State of N.D. ex rel. Bd. of University and School Lands v. Yeutter, s. 89-5485
| Citation | 914 F.2d 1031 |
| Decision Date | 11 December 1990 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 89-5485,89-5497,s. 89-5485 |
| Parties | STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA ex rel. BOARD OF UNIVERSITY AND SCHOOL LANDS, Appellee, v. Clayton K. YEUTTER, U.S. Secretary of Agriculture; Milton Hertz, Administrator of the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service; James M. Davis, Assistant Deputy Administrator of the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service, Appellants. STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA ex rel. BOARD OF UNIVERSITY AND SCHOOL LANDS, Appellee, v. Clayton K. YEUTTER, U.S. Secretary of Agriculture; Milton Hertz, Administrator of the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service; Thomas A. Vongarlem, Assistant Deputy Administrator of the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service, Appellants. STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA ex rel. BOARD OF UNIVERSITY AND SCHOOL LANDS, Appellee/Cross-Appellant, v. Clayton K. YEUTTER, U.S. Secretary of Agriculture; Milton Hertz, Administrator of the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service; James M. Davis, Assistant Deputy Administrator of the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service, Appellants/Cross-Appellees. STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA ex rel. BOARD OF UNIVERSITY AND SCHOOL LANDS, Appellee/Cross-Appellant, v. Clayton K. YEUTTER, U.S. Secretary of Agriculture; Milton Hertz, Administrator of the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service; Thomas A. Vongarlem, Assistant Deputy Administrator of the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service, Appellants/Cross-Appellees. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit) |
Constance A. Wynn, Washington, D.C., for appellants.
Charles M. Carvell, Bismarck, N.D., for appellee.
Before MAGILL, Circuit Judge, ROSS, Senior Circuit Judge, and LARSON, * Senior District Judge.
The Secretary of the United States Department of Agriculture appeals from a district court decision ordering him to promulgate procedural and substantive regulations implementing 16 U.S.C. Sec. 3835(a)(1). This section provides that land may not be enrolled in the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) if it has changed ownership in the preceding three years, but allows the Secretary to waive the three-year ownership requirement if he determines the land was acquired under circumstances that give adequate assurance it was not acquired for the purpose of placing it in the CRP. The State of North Dakota cross-appeals, seeking reversal of the district court's holding that the Secretary's waiver determination is not subject to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. Secs. 701-706. We affirm this holding and accordingly deny the state's cross-appeal. We reverse the district court's decision insofar as it orders the Secretary to promulgate regulations implementing Sec. 3835(a)(1).
The CRP was established by the Food Security Act of 1985. Pub.L. No. 99-198, Secs. 1201, 1231-1236, 99 Stat. 1354, 1504-05, 1509-14 (). This program permits owners and operators of highly erodible cropland to submit offers for long-term contracts with the Secretary under which they agree to place land into soil-conserving uses in exchange for annual rental payments from the Secretary. One of the eligibility requirements for participation in the CRP is that the land must not have changed ownership in the three years prior to the start of the contract period. This three-year ownership requirement and its exceptions are set forth in Sec. 3835(a)(1):
(1) No contract shall be entered into under this subchapter concerning land with respect to which the ownership has changed in the 3-year period preceding the first year of the contract period unless--
(A) the new ownership was acquired by will or succession as a result of the death of the previous owner;
(B) the new ownership was acquired before January 1, 1985;
(C) the Secretary determines that the land was acquired under circumstances that give adequate assurance that such land was not acquired for the purpose of placing it in the program established by this subchapter; or
(D) the ownership change occurred due to foreclosure on the land and the owner of the land immediately before the foreclosure exercises a right of redemption from the mortgage holder in accordance with State law. (Emphasis added).
The dispute in this case centers on the third exception.
