State of New Jersey, Dept. of Ed. v. Hufstedler

• Decision Date: 13 October 1981
• Docket Number: 80-2302,No. 80-1991,Nos. 80-1991,No. 80-2302,80-1991,s. 80-1991
• Parties: 1 Ed. Law Rep. 48 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Petitioner in, v. Shirley HUFSTEDLER, Secretary of Education, United States Department of Education, Respondent inCOMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Petitioner in, v. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Respondent in.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Page 208

662 F.2d 208

1 Ed. Law Rep. 48

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Petitioner in

No. 80-1991, v. Shirley HUFSTEDLER, Secretary of Education, United States

Department of Education, Respondent in No. 80-1991.

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Petitioner in No. 80-2302, v. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

EDUCATION, Respondent in No. 80-2302.

Nos. 80-1991, 80-2302.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Argued May 18, 1981.

Decided Oct. 13, 1981.

John J. Degnan, Atty. Gen., Erminie L. Conley, Asst. Atty. Gen., M. Kathleen Duncan, Mary Ann Burgess, Deputy Attys. Gen. (argued), Trenton, N. J., for State of New Jersey, Dept. of Ed.

Margaret Hunting, Deputy Atty. Gen. (argued), Emogene L. Trexel, Asst. Atty. Gen., Dept. of Justice, Harrisburg, Pa., for Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

Robert J. Arnot (argued), Stephen H. Freid, Philip H. Rosenfelt, U. S. Dept. of Ed., Washington, D. C., for United States Dept. of Ed.

Before ADAMS, ROSENN, and HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

ROSENN, Circuit Judge.

These petitions for review of final decisions of the United States Department of Education ("Department" or "Agency") ¹ present important questions of first impression in this court. The decisions under review are orders directing petitioners New Jersey and Pennsylvania ("States") to refund to the Department federal funds distributed to the States under the provisions of Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 as amended ² ("ESEA") and determined by the Agency audits to have been misapplied under the terms of that Act and its implementing rules and regulations. ³ The States have refused to comply with the Department's directives because they contend that the Agency is without authority under the Act to recover through administrative proceedings Title I funds that were misspent during the years in question. ⁴ Additionally, New Jersey challenges the correctness of the Agency's audit findings; Pennsylvania challenges the Department's interpretation and application of the Act's statute of limitations and claims that its rulemaking procedures are deficient. We reach only the question of the Agency's claimed authority to issue the orders presently before us and

conclude that such authority does not exist. We therefore reverse.

I.

In 1965, as his education program was nearing floor debate in the Senate, President Johnson, commenting on the bill that was to become the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, said: "This bill has a simple purpose: To improve the education of young Americans." ⁵ Beginning with the ESEA, legislation passed in pursuit of that laudable objective fundamentally altered the federal government's remote role in education. The Senate committee report on ESEA notes this change in direction by quoting Senator Taft's statement expressing Congressional concerns prompting the legislation:

"Education is primarily a State function, but in the field of education, as in the fields of health, relief, and medical care, the Federal Government has a secondary obligation to see that there is a basic floor under those essential services for all adults and children in the United States."

S.Rep.No.146, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in (1965) U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1450. According to educational statistics then before the Congress, the nation had almost fallen below the "basic floor" referred to by Senator Taft and this encouraged federal intervention. ⁶

Without doubt, the provisions of ESEA Title I effectuated one of the most ambitious federal forays into the educational domain. Confronted with overwhelming evidence of a direct link between economic privation and educational underachievement, Congress authorized a massive ⁷ infusion of federal funds into the nation's public school systems for the improvement of the educational lot of children from low-income families. In Title I, however, Congress has done more than simply "throw money at a problem." The statutory scheme has been carefully constructed to ensure that the funds appropriated for the benefit of disadvantaged schoolchildren are actually applied and distributed in the most equitable and efficient manner.

