State of Nev. v. U.S., 82-4621

• Decision Date: 20 April 1984
• Docket Number: No. 82-4621,82-4621
• Citation: 731 F.2d 633
• Parties: STATE OF NEVADA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, James Watt, Secretary of the Interior, Lynn Greenwalt, Director, Fish and Wildlife Service, and Kayler Martinson, Regional Director, Fish and Wildlife Services, Defendant-Appellees, and Defenders of Wildlife, Inc., Intervenors-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 633

731 F.2d 633

STATE OF NEVADA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, James Watt, Secretary of the

Interior, Lynn Greenwalt, Director, Fish and Wildlife

Service, and Kayler Martinson, Regional Director, Fish and

Wildlife Services, Defendant-Appellees,

and

Defenders of Wildlife, Inc., Intervenors-Appellees.

No. 82-4621.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Feb. 14, 1984.

Decided April 20, 1984.

Paul A. Zevnik, Paul, Hasting, Jaonfsky & Walker, Washington, D.C., for Defenders of Wildlife, Inc.

Ellen J. Durkee, Atty., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., for U.S.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada.

Before MERRILL, FARRIS, and PREGERSON, Circuit Judges.

PREGERSON, Circuit Judge:

Nevada appeals the district court's decision granting summary judgment, 547 F.Supp. 776 (D.Nev.1982). In granting summary judgment, the district court held that Nevada's quiet title action against the United States over the bed of Ruby Lake was time-barred by the Quiet Title Act's twelve-year statute of limitations on federal waiver of sovereign immunity. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2409a(f) (1976). In addition to challenging that holding, Nevada also contends that once the district court ruled that Nevada's quiet title suit was barred by sovereign immunity, the district court should not have ruled on the merits of the action. Finally, Nevada asserts other general challenges to federal regulatory authority which, although raised below, were not addressed by the district court.

I

Federal waiver of sovereign immunity in quiet title suits is limited by a twelve-year statute of limitations.

Any civil action under [the Quiet Title Act] shall be barred unless it is commenced within twelve years of the date upon which it accrued. Such action shall be deemed to have accrued on the date the plaintiff or his predecessor in interest knew or should have known of the claim of the United States.

28 U.S.C. Sec. 2409a(f). The State of Nevada brought the instant suit on September 29, 1978. Thus, if Nevada officials knew or should have known of the United States' claim to the Ruby Lake bed before September 29, 1966, the suit was properly dismissed as time-barred.

We affirm the district court's holding that Nevada's quiet title suit is time-barred. The Quiet Title Act's statute of limitations on the United States' waiver of sovereign immunity is strictly construed. Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Board of University and School Lands, --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 1811, 1820, 75 L.Ed.2d 840 (1983). Contrary to Nevada's assertion, the Supreme Court has decisively held that the twelve-year statute of limitations applies to quiet title suits brought by a state. Block, 103 S.Ct. at 1814, 1819-22.

Other arguments advanced by Nevada in its attempt to avoid the limitations bar by challenging the underlying legality of the federal claim are unpersuasive. These arguments are unavailing because the crucial issue in our statute of limitations inquiry is whether Nevada had notice of the federal claim, not whether the claim itself is valid or invalid. Park County Montana v. U.S., 626 F.2d 718, 721 (9th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1112, 101 S.Ct. 923, 66 L.Ed.2d 841 (1981); Grosz v. Andrus, 556 F.2d 972, 975 (9th Cir.1977).

Our review of a district court's grant of summary judgment is de novo. M/V American Queen v. San Diego Marine Const., 708 F.2d 1483, 1487 (9th Cir.1983). To succeed in a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must demonstrate that no "genuine issue as to any material fact" remains to be resolved at a trial on the merits "and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e) provides in part:

When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.

In its response to the United States' motion for summary judgment, Nevada sets forth several specific factual disputes between the United States and Nevada. However, those factual disputes relate solely to the validity of the United States' claim to the Ruby Lake bed. Despite Nevada's contention to the contrary, they are not relevant to the statute of limitations notice issue. See Grosz v. Andrus, 556 F.2d at 975 (where even though appellant's predecessors in interest may not have understood the document they signed, they clearly had notice of the government's claim to a right of way on their property, if not when they signed the document, "at least when the construction of the road commenced on their property."). Thus, Nevada has failed to "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial" on the crucial notice issue.

To foreclose summary judgment, Nevada should have offered information admissible in evidence to dispute each specific instance of notice presented by the United States in its papers. The existence of one uncontroverted instance of notice suffices to trigger the limitations period. Nevada has failed to controvert the instances of notice presented by the federal government. Before the district court, the United States in its papers presented numerous instances in which Nevada "knew or should have known" of the federal claim to the Ruby Lake bed. One such example was a 1937 affidavit by the Deputy Surveyor General of Nevada--co-signed by the Governor and Attorney General of Nevada--responding to a federal letter that expressed the United States' intention to acquire the Ruby Lake bed for a wildlife refuge. That letter asked Nevada whether it asserted any interest in the property. The jointly-signed Nevada affidavit disclaimed any interest by the state in the lake bed. The affidavit stated: "That the records of the office of the Surveyor General and State Land Register of the State of Nevada show that the State of Nevada has not and does not claim any interest in the lands in the bed of said Ruby Lake ...."

This affidavit, especially when coupled with the federal government's management of a national wildlife refuge on the lake since 1938, conclusively demonstrates that as early as 1937 Nevada had uncontroverted notice of a federal claim sufficient to trigger the statute of limitations. See, e.g., Park County, 626 F.2d at 720-21 (where single sign, forty-one miles from county seat, not proclaiming ownership but merely asserting some federal authority over a backroad, found sufficient for Sec. 2409a(f) notice purposes).

II

As a fall-back position, Nevada contends that the district court's decision should be vacated to the extent that it addresses the merits of the title suit....