert R. Northcutt, Asst. Counsel, Missouri State Highway Comm'n, Jefferson City, Mo., for plaintiff Missouri State Highway Comm'n.
William G. Clark, Atty. Gen., Lee A. Freeman, John Borst, Jr., Sp. Asst. Attys. Gen., and McConnell, Freeman, Curtis & McConnell, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff State of Illinois.
Lee A. Freeman, John Borst, Jr., and McConnell, Freeman, Curtis & McConnell, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff Chicago Transit Authority.
John J. Dillon, Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, Ind., Lee A. Freeman, John Borst, Jr., and McConnell, Freeman, Curtis & McConnell, Chicago, Ill., William M. Osborn and Bingham, Summers, Welsh & Spilman, Indianapolis, Ind., for plaintiff State of Indiana.
Philip E. Byron, Jr., General Counsel, Indiana Toll Road Comm'n, Elkhart, Ind., and Lee A. Freeman, John Borst, Jr., and McConnell, Freeman, Curtis & McConnell, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff Indiana Toll Road Commission.
Lee A. Freeman, John Borst, Jr., and McConnell, Freeman, Curtis & McConnell, Chicago, Ill., William M. Osborn, Bingham, Summers, Welsh & Spilman, Indianapolis, Ind., for plaintiffs in Indianapolis case.
Daniel P. Ward, Cook County State's Atty., Edward J. Hladis, Chief of Civil Division, Ronald W. Olson and Bergstrom, Brizius & Olson, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff Cook County (Ronald Butler and Thomas A. Hett, Asst. State's Attys., Chicago, Ill., of counsel).
John M. Palmer and Levitt, Palmer, Bowen & Bearmon, Minneapolis, Minn., Colvin A. Peterson, Jr., and Watson, Ess, Marshall & Enggas, Kansas City, Mo., for defendant American Salt Co.
Benedict S. Deinard, Allen I. Saeks and Leonard, Street & Deinard, Minneapolis, Minn., Frank S. Hodge and Hodge, Jones & Reynolds, Hutchinson, Kan., for defendant Barton Salt Co.
Benedict S. Deinard, Allen I. Saeks and Leonard, Street & Deinard, Minneapolis, Minn., F. William McCalpin and Lewis, Rice, Tucker, Allen & Chubb, St. Louis, Mo., for defendant Hardy Salt Co.
Erwin C. Heininger, Thomas B. McNeill, John E. Allen and Mayer, Friedlich, Spiess, Tierney, Brown & Platt, Chicago, Ill., Peter Dorsey, Craig Beck and Dorsey, Owen, Marquart, Windhorst & West, Minneapolis, Minn., for defendants Cargill, Inc., and Cargo Carriers.
James P. Brody and Foley, Sammond & Lardner, Milwaukee, Wis., Ralph H. Neimeyer and Reavill, Neimeyer, Johnson & Killen, Duluth, Minn., for defendant Cutler-Magner Co.
William B. Swearer and Martindell, Carey, Hunter & Dunn, Hutchinson, Kan., Norman R. Carpenter and Faegre & Benson, Minneapolis, Minn., for defendant Carey Salt Co.
Fred W. Freeman and Dickinson, Wright, McKean & Cudlip, Detroit, Mich., Robert E. Bowen and Bowen, Preus, Farrell & Adams, Minneapolis, Minn., for defendant Diamond Crystal Salt Co.
John P. Ryan, Jr., and McBride, Baker, Wienke & Schlosser, Chicago, Ill., Robert B. Hawkins and Oppenheimer, Hodgson, Brown, Wolff & Leach, St. Paul, Minn., for defendant Morton Salt Co. Richard W. Johnson, Lloyd Graven and Neville, Johnson & Thompson, Minneapolis, Minn., Howard F. Ordman and Putney, Twombly, Hall & Skidmore, New York City, Richard K. Decker and Lord, Bissell & Brook, Chicago, Ill., for defendant International Salt Co.
In these consolidated treble damage antitrust actions this Court's Pretrial Order of November 23, 1965, directed the parties to brief and argue several questions concerning the application of § 5(b) of the Clayton Act. Plaintiffs herein include the States of Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri and Wisconsin and various governmental units within these States, and in the Milwaukee class action governmental units from other States. Defendants are companies engaged in some aspect of the salt industry. They are American, Barton, Carey, Cargill, Cargo Carriers, Cutler-Magner, Diamond Crystal, Hardy, International and Morton.1 These actions stem from criminal and civil antitrust proceedings by the United States against Carey, Diamond, International, and Morton Salt Companies. The Government action was based on an alleged conspiracy among the four named defendants, with other alleged coconspirators, to fix prices of rock salt sold to various State and local governmental entities for de-icing purposes.