In November 1987, the State of North Dakota acquired title to two tracts of land through mortgage foreclosures. At the time the state commenced foreclosure proceedings in July 1986, the mortgage payments for the properties had been delinquent for four and five years respectively. On February 10, 1988, North Dakota submitted CRP applications for the two tracts with the appropriate county committees of the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service. 1 The committees denied the applications, as did the reviewing authorities at each level of the administrative appeal process. The applications were rejected on the grounds that North Dakota had not owned the land for three years and did not qualify for a waiver of the three-year ownership requirement under Sec. 3835(a)(1)(C). In making the determination not to grant a waiver, the Secretary relied upon an administratively-developed standard under which it is presumed that land acquired after October 1, 1985 (and held for less than three years) was acquired for the purpose of placing it in the CRP because information about the program had been well publicized by that date.
North Dakota brought an action in the district court seeking review of the Secretary's final decision denying its CRP applications. The state requested (1) a declaratory judgment that the decision was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion; and (2) an order requiring the Secretary to immediately place the state's land in the CRP. Although it held that the Secretary's waiver determination is unreviewable, the district court nevertheless proceeded to find that the Secretary's reliance on a date-of-acquisition standard is arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion. North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ. & School Lands v. Yeutter, 711 F.Supp. 517, 520-21 (D.N.D.1989). The court then ordered that the case be remanded to the Secretary with directions to promulgate procedural and substantive regulations implementing Sec. 3835(a)(1). The court did not grant North Dakota's request for an order requiring enrollment of its land in the CRP.
There is a strong presumption that agency actions are reviewable under the APA. Woodsmall v. Lyng, 816 F.2d 1241, 1243 (8th Cir.1987). Notwithstanding this presumption, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 701(a) states that the APA's provisions for judicial review do not apply "to the extent that--(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law." It is undisputed that the statutory provisions governing the CRP do not explicitly preclude judicial review of the Secretary's determination whether to waive the three-year ownership requirement. Thus, the threshold jurisdictional issue in this case is whether that determination falls within the Sec. 701(a)(2) exception to judicial review.
In its first discussion of Sec. 701(a)(2), the Supreme Court described it as "a very narrow exception ... applicable in those rare instances where 'statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply.' " Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410, 91 S.Ct. 814, 820, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971) (quoting S.Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1945)). In an effort to implement Overton Park, this court followed an approach used by the District of Columbia Circuit, recognizing that " '[i]n practice, the determination of whether there is "law" to apply necessarily turns on pragmatic considerations as to whether an agency determination is the proper subject of judicial review.' " Tuepker v. Farmers Home Admin., 708 F.2d 1329, 1332 (8th Cir.1983) (quoting Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1043 (D.C.Cir.1979)). The Tuepker court explained this approach as follows:
In determining reviewability of an agency's actions, a court must look at the allegations raised in the complaint, together with the governing statutes and regulations, and determine: (1) whether the challenged agency action is of the type Congress intended be left to a reasonable exercise of agency expertise; and (2) whether the problem raised is one suitable for judicial determination. It is only then that a court can sufficiently ascertain whether there is 'law' to apply within the meaning of Overton Park.
Id. Subsequently, in Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830, 105 S.Ct. 1649, 1655, 84 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985), the Supreme Court elaborated on the Sec. 701(a)(2) exception by explaining that "review is not to be had if the statute is drawn so that a court would have no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency's exercise of discretion."
In Woodsmall, 816 F.2d at 1245, we concluded that "Chaney's emphasis on statutory language as the source of law to apply casts doubt on the 'pragmatic considerations' approach" adopted in Tuepker. We noted that "[t]he Chaney Court disparagingly referred to pragmatic considerations ... as amounting to 'an assessment of whether the interests at stake are important enough to justify intervention in the agencies' decisionmaking.' " Id. (quoting Chaney, 470 U.S. at 834, 105 S.Ct. at 1657). However, we left open the issue whether Chaney invalidated the Tuepker approach because the outcome in Woodsmall would have been the same under either Tuepker or an approach emphasizing the centrality of the statutory language. Id.
Our opinion in Woodsmall identified one potential basis for limiting the reach of Chaney. We observed that Chaney concerned an agency refusal to take...
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