State Of N.M. v. Lapietra
Citation | 2010 NMCA 009,147 N.M. 569,226 P.3d 668 |
Decision Date | 08 September 2009 |
Docket Number | Dec. 23,028,No. 28,431.,No. 32,2009.,026,28,32 |
Parties | STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellant,v.Cassandra LaPIETRA and Christopher Titone, Defendants-Appellees. |
Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
Gary K. King, Attorney General, Anita Carlson, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant.
Lisa A. Torraco, Attorney at Law, Lisa Torraco, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee Cassandra LaPietra.
L. Helen Bennett, PC, L. Helen Bennett, Erika N. Poindexter, Attorney at Law, PC, Erika N. Poindexter, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee Christopher Titone.
{1} Cassandra LaPietra and Christopher Titone (Defendants) were each indicted on two counts of intentional or negligent child abuse resulting in great bodily harm with alternative theories that either or both inflicted the abuse or knew, or should have known, that such abuse was being inflicted, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-6-1(D)(1), (2) (2005) (amended 2009). Both Defendants filed pretrial motions to dismiss, pursuant to Rule 5-601 NMRA and State v. Foulenfont, 119 N.M. 788, 895 P.2d 1329 (Ct.App.1995), and the district court granted the motions. The State now appeals the pretrial dismissals. We reverse and remand to the district court to reinstate the case.
{2} A son and daughter (collectively, the children) were born to Defendants on December 16, 2005. The children were getting regular checkups with healthcare providers through January 2006 and appeared to have no injuries. Defendants and the children were residing with LaPietra's parents. On February 6, 2006, the son was admitted into the hospital because of vomiting and dehydration. On the morning of February 9, 2006, it was discovered that the son had numerous brain injuries, and hospital staff made a report to the Children, Youth and Families Department (CYFD) for child abuse. Later that day, CYFD took the daughter into protective custody and discovered that she also had internal injuries that were the result of physical abuse.
{3} Grand jury indictments were filed on January 29, 2007, charging Defendants with child abuse under alternate theories of permitting and/or causing the abuse, contrary to Section 30-6-1(D)(1), (2). Defendants each filed pretrial motions to dismiss, pursuant to Rule 5-601 and Foulenfont, alleging that the facts of the case were undisputed and that, as a purely legal issue, there was a lack of substantial evidence that could prove the identity of the perpetrator who caused the injuries to the children.
{4} On October 3, 2007, the district court held a hearing on the Foulenfont motions. The record reveals that the district court reviewed transcripts of witness interviews and heard objections from the State that this particular case was not appropriate for a Foulenfont motion because the district court should not examine the sufficiency of the evidence when the State is relying on circumstantial evidence to prove the identity of the perpetrator. For the purposes of the Foulenfont motions, Defendants stipulated that the children were abused. However, Defendants urged that there was a lack of evidence showing that they were the ones that committed the abuse. The district court, after reviewing a “voluminous amount of case law” and a “voluminous amount of factual material presented to it by the parties,” granted the motions to dismiss the indictments with “some trepidation and hesitation.”
{5} The contours of the district court's power to conduct a pretrial hearing on a motion to dismiss charges brought under Rule 5-601 is a legal question reviewed under a de novo standard. See State v. Roman, 1998-NMCA-132, ¶ 8, 125 N.M. 688, 964 P.2d 852.
{6} The State argues that the district court erred in deciding the merits of the case before trial. In dismissing the indictments, the court stated that “for the purposes of these motions, ‘it is only a question of who inflicted the abuse,’ ” and “[t]he present motions seek dismissal of the indictments based upon insufficiency of evidence, specifically an absence of evidence on the essential element of identity.” The State argues that a determination of who hurt the children is a question of fact that should be decided by a jury and that a pretrial attack on the sufficiency of evidence under the guise of a Foulenfont motion does not avoid the prohibitions of NMSA 1978, Section 31-6-11(A) (2003). We agree.
