State of Missouri v. Fidelity & Casualty Co.
Citation | 107 F.2d 343 |
Decision Date | 08 November 1939 |
Docket Number | No. 11434.,11434. |
Parties | STATE OF MISSOURI ex rel. and to Use of DE VAULT v. FIDELITY & CASUALTY CO. OF NEW YORK. |
Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit) |
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Oscar B. Elam, of Kansas City, Mo., for appellant.
Ben W. Swofford, of Kansas City, Mo. (Mitchel J. Henderson and Thomas E. Deacy, both of Kansas City, Mo., on the brief), for appellee.
Before THOMAS and VAN VALKENBURGH, Circuit Judges, and DEWEY, District Judge.
Suit was brought by the above named relator against the defendant as surety on a fidelity bond given by James L. Williams, sheriff, for certain acts of the sheriff, his deputies and others, which relator alleges constituted a conspiracy resulting in his injury and damage.
The trial court sustained a motion to dismiss on the ground that the amended complaint did not state facts upon which relief could be granted. From this order and for errors which it is alleged were committed by the court on matters of procedure, the relator, whom we will refer to as the plaintiff, has appealed.
Plaintiff contends that the record discloses, and as a matter of substantive right, he is entitled to a default against the defendant and a jury to assess his damages.
On October 15, 1938, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint which is here for review.
On October 22, 1938, the defendant filed a demurrer charging that this complaint did not contain facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
On October 31, 1938, the plaintiff filed a motion to strike this demurrer and a motion for an interlocutory judgment by default.
On November 4, 1938, the District Court sustained the motion to strike the demurrer and denied plaintiff's request for a default judgment and granted the defendant five days to plead.
On November 9, 1938, the plaintiff filed a motion to set aside the order of November 4, 1938, and on the same date the defendant filed its answer to the amended complaint and separately a motion for judgment on the pleadings.
The motion for judgment on the pleadings charged, among other things that the complaint does not state facts upon which relief can be granted and does not state facts which constitute any cause of action against the defendant. This motion was sustained and plaintiff was granted ten days to file another amended complaint; and plaintiff, having failed and refused to further plead, the court ordered the action dismissed with prejudice.
It is the theory of the plaintiff that as the new Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S. C.A. following section 723c, abolished demurrers, the demurrer which was stricken did not constitute a pleading and hence no pleading was on file at the time he filed his motion for an interlocutory judgment and he is entitled to a default and to have a jury called to assess damages on such default.
There was a demurrer to the original complaint which was sustained. Between the time of that order and the filing of the demurrer to the amended complaint the new Rules of Civil Procedure for federal courts had become in force. The second demurrer contained the charge that the amended complaint did not state facts upon which relief could be granted. As the defendant had already appeared, a default judgment could only be obtained by application to the court. Rule 55 (b) (2). The only difference between the demurrer and a motion to dismiss was therefore in the designation of the pleading and this difference was a matter of form rather than of substance. The circumstances did not show any lack of good faith and had the court entered a judgment by default at the time he struck the demurrer from the record, he would no doubt have set the default aside under these circumstances.
There is nothing in the rules to uphold plaintiff's contention, while on the other hand Rule 55 provides in effect that defaults to be effective must be applied for and granted by the court. That the granting of a default is discretionary is indicated by Rule 55 (c) which authorizes the court to set aside an entry of default on a showing of good cause.
"The default of a party to an action is always a harsh measure, and no party should ever be defaulted, unless the grounds upon which such default is authorized are clearly and authoritatively established and are in such clear and certain terms that the party to be defaulted can know, without question, that he is subject to default if he does not act in a certain manner." Janoske v. Porter, 7 Cir., 64 F.2d 958, 960. 34 C.J. p. 147, § 349.
Nor is there any merit in plaintiff's contention that the court was without jurisdiction to rule upon the motion to dismiss contained in the motion for judgment on the pleadings as such procedure is expressly authorized by 12 (h) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which contains the following:
"A party waives all defenses and objections which he does not present either by motion as hereinbefore provided or, if he has made no motion, in his answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted * * * may also be made * * by motion for judgment on the pleadings * * *."
We agree with the plaintiff that the action of the court in dismissing plaintiff's petition on the ground that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted was a denial of plaintiff's motion for an order setting aside the order of November 4, 1938; but there was no error in the court inferentially overruling this motion of the plaintiff to set aside the order, nor has plaintiff shown the defendant to be in default.
A more serious question is presented as to whether in the amended complaint are facts which constitute any cause of action against the defendant.
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