Under § 5(b) of the Clayton Act, a government antitrust proceeding serves to toll the statute of limitations on private treble damage suits.1a As originally enacted in 1914, § 5(b) was part of a broader § 5 which included the present § 5(a). The latter allows a final judgment or decree against a defendant in a Government proceeding to be used as prima facie evidence in a private treble damage suit.2 Before the 1955 amendments which segregated the prima facie provision from the tolling provision into subheadings (a) and (b), there was no Federal statute of limitations applicable to private antitrust actions. Congress, in 1955, amended the Clayton Act to provide, in § 4B, a four year limitations period.3 In addition, the tolling section was amended to extend the period of suspension for one year following the conclusion of the Government lawsuit. A further change in the tolling provision was the substitution of "civil or criminal proceeding" for the phrase "suit or proceeding in equity or criminal prosecution." Apart from these changes, the basic structure of § 5(b), and § 5(a), remained unaltered from the 1914 enactment. As the Supreme Court indicated in Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Company v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Company, 381 U.S. 311, 85 S.Ct. 1473, 14 L.Ed.2d 405 (1965) hereinafter cited as 3M, "* * * the record of the 1914 legislative proceedings reveals an almost complete absence of any discussion on the tolling problem." 381 U.S. at 321, 85 S.Ct. at 1478. However, the Court noted that one basic intent underlying the tolling provision is outstanding — "the clearly expressed desire that private parties be permitted the benefits of prior government actions." 381 U.S. at 320, 85 S.Ct. at 1478.
Many of the issues raised in the present proceeding are not readily resolved by the plain language of § 5(b), so this basic policy objective must be kept in mind in considering the following questions: (A) When did the Government proceeding commence; and (B) when did it terminate? (C) What defendants in the present actions are subject to the tolling of § 5(b); and (D) what plaintiffs are benefited by that provision? Finally, there is the question of (E) whether the present actions are based in whole or in part on any matter complained of in the Government action.
(A) Commencement of Government Action—
Suspension of the period of limitations under § 5(b) is inaugurated "Whenever any civil or criminal proceeding is instituted by the United States to prevent, restrain, or punish violations of any of the antitrust laws * * *." In early 1959 the Justice Department initiated an investigation of the salt industry and a grand jury empaneled in Springfield, Illinois, in May of that year did consider antitrust violations, as well as other matters. Apparently no formal action was taken by this jury before it was discharged. Subsequently, in February, 1960, another grand jury was convened in Springfield to investigate the salt industry, but no indictments were returned. Thereafter, in September, 1960, a third grand jury was convened in St. Paul, Minnesota. As a result of its investigation, indictments were filed on June 28, 1961, charging Morton, Diamond, International, and Carey Salt Companies with violations of the antitrust laws.
In the 3M case the Supreme Court was faced with the question of whether a proceeding by the Federal Trade Commission against a treble damage defendant served to toll the statute under § 5(b) to the same extent as judicial proceedings. Holding that the F. T. C. action did suspend the limitations period, the Court rejected defendant's argument that since the Commission's Order could have no prima facie effect...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Zenith Radio Corp v. Hazeltine Research, Inc
... ... See New Jersey v. Morton Salt Co., 387 F.2d 94 (CA3 1967); Vermont v. Cayuga Rock lt Co., 276 F.Supp. 970 (Me.1967); Michigan v. Morton Salt Co., 259 F.Supp. 35, 53—56 ... 595, 39 S.Ct. 136, 63 L.Ed. 438 (1919); 2361 State Corp. v. Sealy, Inc., 263 F.Supp. 845, 850 (ND Ill.1967) ... Corporation of America,' or "General Electric Company,' or "Western Electric Company.' 'This release may not be ... ...
-
Overseas Motors, Inc. v. Import Motors Limited, Inc.
... 375 F. Supp. 499 ... OVERSEAS MOTORS, INC., a Michigan corporation, Plaintiff, ... IMPORT MOTORS LIMITED, INC., a ... and distribution of NSU cars in a ten (later eleven) state area ... ANAU, a German corporation, is ... 15. The former NSU company could not dispose of distribution rights in the U.S.A. for ... 1966); Michigan v. Morton Salt Co., 259 F.Supp. 35 (D.Minn.1966), aff'd sub nom., ... ...
-
2361 State Corporation v. Sealy, Incorporated
... ... 2361 STATE CORPORATION, formerly known as A. Brandwein & Company, an Illinois corporation, Plaintiff, ... SEALY, INCORPORATED, Carl N ... Cf. State of Michigan v. Morton Salt Co., 259 F.Supp. 35 (D.Minn.1966) ... ...
-
United States v. American Radiator & Std. Sanitary Corp.
... ... Company, Universal-Rundle 288 F. Supp. 697 Corporation and ... State of Michigan v. Morton Salt Co., 259 F.Supp. 35 (D.C ... ...
-
Table of Cases
...U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103964 (D. Md. 2015), 40 Meyer v. Kalanick, 174 F. Supp. 3d 817 (S.D.N.Y. 2016), 47 , 194 Michigan v. Morton Salt Co. 259 F. Supp. 35 (D. Minn. 1966), aff’d sub nom. Hardy Salt Co. v. Illinois, 377 F.2d 768 (8th Cir. 1967), 128 Mid-South Grizzlies v. NFL, 720 F.2d 772 (3d C......
-
The Special Issues of Coconspirator Evidence and Parallel Government Enforcement
...second trial was a consent decree for purposes of Section 5(a) and not afforded prima facie effect), with Michigan v. Morton Salt Co. 259 F. Supp. 35, 64 (D. Minn. 1966), aff’d sub nom. Hardy Salt Co. v. Illinois, 377 F.2d 768 (8th Cir. 1967) (ruling that a nolo contendere plea entered afte......