State Of North Carolina v. Horton
| Decision Date | 21 September 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 08 CRS 52715,No. 08 CRS 52692,08 CRS 52692,08 CRS 52715 |
| Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. RICKY JOVON HORTON |
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Amanda P. Little, for State.
Guy J. Loranger, for defendant.
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 2 6 May 2 009 by Judge Donald W. Stephens in Person County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 23 February 2010.
Defendant Ricky Jovon Horton appeals from a judgment imposing a probationary sentence upon him based upon his pleas of guilty to two counts of felonious larceny. On appeal, Defendant contends that Judge W. Osmond Smith, III ("trial court") erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a frisk of his person and that Judge Stephens erred by requiring him to pay restitution despite the absence of competent evidence as to the proper amount of restitution. After careful consideration of the record in light of the applicable law, we conclude that the trial court's findings of fact are not sufficient to permit us todetermine the extent to which investigating officers had the reasonable articulable suspicion needed to justify an investigatory detention of Defendant and that this case should be remanded to the Superior Court of Person County for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. With that exception, we conclude that Judge Stephens' judgment should remain undisturbed.
On 14 November 2008, Ralph Covert telephoned the Person County Sheriff's Office for the purpose of reporting a break-in at his residence. Mr. Covert stated that, upon entering the front door of his residence, he could hear someone running out of the rear door. Sheriff's Investigator Todd Dunn responded to the call, which he received at about lunchtime.
Upon arriving in the vicinity of Mr. Covert's residence approximately 15 minutes after the reported break-in, Officer Dunn spotted Defendant, who was then sixteen years old, walking next to a home roughly 150 yards away from Mr. Covert's residence and approximately 150 yards from the point at which Officer Dunn was located. Officer Dunn was driving an unmarked vehicle with a blue light on the dash and a siren and was traveling at 5 to 10 miles per hour. Defendant was the only person in the area, since most residents of that neighborhood are at work at that time of day. According to Officer Dunn, the location at which he observed Defendant was not a high crime area.
Officer Dunn testified that, as soon as Defendant made eye contact with him, Defendant ran in the opposite direction. After Defendant ran, Officer Dunn decided to pursue him. As Officer Dunn followed Defendant in his vehicle, he called for backup. Following a short pursuit, Officer Dunn apprehended Defendant, handcuffed him, and frisked him for weapons. During that process, Officer Dunn found a pocket knife in Defendant's right front pocket, several cell phones in his left pocket and various compact discs in his right rear pocket.
A short time later, Sergeant Oakley, who had initially traveled to Mr. Covert's residence, arrived at the site of Defendant's detention with information concerning the items that had been taken during the break-in. According to Sergeant Oakley, some of the items that Officer Dunn had taken from Defendant matched a list of items that had been taken from Mr. Covert's residence. After making that discovery, the officers opened the cell phone that had been seized from Defendant and discovered that Mr. Covert's name was listed on the phone. At that point, the officers placed Defendant under arrest. The following day, investigating officers discovered that other items seized from Defendant had been taken from another residence at which a breaking and entering had also been reported.
On 14 November 2008, a Warrant for Arrest charging Defendant with feloniously breaking or entering into Mr. Covert's residence and felonious larceny following that breaking or entering wasissued in File No. 08 CR 52692. On 17 November 2008, a Warrant for Arrest was issued in File No. 08 CR 52715 charging Defendant with feloniously breaking or entering into the residence of Michael Clayton, felonious larceny following that breaking or entering, and damage to Mr. Clayton's real property. On 9 February 2009, the Person County grand jury returned bills of indictment charging Defendant with two counts of felonious breaking and entering and felonious larceny in connection with break-ins occurring at the residences of Mr. Covert and Mr. Clayton.
On 3 March 2009, Defendant filed two pretrial motions to suppress, one of which was directed at "any and all statements made by Defendant to law enforcement officers, and any and all evidence stemming from these statements," and the other of which was directed toward "any and all items seized from the Defendant." At a suppression hearing held on 13 March 2009, the trial court granted Defendant's motion to suppress statements that he had made to investigating officers on the grounds that he had been given adult Miranda warnings rather than the warnings required to be administered to juvenile suspects. On the other hand, the trial court denied Defendant's motion to suppress the evidence seized at the time that Defendant was frisked.