{7} Judicial authority to rule on pretrial motions in criminal matters is outlined in Rule 5-601. According to Rule 5-601(B), “[a]ny defense, objection or request which is capable of determination without a trial on the merits may be raised before trial by motion.” See State v. Gomez, 2003-NMSC-012, ¶ 8, 133 N.M. 763, 70 P.3d 753 ( ). In Foulenfont, we stated that it was proper for a district court to decide purely legal matters and dismiss a case when appropriate before trial. 119 N.M. at 790, 895 P.2d at 1331. Questions of fact, however, are the unique purview of the jury and, as such, should be decided by the jury alone. Id. at 789-90, 895 P.2d at 1330-31; see State v. Hughey, 2007-NMSC-036, ¶ 11, 142 N.M. 83, 163 P.3d 470 (); see also State v. Masters, 99 N.M. 58, 59, 653 P.2d 889, 890 (Ct.App.1982) ( ); State v. Mares, 92 N.M. 687, 688-90, 594 P.2d 347, 348-50 (Ct.App.1979) ( ).
{8} Defendants frame the issue as a legal question that asks whether the State had any evidence that would justify a jury trial. They state that “[a] complete lack of evidence does not require the impermissible weighing or determining of evidence, and can be properly determined as a matter of law based on undisputed ... facts.” Defendants agree, for the sake of their motions, that the State could prove a prima facie case that the children suffered abuse, but argue there is no evidence that Defendants caused the injuries. We interpret this argument to be that Defendants are not attacking the sufficiency of the evidence, but instead are arguing that there was a complete lack of evidence regarding the first element of the offense-that Defendants caused the children to be placed in a situation that endangered their life or health. See UJI 14-602 NMRA; UJI 14-603 NMRA. In effect, Defendants are arguing that the grand jury was mistaken in finding probable cause to indict and further, that the district court was correct in reviewing the grand jury's determination of the facts pretrial. We disagree with Defendants for two reasons.
{9} First, the question of who committed the abuse should be decided by the jury. The argument that Defendants make is essentially advocating how to characterize the pretrial transcripts of witness interviews that were given to the district court. The State argues that the transcripts did show circumstantial evidence of who the perpetrator of the abuse was, and that a pretrial determination would prevent the State from gathering further evidence and would take the question away from the jury. Defendants argue that the transcripts show a complete absence of any evidence that indicates who committed the abuse. Defendants' argument, while stipulating to what is known at the pretrial juncture, amounts to a disagreement with the State as to what a reasonable jury could conclude.
{10} This situation is different from Foulenfont. In that case, the defendant and the state agreed to the fact that the defendant had climbed over a fence. The question was whether the fence constituted a “structure” for purposes of the burglary statute, an issue that was a pure matter of law (statutory construction). 119 N.M. at 790, 895 P.2d at 1331 (internal quotation marks omitted). However, the question of whether someone climbed over a fence and the question of whether a fence is a “structure” for purposes of the burglary statute are fundamentally different questions. The former is a question of fact-an element of the offense-and can be determined by circumstantial, as well as direct, evidence. Similarly, asking who committed child abuse after hearing testimony and reviewing evidence involves no questions of law or pure legal issues. Other New Mexico cases have acknowledged this distinction as well. When an issue involves a specific determination or finding, especially when it is an element of the offense, it is a question that is within the unique purview of the jury. See Hughey, 2007-NMSC-036, ¶ 14, 142 N.M. 83, 163 P.3d 470 ( ); State v. Fernandez, 2007-NMCA-091, ¶¶ 7-11, 142 N.M. 231, 164 P.3d 112 ( ); Mares, 92 N.M. at 688-90, 594 P.2d at 348-50 ( ).
{11} The evidence contained in the transcripts can be viewed in a variety of ways, one of which would allow a jury to conclude that either Defendant or both Defendants committed the abuse, allowed the abuse to happen, or knew, or should have known, that the abuse was occurring....
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