State Of Minn. v. Morales

Decision Date23 September 2010
Docket NumberNo. A07-2401.,A07-2401.
Citation788 N.W.2d 737
PartiesSTATE of Minnesota, Appellant, v. Angel MORALES, Respondent.
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

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Syllabus by the Court

The use-immunity statute, Minn.Stat. § 609.09 (2008), is appropriately coextensive with the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and a witness with use immunity does not have a valid Fifth Amendment privilege to refuse to testify.

The framework outlined in State v. Mitchell, 268 Minn. 513, 130 N.W.2d 128 (1964), applies in cases in which the State calls a witness who refuses to testify, regardless of whether the refusal is based on a valid privilege.

The State did not call a witness in bad faith, even though the State knew with a high degree of certainty that the witness would refuse to testify, because the State may have had other reasons for calling the witness besides creating a prejudicial atmosphere.

The State's questioning of a witness who refused to testify was prejudicial because the State's questioning was extensive, fact-laden, and went to the substance of the charged offense, and additionally because the State impeached the witness with his prior testimony, thereby supplying the jury with particular incriminating inferences that were consistent with the State's theory of the case.

The State's questioning of a witness who refused to testify was prejudicial to the extent that it denied the defendant a fair trial and was therefore reversible error.

The district court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted three statements that referenced “another person” and may have thereby inculpated the defendant under the statement-against-interest exception to the hearsay rule, Minn. R. Evid. 804(b)(3) because a reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have made the statements if they were not true.

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, MN; and Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, David C. Brown, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, MN, for appellant.

David W. Merchant, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Benjamin J. Butler, Assistant State Public Defender, St. Paul, MN, for respondent.

OPINION

ANDERSON, PAUL H., Justice.

A Hennepin County jury found Angel Morales guilty of second-degree felony murder for the death of Victor Mesa-Ortiz during the commission of an aggravated robbery. The Hennepin County District Court convicted Morales of this crime and sentenced him to 150 months in prison. At trial, the State alleged that Morales's accomplice, Felipe Vega-Lara, shot and killed Mesa-Ortiz when Mesa-Ortiz resisted an attempt to rob him at gunpoint. The district court granted Vega-Lara use immunity, and the State called Vega-Lara to testify at Morales's trial even though Vega-Lara indicated that he planned to assert a Fifth Amendment privilege. Over Morales's objections, the court allowed the State to question Vega-Lara about the testimony Vega-Lara had provided at his own trial. The court also allowed the State to introduce out-of-court statements by Vega-Lara under the statement-against-interest exception to the hearsay rule.

Morales appealed his conviction, and the court of appeals held that the district court abused its discretion in (1) allowing the State to question Vega-Lara after he had asserted a Fifth Amendment privilege; (2) allowing the State to impeach Vega-Lara with his prior inconsistent statements; and (3) admitting some of Vega-Lara's out-of-court statements as statements against penal interest. After concluding that the errors were not harmless, the court of appeals reversed. We affirm the court of appeals in part and reverse in part.

Victor Mesa-Ortiz was killed on March 13, 2006, while working at a house of prostitution in South Minneapolis. The owner of the house operated the prostitution business, and Mesa-Ortiz was in charge of collecting money from customers and paying the prostitutes at the end of each week. On the day of Mesa-Ortiz's murder, C.M. and M.R., two prostitutes who worked at the house, and M.F., a man who lived there, were at the house with Mesa-Ortiz. That evening, three young men, including Felipe Vega-Lara and Tarun Solorzano-O'Brien, came to the house. The State alleges that the third man, who wore a brown hat with a brim, was the respondent, Angel Morales. After investigating Mesa-Ortiz's murder, the police arrested Vega-Lara and Morales. A Hennepin County grand jury indicted both Vega-Lara and Morales for first-degree felony murder in violation of Minn.Stat. §§ 609.185(a)(3) (2008) and 609.05 (2008). The trials were severed, and the State tried Vega-Lara first. See Minn.Stat. § 631.035, subd. 2 (2008); Minn. R.Crim. P. 17.03, subd. 2(1).

Vega-Lara's Trial

At Vega-Lara's trial, Vega-Lara testified about the robbery and murder. In his testimony, Vega-Lara implicated Morales as follows. On the evening of March 13, 2006, Vega-Lara, Solorzano-O'Brien, and Morales went to the house of prostitution in South Minneapolis. Vega-Lara claimed Morales wanted to rob the house of prostitution and had previously “thought up the mission.” Both Vega-Lara and Morales carried loaded guns when they entered the house. Morales sat on a couch in the corner of the living room while Vega-Lara and Solorzano-O'Brien spoke with Mesa-Ortiz. Vega-Lara paid Mesa-Ortiz money so that he and Solorzano-O'Brien could have sex with C.M. and M.R. Solorzano-O'Brien went into a bedroom with M.R., and Vega-Lara went into another bedroom with C.M.

