State of Mont. v. COUTURE

• Decision Date: 14 September 2010
• Docket Number: No. DA 09-0427.,DA 09-0427.
• Citation: 240 P.3d 987,2010 MT 201,357 Mont. 398
• Parties: STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. James Arthur COUTURE, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

357 Mont. 398

240 P.3d 987

2010 MT 201

STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.James Arthur COUTURE, Defendant and Appellant.

No. DA 09-0427.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs April 8, 2010.

Decided Sept. 14, 2010.

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For Appellant: William F. Hooks, Attorney at Law, Helena, Montana.

For Appellee: Steve Bullock, Montana Attorney General, Matthew T. Cochenour, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana, Mitch Young, Lake County Attorney, Polson, Montana.

Justice JAMES C. NELSON delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 James A. Couture was convicted in the Twentieth Judicial District Court, Lake County, of deliberate homicide and two counts of tampering with or fabricating physical evidence. On appeal, he raises the sole issue of whether the District Court erred in denying his motion to dismiss for violation of his right to a speedy trial. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 Couture shot and killed Daniel McLeod on or about May 2, 2004 (the factual basis of the deliberate homicide conviction). He then threw McLeod's body in the Flathead River and disposed of the gun used to kill McLeod (the factual bases of the tampering convictions). McLeod's body was found May 7; Couture was arrested May 17; and the State filed the Information May 24. Couture's trial began November 27, 2006, 924 days after his arrest. He remained in custody this entire time.

¶ 3 Couture's speedy trial claim is premised on the nearly 31-month delay in bringing him to trial. The record covering that period is extensive, due to a seemingly endless stream of continuances and delays over the two and a half years. Having carefully reviewed that procedural history, we conclude that Couture's right to a speedy trial was not violated. However, that being said, the glacial pace at which this case wended its way through the District Court is of serious concern, given that the right to a speedy trial is a fundamental constitutional right. U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; Mont. Const. art. II, § 24; State v. Ariegwe, 2007 MT 204, ¶ 20, 338 Mont. 442, 167 P.3d 815. Significantly, a variety of factors contributed to the delays, not the least of which was the failure of all involved-the court, the prosecutor, and the defense-to set and hold firm to deadlines. Also encumbering the case's progression toward trial were the court's case-management policies, the State's loss of critical documents and its lack of diligence with some of its filings, and the disjointed and protracted manner in which defense preparations were conducted. Consequently, in order to identify the reasons for the delays and to attribute them to the proper party (Factor Two in the Ariegwe analysis), it is necessary to lay out the procedural history here in substantial detail, by referring to discrete blocks of delay.

I. Arrest to Arraignment (May 17 to Sept. 9, 2004; 115 days)

¶ 4 As noted, Couture was arrested on May 17, 2004. He made his initial appearance in Lake County Justice Court on May 18, and Larry Nistler was appointed to represent him on May 19. The court declined to set bail due to the nature of the charge (deliberate homicide), and Couture never filed a motion to set bail during the pretrial period. On May 27, the date set for arraignment in District Court, Nistler informed the court that he wanted to obtain a mental health evaluation of Couture before Couture entered his pleas. See § 46-14-202, MCA. The court agreed to order an evaluation through the Montana State Hospital, but noted that it did not want the case “to slip off the calendar.” Nistler suggested a continuance of two weeks, and the court reset the arraignment for June 10.

¶ 5 A number of continuances followed-June 10 to July 1 to July 15 to August 12 to August 26 to September 9-all at Couture's request, and all related to his efforts to schedule and obtain the mental health evaluation and then discuss the report with counsel, review his rights, and decide on a plea. Ultimately, Couture was found fit to proceed, and on September 9, 2004, he entered pleas of not guilty to all charges. The court then proposed to set an accelerated omnibus hearing for September 23; however, due to the court's policy on plea agreements (described below), Nistler stated that he would not be ready on that date. The court thus set the omnibus hearing for October 7.

