State Of N.D. v. The Honorable Gary H. Lee

Decision Date11 May 2010
Docket NumberNo. 20090218.,20090218.
PartiesSTATE of North Dakota, ex rel. Christene A. HARRIS in her capacity as Assistant Ward County State's Attorney, Petitionerv.The Honorable Gary H. LEE, Judge of the District Court, Northwest Judicial District, and LeRoy A. Anderson, Jr., Respondents.
CourtNorth Dakota Supreme Court

Christene Ann Harris, Assistant State's Attorney, Minot, N.D., for petitioner.

LeRoy A. Anderson, Jr., respondent; no appearance.

SANDSTROM, Justice.

[¶ 1] The State has petitioned for a supervisory writ, requesting that we direct the district court to recognize it has jurisdiction over a class B misdemeanor charge of driving while under suspension which occurred within the city limits of the City of Minot. We grant the petition, concluding the district court had jurisdiction over the offense.

I

[¶ 2] A North Dakota highway patrol officer stopped LeRoy Anderson, Jr., for speeding within the city limits of Minot. The officer learned Anderson's driver's license was suspended and issued a citation charging him with driving while under suspension in violation of N.D.C.C. § 39-06-42, a class B misdemeanor. The caption at the top of the citation indicated the case would be heard in the district court of Ward County.

[¶ 3] At his initial appearance on the charge, Anderson pleaded guilty. Before the court accepted the plea, the assistant state's attorney provided a factual basis, noting the traffic stop had occurred within the Minot city limits. The court then questioned whether it had jurisdiction:

THE COURT: Let's go back to that very first part of that factual basis.
MS. HARRIS [assistant state's attorney]: Mm-hmm?
THE COURT: Was the highway patrolman who stopped Mr. Anderson inside the city limits for a Class B misdemeanor?
MS. HARRIS: Correct, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Why is this not in city court?
....
THE COURT: And this is a B misdemeanor-
MS. HARRIS: Correct.
THE COURT: -that occurred within the city. And so if it's a B misdemeanor within the city, why isn't this being handled down in the city court?
....
THE COURT: I guess, I'm-Mr. Anderson, I'm not going to accept your plea. I think this is a matter that should be down in the city court and I'm going to dismiss these charges up here in the district court. And they're dismissed without prejudice so that they can be re-filed down in the city court if that's the case. But we're going to get to the-I've had this discussion with the state's attorney and with others before. It shouldn't be the status of the officer that makes the difference, it's the location and the crime that makes the difference as to who has jurisdiction. I just don't-maybe I'm wrong on that. And if I am, you know,-I'm saying, you know, you're not off the hook. You can be recharged down in the city or you can be recharged maybe back up here. But for right now, I'm not going to accept your plea and I'm going to dismiss the charge.

[¶ 4] On May 5, 2009, the district court entered a written order dismissing the case against Anderson, and the State moved to reconsider. The district court denied the motion to reconsider by order dated July 13, 2009.

[¶ 5] The State filed a notice of appeal on July 20, 2009. Because there were questions regarding the timeliness of the appeal, we directed the State to file a response addressing whether the appeal was timely and, if not, whether a writ of supervision would be appropriate in this case. In its response, the State conceded its appeal was untimely and abandoned its attempted appeal, but requested that this Court issue a supervisory writ directing the district court to recognize it has jurisdiction over a class B misdemeanor violation of state law occurring within the city limits resulting from a traffic stop initiated by a North Dakota highway patrol officer.

II

[¶ 6] Under N.D. Const. art. VI, § 2, and N.D.C.C. § 27-02-04, this Court may examine a district court decision by invoking our supervisory authority. Mann v. N.D. Tax Comm'r, 2005 ND 36, ¶ 20, 692 N.W.2d 490. We exercise our authority to issue supervisory writs rarely and cautiously, and only to rectify errors and prevent injustice in extraordinary cases when no adequate alternative remedy exists. E.g., Forum Commc'ns Co. v. Paulson, 2008 ND 140, ¶ 8, 752 N.W.2d 177; Trinity Hosps. v. Mattson, 2006 ND 231, ¶ 6, 723 N.W.2d 684. Our authority to issue a supervisory writ is ‘purely discretionary,’ State v. Paulson, 2001 ND 82, ¶ 6, 625 N.W.2d 528 (quoting Patten v. Green, 369 N.W.2d 105, 106 (N.D.1985)), and we determine whether to exercise supervisory jurisdiction on a case-by-case basis, considering the unique circumstances of each case. See Forum Commc'ns, at ¶ 8; State v. Holte, 2001 ND 133, ¶ 5, 631 N.W.2d 595; Central Power Elec. Coop., Inc. v. C-K, Inc., 512 N.W.2d 711, 715 (N.D.1994). Exercise of supervisory jurisdiction may be warranted when issues of vital concern regarding matters of important public interest are presented. See Forum Commc'ns, at ¶ 9; Trinity Hosps., at ¶ 7; Mitchell v. Sanborn, 536 N.W.2d 678, 683 (N.D.1995).

[¶ 7] This case presents a significant issue regarding the jurisdiction of the district court to hear criminal matters arising under state law which occurred within city limits. This is an issue of vital concern regarding matters of important public interest. We therefore will exercise our discretionary supervisory authority to review the district court's decision in this case.