For example, the amount of a grant to a particular local educational agency ("LEA") is determined by direct reference to the number of children from low-income families eligible to attend the schools served by the LEA. Pub.L.No.874, tit. II, § 203, as added by Pub.L.No.89-10, tit. I, § 2, 79 Stat. 27, 28 (1965) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 2711 (Supp.III 1979)). Federal funds are to be distributed only after the state educational agency ("SEA") to which the particular LEA is responsible has provided assurances that the LEA, under the SEA's direction, will expend the federal monies only on "programs and projects ... (A) which are designed to meet the special educational needs of educationally deprived children in school attendance areas having high concentrations of children from low-income families and (B) which are of sufficient size, scope, and quality to give reasonable promise of substantial progress toward The federal program prohibits the use of the funds to supplant an existing state-funded compensatory education program, requires LEA's to maintain their existing commitment in the area as a condition to continued eligibility, and prescribes that only the excess costs incurred as a result of instituting Title I programs shall be paid with Title I funds. 20 U.S.C. § 2736 (Supp.III 1979). The Act also establishes very definite criteria to be used in identifying the schools and attendance areas in which Title I funds may be expended, 20 U.S.C. § 2732 (Supp.III 1979), as well as the children that may be served. 20 U.S.C. § 2733 (Supp. III 1979). As might be expected, the specificity and complexity of the statutory restrictions on the use of Title I funds are modest when compared with the intricate set of rules and regulations adopted by the administering federal agency. See 45 C.F.R. pts. 116 & 116a (1980) and note 3 supra.

meeting those needs ...." Pub.L.No.874, tit. II, § 205, as added by Pub.L.No.89-10, tit. I, § 2, 79 Stat. 27, 30 (1965) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 2734 (Supp.III 1979)).

Although this overview of the program might suggest a rigid and pervasive federal presence at all levels of Title I administration, in keeping with traditional governmental roles in education, Congress actually entrusted most of the responsibility for management to the SEA's and the primary responsibility for innovative program development to the LEA's. Basically, the Act contemplates that each LEA that desires to receive Title I funds will file an application detailing its needs, its eligibility, and the intended uses for the requested funds. This application is submitted to the SEA, which verifies its accuracy and ensures that all proposals conform with current Title I guidelines. The SEA after collecting all LEA applications from its jurisdiction, then submits its own application to the Department for the aggregate sum to which its LEA's are eligible (according to their applications), plus an amount for administration expenses. This application is accompanied by assurances from the SEA that the funds will be used only for lawful Title I purposes.

The resolution of the questions presented by this case therefore is of considerable importance in administering the Title I program. Congress chose to rely heavily on the States to assure proper application of Title I funds, but committed to the Department the authority to adopt such rules and regulations as it deemed appropriate. Such a division of responsibility must inevitably lead to conflicts between the SEA's and the Department over the proper application of Title I funds. When conflicts have developed, the Department has resorted to a variety of procedures, all directly related to its power over the purse strings, to enforce its interpretation of the Act against the States. Some, such as withholding funds or refusing to approve applications, find their roots in the clear and unambiguous terms of the statute in effect when the deposited funds were received. Pub.L.No.874, tit. II, §§ 206, 210, as added by Pub.L.No.89-10, tit. I, § 2, 79 Stat. 31, 33 (1965) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 2832, 2836 (Supp. III 1979)). In this case, however, the Department adopted procedures for the Pennsylvania and New Jersey audit proceedings not clearly authorized by the statute under which the funds were disbursed. It is this variance in procedure that is the genesis of this litigation.

A.

To understand fully the issue we decide today, a brief examination of the administrative proceedings that have brought these cases to us is necessary. The Department, in carrying out its statutory responsibilities, performed separate audits of the Pennsylvania and New Jersey Title I programs. The initial audits were performed by auditors employed by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare Audit Agency ("HEWAA"). In its final audit reports, issued in April (Pennsylvania) and June (New Jersey) of 1975, HEWAA found that both States had misapplied substantial sums of federal Title I monies during the Upon receipt of the Deputy Commissioner's final audit determination letters, both States filed applications for review with the Title I Audit Hearing Board. ⁸ Panels of that Board held hearings ⁹ on the States' objections and, in written decisions dated February 19, 1980, (New Jersey) and May 7, 1980, (Pennsylvania), modified the Deputy Commissioner's findings and assessed audit deficiencies of $1,031,304 ¹⁰ against New Jersey and of $422,424.29 ¹¹ against Pennsylvania. The Board's decisions were subject to a comment period during which they were forwarded to the Secretary, who declined to review them. The Board's decision as to New Jersey became the final decision of the Department on May 2, 1980; the decision as...