State Of North Carolina v. Sargeant

Decision Date03 August 2010
Docket NumberNo. COA09-262.,COA09-262.
Citation696 S.E.2d 786
PartiesSTATE of North Carolinav.Neil Matthew SARGEANT, Defendant.
CourtNorth Carolina Court of Appeals
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 24 April 2008 by Judge Ronald K. Payne in Watauga County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 2 September 2009.

Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General John G. Barnwell, for the State.

Appellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender Benjamin Dowling Sendor, for defendant-appellant.

GEER, Judge.

Defendant Neil Matthew Sargeant appeals his convictions for first degree murder, first degree kidnapping, robbery with a dangerous weapon, and burning of personal property. The primary issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in taking partial “verdicts” from the jury.

At trial, at the end of the first day of deliberation, the jury had not reached a unanimous decision as to each of the charges. The trial court requested that the jury go ahead and submit verdict sheets for any of the charges as to which it had unanimously found defendant guilty. The trial court then received the jury's verdicts finding defendant guilty of first degree kidnapping, robbery with a dangerous weapon, and burning of personal property, as well as first degree murder on the bases of both felony murder and lying in wait. The only issue left for the jury to decide was whether defendant was guilty of first degree murder on the basis of premeditation and deliberation. The next morning, the court gave the jury a new verdict sheet solely asking the jury to decide whether defendant was guilty of first degree murder on the basis of premeditation and deliberation. The jury returned a guilty verdict later that day.

The issue on appeal is whether it was error to take a “verdict” as to lying in wait and felony murder when the jury had not yet agreed on premeditation and deliberation. Premeditation and deliberation, felony murder, and lying in wait are not crimes, but rather are theories upon which a defendant may be convicted of first degree murder. We hold that a trial court cannot take a verdict on a theory. Therefore, the trial court, in this case, erred by taking partial verdicts on theories as to the charge of first degree murder.

Facts

Stephen Harrington was kidnapped, robbed, and murdered on the night of 7 November 2005. A medical examiner determined the cause of death to be asphyxiation. Defendant, Kyle Triplett, and Matthew Dalrymple were subsequently charged capitally with the first degree murder of Harrington. They were also charged with first degree kidnapping, robbery with a dangerous weapon, and burning of personal property. The three men and the victim were acquaintances who dealt and used illegal drugs together.

The State first proceeded against Triplett. On 10 September 2007, Dalrymple had given the State a written statement pointing to Triplett as responsible for the death of Harrington and as having orchestrated the removal of Harrington from defendant's home. In anticipation of trying Triplett, the State entered into an agreement with Dalrymple on 13 September 2007. In that agreement, the State agreed not to seek the death penalty against Dalrymple. In return, Dalrymple agreed to “be available to provide truthful testimony concerning the events surrounding the death of Stephen Harrington if called upon by the state to do so.” The truthfulness of his testimony was to “be measured against [his] written statement in the presence of Detective Dee Dee Rominger on 10th September 2007.” The State agreed further [t]hat as to the statement to Detective Rominger the State will not use the statement against [Dalrymple] in any state criminal proceedings, and will not use any evidence derived from such statement against him in any state judicial proceeding.”

Ultimately, Dalrymple was not required to testify against Triplett because Triplett pled guilty to second degree murder, among other offenses, for his involvement in the crime. The State next proceeded against defendant and called Triplett as a witness during the trial. Triplett's testimony placed the majority of the blame for Harrington's murder on defendant.

Triplett testified that when he arrived at defendant's house on the night of 7 November 2005, defendant told him to put on gloves, grab Harrington when he arrived later, and put a gun to Harrington's head. When Harrington arrived, Triplett grabbed Harrington by the throat and put a gun to his head. Then, defendant wrapped Harrington in duct tape and punched him while Dalrymple kicked him. Dalrymple removed cocaine from Harrington's pocket before Triplett and defendant put Harrington in the trunk of Harrington's car. Triplett testified that he and defendant drove Harrington's car, while Dalrymple followed in a second car. They parked the car near a bridge where defendant sprayed Harrington's body with lighter fluid, and Triplett lit the fluid with a lighter. The three men then returned to defendant's house in the car driven by Dalrymple.

During defendant's case in chief, defendant called Dalrymple to the stand. Dalrymple invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and refused to testify. Since Dalrymple was unavailable to testify on defendant's behalf, defendant moved, pursuant to N.C.R. Evid. 804(b)(5), to introduce Dalrymple's 10 September 2007 statement to Detective Rominger. According to Dalrymple's statement, Triplett had grabbed Harrington by the neck and held him at gunpoint, as Triplett had testified, but Triplett was also responsible for duct-taping Harrington's head, hitting Harrington, and kicking him. Dalrymple stated that defendant had been asleep during the initial attack, but had awoken later and ridden in the second car with Dalrymple because Dalrymple was scared. Triplett, he said, lit the fire. The trial court concluded that the statement lacked sufficient indicia of trustworthiness and excluded the statement.