III

[¶ 8] This case presents a single issue for our consideration: Does the district court of Ward County have jurisdiction over the offense when a North Dakota highway patrol officer charges a driver with a violation of N.D.C.C. § 39-06-42, driving while under suspension, for conduct occurring within the city limits of Minot? Our resolution of the issue requires an analysis of a highway patrol officer's authority, the applicability of state law within city limits, and the criminal jurisdiction of the district court.

[¶ 9] Members of the North Dakota highway patrol have broad powers on all highways within the state. A highway patrol officer is expressly authorized to “enforc[e] the provisions of [N.D.C.C. tit. 39] relating to operators' licenses ... and of any other law regulating the operation of vehicles or the use of the highways,” [t]o make arrests upon view and without warrant for any violation committed in the person's presence of any of the provisions of this title relating to operators' licenses ... or to other laws regulating the operation of vehicles or the use of the highways,” and [t]o exercise general police powers over all violations of law committed in their presence upon any highway and within the highway right of way or when in pursuit of any actual or suspected law violator.” N.D.C.C. § 39-03-09(1), (2), and (12). In addition, members of the highway patrol “shall enforce the provisions of the laws of this state relating to the protection and use of highways and shall patrol the highways and cooperate with sheriffs and police in enforcing the laws regulating the operation of vehicles and the use of highways.” N.D.C.C. § 39-03-03. The general powers of highway patrol officers thus extend over violations of law committed upon any highway or highway right-of-way within the state. Brewer v. Ziegler, 2007 ND 207, ¶ 8, 743 N.W.2d 391.

[¶ 10] Section 39-01-01(26), N.D.C.C., broadly defines “highway”:

“Highway” means the entire width between the boundary lines of every way publicly maintained when any part thereof is open to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel and of every way privately maintained within a mobile home park, trailer park, or campground containing five or more lots for occupancy by mobile homes, travel trailers, or tents when any part thereof is open for purposes of vehicular travel.

This definition clearly encompasses streets and roadways within city limits. Thus, a North Dakota highway patrol officer's authority extends to violations committed on streets within city limits.

[¶ 11] There is no question that N.D.C.C. § 39-06-42(1), which prohibits a person whose license has been suspended from driving a motor vehicle “on a highway or on public or private areas to which the public has a right of access for vehicular use in this state,” applies to driving on a city street. Again, the definition of “highway,” which extends to “every way publicly maintained when any part thereof is open to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel,” clearly includes city streets.

[¶ 12] Furthermore, although the City of Minot has enacted an ordinance prohibiting driving under suspension within the city under its home rule charter, that ordinance does not supersede the application of state law. Section 12.1-01-05, N.D.C.C., provides:

No offense defined in this title or elsewhere by law shall be superseded by any city or county ordinance, or city or county home rule charter, or by an ordinance adopted pursuant to such a charter, and all such offense definitions shall have full force and effect within the territorial limits and other jurisdiction of home rule cities or counties.

Even when a home rule city enacts an equivalent ordinance, all state criminal laws, including criminal and noncriminal vehicular offenses, remain in full force and effect within the city limits. See

State v. Brown, 2009 ND 150, ¶ 24, 771 N.W.2d 267; Sauby v. City of Fargo, 2008 ND 60, ¶ 10, 747 N.W.2d 65. Section 12.1-01-05, N.D.C.C., is an expression of the legislature's intent that state criminal laws are to have uniform application throughout the state. City of Bismarck v. Hoopman, 421 N.W.2d 466, 468-69 (N.D.1988).

[¶ 13] Having determined that N.D.C.C. § 39-06-42(1) applied within the Minot city limits and that the highway patrol officer had the authority to enforce the statute within the city limits, it necessarily follows that the district court had jurisdiction over the offense. Under N.D. Const. art. VI, § 8, the district court has “original...

To continue reading

Request your trial
15 cases
  • State v. Pogue
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • 25 Agosto 2015
  • Nygaard v. Taylor
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • 29 Agosto 2017
    ...did not intend that its December 7, 2016 orders were final orders.[¶ 11] Nevertheless, in State ex rel. Harris v. Lee , 2010 ND 88, ¶ 6, 782 N.W.2d 626, we explained:Under N.D. Const. art. VI, § 2, and N.D.C.C. § 27–02–04, this Court may examine a district court decision by invoking our sup......
  • State v. Romanick
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • 3 Marzo 2017
    ...5, 823 N.W.2d 767 ; State ex rel. Roseland v. Herauf , 2012 ND 151, ¶ 3, 819 N.W.2d 546 ; State ex rel. Harris v. Lee , 2010 ND 88, ¶ 6, 782 N.W.2d 626 ; Forum Commc'ns Co. v. Paulson , 2008 ND 140, ¶ 8, 752 N.W.2d 177. "We exercise our authority to issue supervisory writs rarely and cautio......
  • City of Jamestown v. Casarez
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • 20 Abril 2021
    ...intent that state criminal laws are to have uniform application throughout the state." State, ex rel. Harris v. Lee , 2010 ND 88, ¶ 12, 782 N.W.2d 626. "[I]f the legislature enacts a statute which clearly conflicts with ordinances that have been enacted the statute prevails and the conflict......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT