State Of Minn. v. Al-naseer, No. A07-2275.

Decision Date16 September 2010
Docket NumberNo. A07-2275.
Citation788 N.W.2d 469
PartiesSTATE of Minnesota, Appellant, v. Mohammed Gazizamil AL-NASEER, Respondent.
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The heightened scrutiny applied to circumstantial evidence is not limited to cases in which every element required for conviction was proven entirely by circumstantial evidence. Instead, the heightened scrutiny applies to any disputed element of the conviction that is based on circumstantial evidence.

2. If from the circumstances proved it can reasonably be inferred that a driver did not know he had been in an accident with a person or another vehicle, the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction of criminal vehicular homicide (leaving the scene) under Minn.Stat. § 609.21, subd. 1(7) (2008).

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Tibor M. Gallo, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, MN; and Brian Melton, Clay County Attorney, Moorhead, MN, for appellant.

David W. Merchant, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Roy G. Spurbeck, Assistant State Public Defender, St. Paul, MN, for respondent.

OPINION

PAGE, Justice.

This case has a long and complicated procedural history. Respondent, Mohammed Gazizamil Al-Naseer, was initially charged with two counts of criminal vehicular homicide in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.21, subd. 1(1) (2006) (gross negligence), and Minn.Stat. § 609.21, subd. 1(7) (2006) (leaving the scene), as a result of a traffic accident that caused the death of Kane Thomson. A Clay County jury found Al-Naseer guilty on both counts and the district court subsequently convicted him of both counts, sentencing him to 48 months in prison. On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the gross-negligence conviction but reversed the leaving-the-scene conviction and remanded for a new trial, concluding that the district court incorrectly instructed the jury on the mens rea requirement. State v. Al-Naseer (Al-Naseer I), 678 N.W.2d 679, 694-97 (Minn.App.2004). After granting Al-Naseer's petition for review, we affirmed the court of appeals' leaving-the-scene decision but reversed the gross-negligence conviction because the district court failed to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of careless driving. State v. Al-Naseer (Al-Naseer II), 690 N.W.2d 744, 750, 753 (Minn.2005).

On remand, after a bench trial at which he waived his right to a jury trial and his right to testify, Al-Naseer was found guilty and convicted of both criminal vehicular homicide (leaving the scene) and careless driving, but found not guilty of criminal vehicular homicide (gross negligence). Al-Naseer again appealed to the court of appeals, which reversed the criminal vehicular homicide (leaving the scene) conviction and remanded for additional findings with respect to Al-Naseer's mens rea. State v. Al-Naseer (Al-Naseer III), 721 N.W.2d 623, 626 (Minn.App.2006). Both the State and Al-Naseer petitioned for review. We granted the State's petition but denied Al-Naseer's petition.

Ultimately, we held that in order for a defendant to be found guilty of criminal vehicular homicide (leaving the scene), the State is required to prove that the defendant knew he had been involved in an accident with a person or another vehicle. On that basis, we

affirm[ed] the reversal of Al-Naseer's conviction but remand[ed] to the district court to reconsider its verdict based on the present record and to make amended findings in light of the mens rea standard that requires proof that Al-Naseer knew that his vehicle was involved in an accident with a person or another vehicle.

State v. Al-Naseer (Al-Naseer IV), 734 N.W.2d 679, 688-89 (Minn.2007).

Before reconsidering its verdict on remand, the district court allowed the parties to submit briefs. In his brief, Al-Naseer argued that, in light of the new standard we articulated in Al-Naseer IV, he was entitled to a new trial because his constitutional rights to notice of the charges against him and a fair opportunity to defend against those charges would be violated if the court made amended factual findings based on the existing record. The district court refused to consider these arguments, concluding that it did not have the authority to alter our mandate on remand. Al-Naseer also argued that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. Specifically finding that Al-Naseer knew he had been involved in an accident with a person or another vehicle, the court again found Al-Naseer guilty of the leaving-the-scene and careless-driving offenses.

