State of S.D. v. Dole

• Decision Date: 21 May 1986
• Docket Number: No. 85-5223,85-5223
• Citation: 791 F.2d 628
• Parties: STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA, Appellant, v. Elizabeth H. DOLE, Secretary, United States Department of Transportation, Washington, D.C., in her official capacity, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 628

791 F.2d 628

54 USLW 2623

STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA, Appellant, v. Elizabeth H. DOLE, Secretary, United States Department of Transportation, Washington, D.C., in her official capacity, Appellee.

No. 85-5223.

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Feb. 13, 1986.

Decided May 21, 1986.

Mark V. Meierhenry, Atty. Gen., Pierre, S.D. and J. Wallace Malley, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen. (amici curiae) Montpelier, Vt., for appellant.

Robert V. Zener, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., for appellee.

Before ARNOLD, Circuit Judge, TIMBERS, ^* Senior Circuit Judge, and FAGG, Circuit Judge.

FAGG, Circuit Judge.

The State of South Dakota appeals the dismissal of its complaint challenging the constitutionality of a 1984 amendment to the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982. 23 U.S.C. Sec. 158. The challenged amendment was enacted under Congress's spending power, U.S. Const. art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 1, and was intended to encourage states to raise their minimum drinking age to twenty-one. Finding no constitutional impediment to Congress's action, we affirm the district court's dismissal of South Dakota's complaint.

I. Background

The law challenged by South Dakota was enacted by Congress in July of 1984 and provides:

(a)(1) The Secretary [of Transportation] shall withhold 5 per centum of [a State's highway funds] * * * on the first day of the fiscal year succeeding the fiscal year beginning after September 30, 1985, in which the purchase or public possession in such State of any alcoholic beverage by a person who is less than twenty-one years of age is lawful.

(2) The Secretary [of Transportation] shall withhold 10 per centum of [a State's highway funds] * * * on the first day of the fiscal year succeeding the second fiscal year beginning after September 30, 1985, in which the purchase or public possession in such State of any alcoholic beverage by a person who is less than twenty-one years of age is lawful.

(b) The Secretary [of Transportation] shall promptly apportion to a State any funds which have been withheld * * * under subsection (a) of this section * * * if in any succeeding fiscal year such State makes unlawful the purchase or public possession of any alcoholic beverage by a person who is less than twenty-one years of age.

* * *

* * *

23 U.S.C. Sec. 158.

In essence, that law requires the Secretary of Transportation (Secretary) to withhold a percentage of a state's federal highway funds in fiscal years 1987 and 1988 if, by October 1, 1986, the state has not adopted a minimum drinking age of twenty-one. Id. Sec. 158(a). Funds withheld in 1987 (five percent) and 1988 (ten percent) may be reapportioned to a state if the state "in any succeeding fiscal year" raises its minimum drinking age to twenty-one. Id. Sec. 158(b).

South Dakota presently allows individuals under the age of twenty-one to purchase certain types of alcoholic beverages. As a result, South Dakota will be ineligible to receive five percent of its 1987 (approximately $4,000,000) and ten percent of its 1988 (approximately $8,000,000) federal highway funds unless it adopts a minimum drinking age of twenty-one. South Dakota argues that Congress, by enacting this law, has impermissibly impaired the state's exclusive and constitutionally protected right to regulate the consumption of alcoholic beverages within the state and as a consequence has violated both the twenty-first amendment and the tenth amendment of the United States Constitution.

In response, the Secretary concedes the state's broad power to regulate extensively the traffic, sale, manufacture, and consumption of alcohol within the state. The Secretary also concedes that incident to that broad power is the authority to establish a minimum drinking age within the state. The Secretary asserts, however, that the state's power to regulate alcohol is not exclusive and does not preclude Congress from addressing alcohol related problems of a nationwide (rather than purely local) nature.

Specifically, the Secretary contends the law at issue falls within the scope of Congress's authority under the spending clause. By conditioning a small portion of a state's federal highway funds on the adoption of a minimum drinking age of twenty-one, Congress has attempted to enlist the state's cooperation in addressing an evil--drunk driving--that not only transcends state lines but, in Congress's view, is actually aggravated by state lines. Further, the Secretary argues that this law undermines no attribute of sovereignty retained by the state and in no way diminishes the state's power to regulate extensively the traffic, sale, manufacture, and consumption of alcohol within the state.

