State Of N.J. Div. Of Youth And Family Serv. v. T.G
| Decision Date | 21 July 2010 |
| Parties | STATE of New Jersey DIVISION OF YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff-Respondent,v.T.G., Defendant-Appellant.In the Matter of the Guardianship of R.V., Minor. |
| Court | New Jersey Superior Court |
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Howard Danzig, Designated Counsel, argued the cause for appellant (Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney; Mr. Danzig, on the brief).
Jane Blank, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Paula T. Dow, Attorney General, attorney; Andrea M. Silkowitz, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Ms. Blank, on the brief).
Phyllis G. Warren, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for minor (Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney; Ms. Warren, on the brief).
Before Judges PARRILLO, LIHOTZ & ASHRAFI.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
LIHOTZ, J.A.D.
Defendant T.G. appeals from a July 1, 2009 Family Part order denying her motion to set aside her voluntary surrender of parental rights in respect of her child, R.V., which resulted in a judgment awarding guardianship to plaintiff New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services (DYFS or the Division) to secure the child's adoption. Defendant argues the court erred in denying her motion, filed pursuant to Rule 4:50-1. She maintains the judgment must be vacated as DYFS failed to comply with a material condition of the surrender agreement. Defendant additionally contends the court violated her rights of procedural due process and against self-incrimination. Following our review of these arguments in light of the record and the applicable law, we affirm.
Defendant gave birth to R.V. on May 1, 1997. R.V.'s father is R.J.V. The Division became involved with the family on May 30, 1997, as both defendant and R.J.V. suffered from alcohol dependence. R.J.V. voluntarily surrendered his parental rights on November 7, 2008, and is not a party to this appeal. We focus our review on defendant's surrender and her motion to vacate the judgment of guardianship.
After years of unsuccessful efforts to assist defendant's achievement of sobriety, the Division filed a complaint for guardianship on December 8, 2005. The complaint was amended on July 28, 2006, to seek kinship legal guardianship (KLG) in favor of R.V.'s grandmother, H.L. On September 1, 2006, defendant consented to entry of a KLG judgment. Then, on July 6, 2007, she moved to amend or vacate that judgment. Thereafter, the Division commenced a review of the family's circumstances, inquiring whether reunification was in the child's best interests.
The Division's investigation revealed defendant and R.J.V. continued their substance abuse and H.L. allowed defendant to reside in her home, ignoring the court's orders precluding defendant from unsupervised contact with the child. The Division reopened the protective services litigation and obtained an order of care and supervision of R.V.
Pending further review, the court allowed R.V. to remain with H.L. and required all contact between defendant and R.V. be supervised by the Division. Conflict between defendant and H.L. heightened, and H.L. informed DYFS she was unable to protect R.V. from defendant. On March 28, 2008, the Division exercised an emergency removal of R.V. The court vacated the KLG judgment and granted custody, care, and supervision of the child to the Division.
On August 21, 2008, the Division filed a second guardianship complaint, seeking termination of defendant's and R.J.V.'s parental rights. R.J.V. consented to a general surrender of his parental rights, while a trial to sever defendant's parental rights was scheduled for March 30 and 31, 2009.
On the first trial date, defendant, represented by counsel, appeared and agreed to voluntarily surrender her parental rights. During the ensuing hearing, defendant testified she knew the trial would begin that morning and acknowledged she had consulted with her attorney, who was prepared to proceed. Defendant stated she understood the nature of a general surrender, specifically that her decision would end her parental rights to R.V. and that all visitation would cease except as allowed at the discretion of the child's caretakers. Additionally, defendant waived her right to trial and the right to participate in three counseling sessions prior to the effectuation of her decision. She testified she had freely and voluntarily entered into her decision, was neither coerced nor threatened, and was free of the influence of drugs or alcohol. Upon cross-examination by the Division's counsel and the Law Guardian, defendant reiterated she had had enough time to think about her decision, had completely discussed the matter with her attorney, and understood the Division was ready to proceed to trial.
The court then conducted this inquiry:
At the conclusion of questioning, counsel for defendant addressed the court, asking: “All of these proceedings, they're confidential[,] [c]orrect[?]” The court responded affirmatively and defendant's attorney stated, “So I can assure my client that this order remains confidential and [R.V.] won't be told about it[?]” When asked to further explain the concern over what would remain confidential from the child, counsel stated:
Resolving that query, the court entered these findings:
The March 30, 2009 judgment reflected defendant's voluntary surrender was accepted and placed the child in the guardianship of the Division.
Several months thereafter, defendant obtained new counsel and moved to vacate the judgment of guardianship. In her application, defendant asserted the surrender was not entered into knowingly, willingly, or voluntarily as “the premise behind the surrender” was that the Division had promised her file would be sealed and “certain unfavorable information about [her] would not be disclosed[.]” However, following the hearing, defendant learned the Division had revealed information regarding her relapses to her substance abuse program, leading to her discharge. Also, the information was related to defendant's probation officer. Because substance abuse treatment was a condition of her probation, an investigation was conducted as to whether she had violated its terms. Defendant asserts the false assurances of confidentiality induced her to enter the voluntary surrender; otherwise, she would have “taken her chances” at trial.
During the motion hearing, defendant was permitted to address the court and did so, stating:
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