After a period of time, Vega-Lara left the bedroom. Vega-Lara claimed that he then saw Morales attempting to rob Mesa-Ortiz at gun point, but Mesa-Ortiz resisted. As Mesa-Ortiz and Morales struggled over Morales's gun, Vega-Lara shot Mesa-Ortiz. Vega-Lara testified that he did not go to the house with the intent to kill Mesa-Ortiz.

The jury acquitted Vega-Lara of first-degree murder, but found him guilty of unintentional second-degree felony murder during the commission of an assault. The district court convicted him of that crime. Vega-Lara subsequently appealed his conviction to the court of appeals.

Morales's Trial

While Vega-Lara's appeal was pending, the State tried Morales for first-degree murder, Minn.Stat. § 609.185(a)(3), and three lesser-included offenses: intentional second-degree murder, Minn.Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(1) (2008); unintentional second-degree felony murder during the commission of an assault, Minn.Stat. § 609.19, subd. 2(1) (2008); and unintentional second-degree felony murder during an aggravated robbery, § 609.19, subd. 2(1). During Morales's trial, the State filed a motion under Minn.Stat. § 609.09 (2008), seeking to compel Vega-Lara-who was claiming a Fifth Amendment privilege-to testify under a grant of immunity.

Vega-Lara challenged the State's motion to compel him to testify. Vega-Lara claimed he could assert a valid Fifth Amendment privilege regardless of a grant of immunity because he had a legitimate “fear of a perjury prosecution arising out of a conflict between what he said in his own trial and what he may say at this trial.” The district court acknowledged that even with use immunity, Vega-Lara would be subject to a perjury prosecution if he lied at Morales's trial. Nonetheless, the court granted the State's motion to compel Vega-Lara to testify, explaining that if Vega-Lara was successful on his appeal and was retried, nothing that Vega-Lara said at Morales's trial could be used against him at the retrial. The court further explained that the State would be able to use Vega-Lara's testimony against him in a prosecution for perjury “only if [Vega-Lara] were to make a false statement under oath.”

At trial, the State called C.M., M.R., and M.F. to testify. Each witness testified that three men came to the house on March 13, 2006, and identified Vega-Lara and Solorzano-O'Brien as two of the three men who were present in the house when Mesa-Ortiz was killed. C.M. and M.R. described Vega-Lara as being very nervous, aggressive, bossy, and having a “strange” attitude. C.M. and M.R. described the third man as quiet, young, and wearing a hat low on his head. Neither C.M., M.R., nor M.F. identified Morales as the third man. 1

M.F. testified that after the three men arrived at the house, he left the kitchen where he had been preparing food to go to a grocery store. C.M. testified that she went into a bedroom with Vega-Lara and had sex for approximately five minutes, after which Vega-Lara asked to have sex again. C.M. told Vega-Lara he would have to pay again, and he then left the bedroom. At that time, C.M. noticed the third man was still sitting in the living room, but had moved to a different seat. C.M. also testified that shortly after Vega-Lara left the bedroom, she heard people struggling” in the dining room, and then “after awhile” she heard a gunshot. She then heard people “running, like people getting out.” Similarly, M.R. testified that she heard struggling and a gunshot while she was in the bedroom with Solorzano-O'Brien. After the gunshot, Solorzano-O'Brien ran out of the bedroom and M.R. hid in a closet. When C.M. and M.R. emerged from their respective bedrooms some time later, they did not see anyone else in the house. Because C.M. and M.R. did not witness the shooting, they did not know who shot Mesa-Ortiz or if the third man was involved in the shooting.

M.F. testified that when he returned to the house, another man had arrived at the house and discovered Mesa-Ortiz lying face down in the backyard. After trying to revive Mesa-Ortiz, M.F. and the other man put Mesa-Ortiz in a car and attempted to take him to a hospital. When they could not locate a hospital, they stopped and called the police. Police officers testified that when they arrived at the car, Mesa-Ortiz was dead and the front pockets of Mesa-Ortiz's pants were pulled out. An autopsy revealed that a gunshot wound to the chest caused Mesa-Ortiz's death, and...

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