II. The District Court's Policies on Trial Dates and Plea Agreements

¶ 6 The Twentieth Judicial District Court has a trial setting procedure which, in conjunction with its plea agreement policy, arguably caused much of the pretrial delay in this case. Under the trial setting procedure, court staff first picks a “tentative” trial date that is 180 days after the defendant's initial appearance. The trial date does not become “firm,” though, until the parties proceed through the omnibus hearing. Thus, if omnibus is held within the initial 180-day period, then the trial date falling 180 days after the initial appearance becomes the “firm” trial date. But if omnibus is not held within this period, then the 180-day trial date is discarded. In this event, the court requires the defendant to file a speedy trial waiver in order to extend the trial date beyond the 180-day period. Likewise, the court requires a waiver if the parties are not ready for the omnibus hearing by the 150th day, since by statute the court must hold the omnibus hearing “not less than 30 days before trial.” Section 46-13-110(1), MCA. If the defendant refuses to provide a waiver, then the court leaves the trial date set at 180 days from the initial appearance. If a waiver is provided, then staff selects a new trial date. But again, the trial date is “tentative” and does not become “firm” until the parties proceed through the omnibus hearing. Consequently, a continuance of the omnibus hearing acts as a de facto continuance of the first trial setting.

¶ 7 The District Court's consideration of plea agreements, in turn, is controlled by the omnibus hearing. If a plea agreement is reached before the omnibus hearing, then the court either will accept the plea agreement and be bound by it, or will allow the defendant to withdraw from the plea agreement if it is not acceptable to the court. But after the omnibus hearing, the court does not treat any subsequently negotiated plea agreement as binding on the court, and the defendant is not allowed to withdraw his guilty plea solely because the court imposes a sentence different from the one recommended in the plea agreement. As a result, there is a built-in incentive for a defendant to exhaust all possibilities of a plea agreement with the State before the omnibus hearing. As Nistler later explained at the speedy trial hearing, “once you go through omnibus, you have to advise your client that there are no guarantees anymore, now the plea agreement may not be worth the paper it's written on.” Thus, in essence, “you've got a deadline at omnibus. Once you cross that threshold, you're going to trial.” Nistler noted that he had seen some “disastrous consequences” when counsel proceeded through omnibus and then attempted to settle the case. For this reason, he stated, the court's policy “is something that I bear in mind in handling cases. Many times I may even get crosswise with the judges because I'll continue omnibuses multiple times. But until you rule out a plea agreement as an option, you are not serving your client well to go through omnibus hearing.” The court, in turn, is “fairly liberal” about continuing omnibus hearings at the defendant's request.

¶ 8 The upshot of the District Court's policies on trial dates and plea agreements, therefore, is this: Until plea negotiations are exhausted, the defendant repeatedly seeks continuances of the omnibus hearing, and the court routinely grants them; and each continuance of the omnibus hearing, in turn, acts as a de facto continuance of the trial date. Bottom line: No firm trial date is set until the defendant and the State rule out the possibility of a plea agreement. Of course, that could take months-or even years-since plea negotiations may be ongoing until discovery, investigations, testing, and interviews have all been completed. Hence, the District Court's policies, in tandem, theoretically may result in an indefinite postponement of the setting of the first trial date.

III. Investigation and Plea Negotiations (Sept. 9, 2004, to Jan. 27, 2005; 140 days)

¶ 9 As noted, the District Court set the omnibus hearing for October 7, 2004. On that date, Nistler informed the court that he and the prosecutor had just begun discussing a plea agreement. In addition, he stated that before he could advise the court on whether there was going to be a plea agreement, he needed an investigator to pursue some leads. He stated that he would be filing a motion to fund the investigator, and he suggested that the omnibus hearing be continued for a month. The prosecutor did not object, and the court reset the hearing for November 12.

¶ 10 On November 12, Nistler reported that he had had “tentative discussions” with the State concerning a plea offer. In addition, he reported that the individual he uses for major felony investigations had not been available until just recently due to a homicide investigation in Cascade County. Nistler requested a continuance of the omnibus hearing for another month. The prosecutor did not object, and the court reset the hearing for December 9.

¶ 11 On December 9, Nistler reported that the investigation was still in progress and that he was waiting for the State to reduce its plea proposal to writing. He requested two additional weeks. The court, however, stated that it was “concerned, obviously, that this case has been pending for a significant period of time.” In response, Nistler contended that much of the delay thus far was attributable to obtaining the psychological evaluation through...