On the morning of Tuesday, 22 April 2008, with closing arguments having concluded the previous day, the court instructed the jury as to the charges, including the “three theories under which [the jury could] find [defendant] guilty of first degree murder, those theories being lying in wait, the felony murder rule, and premeditation and deliberation.” The verdict sheet for the first degree murder charge set out the following choices:

WE THE JURY, AS OUR UNANIMOUS VERDICT, FIND THAT THE DEFENDANT, NEIL MATTHEW SARGENT, IS:
_____ GUILTY OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER.
_____ (A) IF YES, DO YOU UNANIMOUSLY FIND ON THE BASIS OF LYING IN WAIT.
_____ (B) IF YES, DO YOU UNANIMOUSLY FIND ON THE BASIS OF THE FELONY MURDER RULE
(I) _____ IF YES, DO YOU UNANIMOUSLY FIND THE UNDERLYING FELONY TO BE:
_____ 1. KIDNAPPING
_____ 2. ROBBERY WITH A DANGEROUS WEAPON
_____ (C) IF YES, DO YOU UNANIMOUSLY FIND ON THE BASIS [SIC] PREMEDITATION AND DELIBERATION
OR
_____ GUILTY OF SECOND DEGREE MURDER
OR
_____ NOT GUILTY

The verdict sheets for the other charges gave the jury a choice of only guilty of the charge or not guilty, except for robbery, which had a choice of (1) guilty of robbery with a dangerous weapon, (2) guilty of common law robbery, or (3) not guilty.

At 10:55 a.m., after the jury had retired to deliberate, the jury sent its first note to the court: “What did State need to prove for a verdict of guilty to Burning of personal property-Can we have a list?” At 11:35 a.m., the jury sent another note: “Are there any possible consequences/punishments/repercussions to a witness for lying under oath? Specifically a witness who made a plea agreement with the State? We need to be reinstructed on the elements needed to be proven by the state on the charge of robbery w/ a dangerous weapon & common law robbery.” The jury sent its third note at 12:25 p.m.: “Please reinstruct us on First Degree Murder. If we are going to lunch please wait until we return.” Shortly after receiving this note, the court dismissed the jurors for their lunch break and told them to return at 2:00 p.m.

After the lunch break, the court reinstructed the jury on first degree murder. At 3:00 p.m., after having resumed deliberation, the jury sent a fourth note: “Would you reinstruct us on one theory @ a time so that we may deliberate one @ a time. Please redefine ‘in concert[.] Please redefine ‘premeditated[.] Please reinstruct on the difference between 1st & 2nd degree murder.” In response to this note, the court first reinstructed the jury as to the theory of lying in wait. When the jury notified the court at 3:20 p.m. that it was ready for the next instruction, the court reinstructed the jury as to the theory of felony murder. After the jury indicated at 3:40 p.m. that it was ready for the final theory, the court reinstructed the jury as to the theory of premeditation and deliberation. At 4:15 p.m., the jury sent its fifth note of the day asking the court to “redefine two of five points” regarding premeditation and deliberation: “premeditation” and “intent.”

Shortly after the jurors exited the courtroom, the trial judge informed the State and defendant that before the court recessed for the day, the trial judge intended to ascertain whether the jury had already reached any unanimous verdicts:

Now, I am thinking about this. If we don't have the verdict, I should say verdicts by 5:00 p.m. I am going to make an inquiry if they've reached a verdict on any of the counts. If they have, it is my plan to take the verdict before we-those verdicts or verdict as the case may be if we have any before we adjourn for the evening. The reason being if they've reached a verdict on one or more and not on all and something happens over the evening hour I've got a problem. If we take those verdicts tonight, I won't have that problem.

Although the State had no objection, defendant noted his objection.

At 4:51 p.m., after about five hours of deliberation, the trial judge advised the State and defendant that he had resolved to go...

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6 cases
  • State v. Lail
    • United States
    • North Carolina Court of Appeals
    • December 30, 2016
    ...appropriate and recognizing that "special verdicts are a widely accepted method of preventing Blakely error"); State v. Sargeant , 206 N.C.App. 1, 10, 696 S.E.2d 786, 793 (2010) ("[A] jury's specification of its theory ... is for purposes of sentencing proceedings."), writ allowed , 364 N.C......
  • State v. Greenfield
    • United States
    • North Carolina Supreme Court
    • September 25, 2020
    ...belief or apprehension at the time the homicide is committed. " (emphasis added) (citations omitted)).5 See State v. Sargeant , 206 N.C. App. 1, 14, 696 S.E.2d 786, 795 (2010) (holding that the trial court "intru[ded] into the province of the jury" when it accepted partial verdicts and sent......
  • State v. Hill
    • United States
    • North Carolina Court of Appeals
    • May 21, 2013
    ...N.C.App. 735, 740, 656 S.E.2d 632, 635,cert. denied,362 N.C. 364, 664 S.E.2d 313 (2008); see also State v. Sargeant, 206 N.C.App. 1, 26, 696 S.E.2d 786, 802 (2010) (Ervin, J., dissenting) (“The issues that have been addressed by the Supreme Court and this Court in cases involving alleged vi......
  • State Carolina v. Sargeant
    • United States
    • North Carolina Supreme Court
    • March 11, 2011
    ...TEXT STARTS HERE Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A–30(2) from the decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, ––– N.C.App. ––––, 696 S.E.2d 786 (2010), ordering a new trial following a judgment imposing a sentence of life imprisonment without parole upon a jury verdict finding defen......
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