Al-Naseer again appealed his leaving-the-scene conviction, and while the court of appeals found that there was sufficient evidence to uphold the verdict, it also found that Al-Naseer was entitled to a new trial because his constitutional right to due process was violated by the district court's failure to conduct a new trial. State v. Al-Naseer ( Al-Naseer V ), No. 07-2275, 2009 WL 304738 (Minn.App.2009). The State petitioned for review, challenging the court of appeals' grant of a new trial based on the denial of due process, and Al-Naseer cross-petitioned, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. We granted both petitions, requiring us to determine: (1) whether Al-Naseer's conviction was supported by sufficient evidence; and (2) whether Al-Naseer's constitutional challenges were properly heard and correctly decided by the court of appeals. Without reaching Al-Naseer's constitutional challenges, we reverse.

The facts of this case are largely undisputed and are set forth in detail in Al-Naseer II and Al-Naseer IV, and will not be repeated here except as necessary for resolution of the issues presented in this appeal. Al-Naseer was driving west on Highway 10 in Clay County when his vehicle gradually crossed the fog line and hit Kane Thomson, who was on the right shoulder of the road changing a flat tire. Thomson was crouched down while his friend, Dustin Leingang, stood a foot away holding a flashlight. Thomson had removed the flat tire and placed it between him and the fog line. As Thomson was putting on the spare tire, Leingang felt something brush past his hand with enough force to spin him around, heard a loud thud, looked toward Thomson, and saw Thomson rolling on the shoulder of the road in front of his vehicle. About 150 feet ahead Leingang saw Al-Naseer's vehicle straddling the fog line neither braking nor accelerating. The vehicle gradually made its way back onto the highway and did not stop. Thomson died from his injuries.

The accident caused significant damage to Al-Naseer's vehicle: the right headlight was damaged and stopped working, the right front corner of the vehicle was crumpled, and pieces of debris were scattered along the highway for nearly 125 feet from the accident. According to an accident-reconstruction expert, the impact of the accident and the dragging of the flat tire likely jolted the vehicle and caused a loud noise.

A Dilworth police officer spotted Al-Naseer's vehicle traveling approximately six miles from the accident scene, at about 45 miles an hour, with its hazard lights flashing, both headlights off, and its right front tire flat. When stopped by the officer, Al-Naseer got out of his vehicle and immediately went to the vehicle's damaged right front area. 1 Al-Naseer had difficulty communicating in English, but when asked if he had been in an accident, he responded that he had hit something but did not know what it was.

Al-Naseer argues that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his leaving-the-scene conviction. In particular, Al-Naseer contends reasonable doubt exists because the evidence admitted to prove the mens rea element of the offense was circumstantial and consistent with rational hypotheses other than guilt. In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the evidence to determine “whether the facts in the record and the legitimate inferences drawn from them would permit the jury to reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense of which he was convicted.” State v. Moore, 481 N.W.2d 355, 360 (Minn.1992). The jury's verdict will be upheld if, “giving due regard to the presumption of innocence and to the state's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, [the jury] could reasonably have found the defendant guilty.” State v. Pierson, 530 N.W.2d 784, 787 (Minn.1995).

A conviction based on circumstantial evidence, however, warrants heightened scrutiny. State v. Bolstad, 686 N.W.2d 531, 539 (Minn.2004). This heightened scrutiny requires us to consider “whether the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the circumstances proved support a rational hypothesis other than guilt.” State v. Taylor, 650 N.W.2d 190, 206 (Minn.2002). In other words, the circumstances proved must “be consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and inconsistent with any other rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” State v. Bias, 419 N.W.2d 480, 484 (1988). “Circumstantial evidence must form a complete chain that, in view of the evidence as a whole, leads so directly to the guilt of the defendant as to exclude beyond a reasonable doubt any reasonable inference other than guilt.” Taylor, 650 N.W.2d at 206.

We recognize that the trier of fact is in the best position to determine credibility and weigh the evidence. Moore, 481 N.W.2d at 360; see also State v. Hough, 585 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn.1998) (We review criminal bench trials the same as jury trials when determining whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain convictions.”). We “will not overturn a conviction based on circumstantial evidence on the basis of mere conjecture.” State v. Lahue, 585 N.W.2d 785, 789 (Minn.1998). The State does not have the burden of removing all doubt, but of removing all reasonable doubt. State v. Hughes, 749 N.W.2d 307, 313 (Minn.2008).

“When reviewing the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence, ‘our first task is to identify the circumstances proved.’...

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