State Of Minn. v. Hollins

• Decision Date: 05 October 2010
• Docket Number: No. A09-1865.,A09-1865.
• Citation: 789 N.W.2d 244
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Antoine Lamonte HOLLINS, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals

789 N.W.2d 244

STATE of Minnesota, Respondent,

v.Antoine Lamonte HOLLINS, Appellant.

No. A09-1865.

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

Oct. 5, 2010.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED.

Syllabus by the Court

When a person is detained based on reasonable suspicion of possessing a handgun in public in violation of Minn.Stat. § 624.714, subd. 1a (2008), police may conduct a limited search for identification following a lawful demand for identification where the person detained has refused to provide his name or identity information.

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, MN; and Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Lee W. Barry, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, MN, for respondent.

David W. Merchant, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Bridget Kearns Sabo, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, MN, for appellant.

Considered and decided by HALBROOKS, Presiding Judge; STONEBURNER, Judge; and STAUBER, Judge.

OPINION

STAUBER, Judge.

On appeal from his conviction of felon in possession of a firearm, appellant argues that (1) the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence of his identity that was discovered during a limited search of appellant and (2) the district court abused its discretion by allowing into evidence a gun, round, and magazine that could not be directly linked to him. We affirm.

FACTS

On the evening of January 16, 2009, appellant arrived at a nightclub in downtown Minneapolis. There was live music at the club, and prior to admittance, all patrons proceeded through a metal detector and were pat-searched for weapons by club security. Nathan Enget, one of the club's security guards, checked more than 800 people that evening. Upon entering the club, appellant set off the metal detector. Enget then pat-searched appellant and discovered a loaded handgun in the waistband of appellant's pants, at which point appellant stated, “[m]y bad, I forgot, I can take it back to my car.” Enget called out to his supervisor, Reginald Prince, stating, “hey, he [sic] got a gun.” Enget handed the gun to Prince who told Enget to allow appellant into the club because he did not want appellant to get angry and leave, believing it was the best way to control the situation. Prince then “took the magazine out [of the gun] and realized the handle was cocked ... and removed a live cartridge inside.”

Prince told his supervisor, John Barlow, what had occurred and Barlow summoned the assistance of two Minneapolis police officers who were working a security detail that evening for an association of bars and restaurants in the warehouse district. Prince gave the gun, magazine, and round to the police who then secured it in the trunk of their squad car. Two club bouncers were instructed to locate appellant inside the club and bring him outside to the officers. The police officers testified that it was very cold, there was a large crowd outside the nightclub, and they did not know whether any of appellant's associates was in this group of people. The officers testified that in order to minimize any potential danger to themselves or others, they decided to handcuff appellant and put him in their squad car for questioning. The police then asked appellant for his name. When appellant would not reply, one of the officers took appellant's wallet out of his pocket to obtain his identification. The officers entered his name into the squad-car computer and determined that appellant was ineligible to possess a firearm because “he had prior convictions for felon in possession of a handgun” and that “he was also a registered gang member.” The officers then placed appellant under arrest for felon in possession of a firearm in violation of Minn.Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2008).

Appellant moved to suppress the police officers' discovery of his identity as the fruit of an unlawful search. Following an omnibus hearing, the district court denied the motion. The parties stipulated to appellant's status as a felon and the jury was informed that appellant is prohibited from possessing a firearm pursuant to Minnesota law. The jury found appellant guilty of violating Minn.Stat. § 624.713 (2008), as a person prohibited from possessing a firearm. This appeal followed.

ISSUES

I. Did the district court err by denying appellant's motion to suppress identity evidence discovered during the limited search?

II. Did the district court abuse its discretion by admitting into evidence the gun, round, and magazine?

ANALYSIS

I.

“When reviewing pretrial orders on motions to suppress evidence, we may independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the district court erred in suppressing-or not suppressing-the evidence.” State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 98 (Minn.1999). The district court's findings of fact are reviewed for clear error. State v. Lee, 585 N.W.2d 378, 383 (Minn.1998).

The United States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantee individuals the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. But “an officer may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion [of] criminal activity.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123, 120 S.Ct. 673, 675, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)); State v. Waddell, 655 N.W.2d 803, 809 (Minn.2003). “Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” State v. Davis, 732 N.W.2d 173, 182 (Minn.2007) (quotation omitted). The Minnesota Supreme Court has recognized that “the reasonable suspicion standard is not high.” State v. Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn.2008) (quotation omitted). A police officer may make his decision based on the circumstances as a whole and may make inferences and deductions that may not be obvious to an untrained person. Harris, 590 N.W.2d at 99. However, the officer must “be able to articulate something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch.” State v. Martinson, 581 N.W.2d 846, 850 (Minn.1998) (quotations omitted). Reviewing courts consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether the police had justification for a Terry stop. State v. Britton, 604 N.W.2d 84, 87 (Minn.2000).

Appellant argues that the search of his pockets and wallet was unjustified and unconstitutional and that the search did not fit into any of the recognized exceptions to the rule against warrantless searches as it was not a protective pat-search, nor a search incident to a lawful arrest. Although appellant accepts the premise that the police called to the scene had the requisite reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop, he argues that the investigatory stop was limited to only a search for weapons. Thus, appellant contends that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence of his identity as the fruit of an unlawful search.

To support his claim, appellant cites State v. Fox, 283 Minn. 176, 168 N.W.2d 260 (1969). In that case, the police obtained a search warrant for a woman's apartment allowing them to seize certain property; the warrant did not include a search of the defendant who happened to be at the apartment when the search was conducted. 283 Minn. at 178-79, 168 N.W.2d at 261. The police pat-searched the defendant and found a wallet with marijuana inside. Id. at 179, 168 N.W.2d at 261. The supreme court held that absent probable cause, the officers did not have the right to search the defendant and obtain his wallet. Id. at 180, 168 N.W.2d at 262-63.

Relying on Fox, appellant argues that, absent probable cause, a limited search for identification violates the Fourth Amendment protection against illegal searches and seizures. See id. at 178-79, 168 N.W.2d at 262 (stating that “the right of police officers to stop a suspicious person does not extend to a right of search in the absence of probable cause”). Appellant presents a compelling argument-one that has been raised before, but not decided, by our supreme court.

The United States Supreme Court and the Minnesota Supreme Court have consistently ruled that in the course of a Terry stop, police may direct a person to provide identification. United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229, 105 S.Ct. 675, 680, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700-01 n. 12, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 2593 n. 12, 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981); State v. White, 489 N.W.2d 792, 793 (Minn.1992); State v. Schinzing, 342 N.W.2d 105, 109 (Minn.1983). But in White, the Minnesota Supreme Court speculated as to whether a person can hide his true identity “by just saying No” when asked to identify himself. 489 N.W.2d at 794. The court concluded that “[t]he United States Supreme Court has not decided the issue, and neither have we.” Id. The court went on to hold that the officer's search of the car for identification could be sustained as a search incident to arrest, and therefore the court declined to decide the search-for-identification issue. Id.; see also State v. Frazier, 318 N.W.2d 42, 44 n. 1 (Minn.1982) (expressly declining to decide whether, in certain circumstances, police may conduct a limited identification search of a person lawfully stopped for a temporary investigation). ¹

The narrow issue before us is whether, under the circumstances of this case, the police were justified in performing a limited search of appellant to obtain his identification. Despite appellant's argument to the contrary, the supreme court in Fox indicated that there may be circumstances where it is necessary for law enforcement to conduct a limited search in order to obtain a suspect's identification. Specifically, the court in Fox also observed:

[P]ersons found under suspicious circumstances are not clothed with a right of privacy which prevents law-enforcement...