II. Congress's Power Under the Spending Clause

Congress's power under the spending clause is a separate and distinct grant of legislative authority and is in no way limited by its other broad legislative powers. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474, 100 S.Ct. 2758, 2772, 65 L.Ed.2d 902 (1980) (opinion by Burger, C.J.); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90-91, 96 S.Ct. 612, 668-69, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) (per curiam); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65-66, 56 S.Ct. 312, 319, 80 L.Ed. 477 (1936). That power, when viewed in conjunction with the necessary and proper clause, is quite expansive, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 90, 96 S.Ct. at 668, and without question includes the authority to attach conditions to the receipt and further expenditure of federal funds, see Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. at 474, 100 S.Ct. at 2772 (opinion by Burger, C.J.) (citing cases that uphold Congress's placement of conditions on the receipt of federal funds).

Congress's power under the spending clause is not, however, unlimited. First, in exercising that power, Congress must seek to further the well-being of the nation as a whole and not simply the well-being of a particular region or locality. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. at 64-67, 56 S.Ct. at 318-19; see also Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640-41, 57 S.Ct. 904, 908-09, 81 L.Ed. 1307 (1937); Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 586-87, 57 S.Ct. 883, 890-91, 81 L.Ed. 1279 (1937). Further, any conditions imposed by Congress must be reasonably related to the national interest Congress seeks to advance. See Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461, 98 S.Ct. 1153, 1164, 55 L.Ed.2d 403 (1978) (opinion by Brennan, J.). Finally, these conditions must not violate any "independent constitutional bar," Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood School District, 469 U.S. 256, 105 S.Ct. 695, 703, 83 L.Ed.2d 635 (1985), or "controlling constitutional prohibition," King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333 n. 34, 88 S.Ct. 2128, 2141 n. 34, 20 L.Ed.2d 1118 (1968). See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 91, 96 S.Ct. at 669.

South Dakota does not contend either that Congress acted unreasonably in concluding the national welfare is advanced by expending federal funds to develop and maintain a national highway system or that Congress could not reasonably believe drunk drivers represent a serious threat to the safe and uninterrupted use of these highways. Rather, South Dakota challenges the means adopted by Congress to further the nation's interest in safe highways.

In its debates over the bill that became 23 U.S.C. Sec. 158, Congress evidenced the growing national concern over the problem of drunk driving. Virtually without exception, the members of Congress, while often disagreeing on what should or could be done about the problem, agreed that the problem of drunk driving disproportionately touches the lives of young adults. See generally 130 Cong.Rec. S8208-47 (daily ed. June 26, 1984); 130 Cong.Rec. H5395-407 (daily ed. June 1, 1984) (the House and Senate debates over the proposed legislation).

Significantly, as evidenced by their debates, most members of Congress also believed the problem of young adults drinking and driving is not purely a local or intrastate problem but rather is a problem with substantial national and interstate ramifications. Specifically, as a result of the patchwork of differing state laws, young adults who are unable to consume alcohol legally in their home state often drive to states having lower drinking ages. Then, after consuming varying amounts of alcohol, these individuals attempt to return home, often with tragic and even fatal results. See, e.g., 130 Cong.Rec. S8228 (daily ed. June 26, 1984) (statement of Sen. Mitchell); id. at S8239 (statement of Sen. Bradley and statement of Sen. Biden); id. at S8241 (statement of Sen. Huddleston and statement of Sen. Hollings); 130 Cong.Rec. H5395 (daily ed. June 1, 1984) (statement of Rep. Anderson); id. at H5398 (statement of Rep. Barnes); id. at H5402 (statement of Rep. Coats and statement of Rep. Porter).

Given this reality, Congress concluded that encouraging states to adopt a uniform minimum drinking age of twenty-one would not only increase the safety of our nation's highways and save thousands of lives but would also protect the valuable national resource represented by our nation's youth. Thus, as a means to achieving these ends, Congress conditioned a portion of each state's federal highway funds on the state's adoption of a minimum drinking age of twenty-one.

Giving appropriate deference to Congress's view of the national welfare and the means necessary to promote that welfare, see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 91, 96 S.Ct. at 669; Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. at 640-41, 644-45, 57 S.Ct. at 909-10, we believe Congress reasonably could have concluded the problem of young adults drinking and driving is not a purely local or intrastate concern but rather is a concern of interstate and national proportions. We further believe Congress, in its reasoned discretion, could determine that a uniform minimum drinking age would lessen that problem and improve the safety of our nation's highways for all Americans. Finally, we conclude Congress's decision to condition a portion of a state's federal...