On 26 May 2009, Defendant entered pleas of guilty pursuant to a negotiated arrangement to one count of felonious larceny in File No. 08 CrS 52692 and one count of felonious larceny in File No. 08 CrS 52715 before Judge Stephens. In return for Defendant's guilty pleas, the State voluntarily dismissed one count of trespass onrailroad right of way in File No. 08 CrS 52502, one count of felonious breaking and entering in File No. 08 CrS 52692, one count of injury to real property in File No. 08 CrS 52693 and one count of felonious breaking and entering and injury to real property in File No. 08 CrS 52715. At the time that he entered his guilty pleas, Defendant reserved the right to seek appellate review of the denial of his suppression motion. Based upon Defendant's guilty pleas, Judge Stephens found that Defendant had no prior record points and should be sentenced as a Level I offender. As a result, Judge Stephens consolidated Defendant's convictions for judgment and sentenced Defendant to a minimum term of 6 months and a maximum term of 8 months imprisonment in the custody of the North Carolina Department of Correction. However, Judge Stephens suspended Defendant's sentence and placed Defendant on supervised probation for 24 months subject to the usual terms and conditions of probation and the additional conditions that he pay the costs, $600 in restitution, and attorneys fees; obtain his G.E.D.; submit to warrantless searches for stolen goods, controlled substances, and contraband; submit breath, urine or blood samples for the purpose of drug or alcohol testing upon request; and avoid contact with any of the "victims." Defendant noted an appeal to this Court from the judgment imposed by Judge Stephens.
On appeal, Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the evidence obtained at the time that he was frisked by investigating officers on the grounds thatthe investigative detention to which he was subjected "was neither justified at its inception nor permissible in its scope" and that Judge Stephens erred in requiring him to pay restitution on the grounds that Judge Stephens' restitution order lacked adequate evidentiary support. With the exception of our determination that the trial court erred by failing to make adequate findings and conclusions to support its conclusion that Officer Dunn had a reasonable, articulable suspicion for his investigatory detention of Defendant and that this case should be remanded to the Person County Superior Court for additional findings of fact and conclusions of law, we find no error in the proceedings below.
The scope of review utilized in examining an appellate challenge to the denial of a defendant's motion to suppress is well-established. At bottom, "*[t]his Court must determine whether [the] findings of fact support the trial court's conclusions of law, and if so, the trial court's conclusions of law are binding on appeal.'" State v. Hendrickson, 124 N.C. App. 150, 153, 476 S.E.2d 389, 391 (1996) (), appeal dismissed and disc, review improvidently allowed, 346 N.C. 273, 485 S.E.2d 45 (1997). In making the required determination, the trial court's "findings of fact are treated as conclusive on appeal in the event that they are supported by competent evidence, even if the record contains evidence that wouldsupport a different finding." State v. Simmons, _ N.C. App. _, _, 688 S.E.2d 28, 30 (2010) (citing State v. Downing, 169 N.C. App. 790, 794, 613 S.E.2d 35, 38 (2005)). Such "deference is afforded the trial judge because he [or she] is in the best position to weigh the evidence, given that he [or she] has heard all of the testimony and observed the demeanor of the witnesses." State v. Hughes, 353 N.C. 200, 207, 539 S.E.2d 625, 631 (2000). "In the event that the trial court's factual findings have adequate evidentiary support, the relevant question on appeal becomes whether the trial court's conclusions of law embody a correct legal standard and are supported by its factual findings." Simmons, _ N.C. App. at _, 688 S.E.2d at 30 (citing State v. Coplen, 138 N.C. App. 48, 52, 530 S.E.2d 313, 317, cert, denied, 352 N.C. 677, 545 S.E.2d 438 (2000)). As a result, the trial court's conclusions of law are subject to de novo review. State v. Edwards, 185 N.C. App. 701, 702, 649 S.E.2d 646, 648, disc, review denied, 362 N.C. 89, 656 S.E.2d 281 (2007).
In denying Defendant's suppression motion, the...
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