State of Me. v. U.S. Dept. of Labor, 85-1080

Decision Date09 August 1985
Docket NumberNo. 85-1080,85-1080
Citation770 F.2d 236
PartiesSTATE OF MAINE and Patricia M. McDonough, Commissioner, Maine Department of Labor, Petitioners, v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, and Ford B. Ford, Under Secretary of Labor, Respondents. Penobscot Consortium, Intervenor.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Pamela W. Waite, Asst. Atty. Gen., Augusta, Me., with whom James E. Tierney, Atty. Gen., Augusta, Me., was on brief for petitioners.

Vincent C. Costantino, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Office of the Solicitor, Washington, D.C., with whom Francis X. Lilly, Sol. of Labor, William H. DuRoss, III, Associate Sol. for Employment and Training, and Harry L. Sheinfeld, Counsel for Litigation, Washington, D.C., were on brief for Secretary of Labor.

Noel H. Klores, Washington, D.C., with whom Klores, Feldesman & Tucker, Washington, D.C., was on brief for Penobscot Consortium.

Before CAMPBELL, Chief Judge, RUBIN * and BREYER, Circuit Judges.

BREYER, Circuit Judge.

Maine's Department of Labor ("Maine Labor") and Penobscot Consortium both applied to the United States Department of Labor ("DOL") for a grant to provide job training for Maine's migrant and seasonal farmworkers. 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1672. The DOL awarded the grant to Penobscot Consortium; its competitor (Maine Labor) here asks us to review DOL's decision, and, in effect, to set it aside. 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1578. We decline to do so.

I

Maine Labor's basic claim is that, in awarding the grant to Penobscot, DOL did not follow its own prescribed procedures; and, in any event, the procedures that DOL actually followed are contrary to a governing statute. 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1672. In support of this claim, Maine Labor points to the fact that DOL announced it would award the grant on the basis of scores given by a review panel (which considered the applicants' experience, administrative ability, and so forth), and yet DOL did not award the grant to the highest scoring applicant. The panel gave Maine Labor 86.6 points, and Penobscot 84.3 points, out of 100 possible points. Despite Maine Labor's higher score, DOL gave the grant to Penobscot. DOL administrators said they found the scores so close--within a "competitive range" of three points--that Penobscot's advantages as an incumbent (lower start-up costs, less service disruption) tipped the balance in its favor.

Maine Labor appealed within the agency. And, an agency ALJ said that DOL had applied its 'scores-within-a-close-competitive-range-are-not-final' theory only to incumbents its theory therefore amounted to a bonus for incumbents; and, under existing procedures, such a bonus was improper. See 41 C.F.R. Secs. 29-3.805-52 (1984). In addition, the ALJ noted that DOL's administrators had not held post-scoring discussions with both competitors, as existing procedures required. See 41 C.F.R. Secs. 29-3.805-53, -3.805-54 (1984). The ALJ thought this practice not only violated DOL's rules, but also violated a statute requiring DOL to use grant award "procedures consistent with standard competitive government policies." 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1672(c)(1). The Undersecretary of DOL then reviewed the ALJ's decision and reversed it. 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1576. Essentially, he concluded that in close cases DOL administrators have discretion to consider incumbency, or, as he called it, "being in place," as "a factor in selecting a service delivery agent." And, he awarded the grant for the October 1983-June 1985 grant period to Penobscot, which consequently administered Maine's migrant worker training program during that time.

Since DOL's Undersecretary made his decision, two sets of events have occurred that affect its review in this court. First, DOL has changed its grant procedures, so that applicants are now on notice that the "high scorer" may not always receive the grant. 49 Fed.Reg. 41118, 41120 (1984). Second, the relevant grant period (1983-85) has now expired. DOL has selected a grant recipient for the 1985-87 grant period, and the new grant administration period has begun. In light of this background, Maine Labor's legal arguments, and these supervening facts, we conclude that Maine Labor is not legally entitled to the relief that it seeks.

II

Our basic conclusion rests upon our belief that (1) there is no significant, existing legal controversy between Maine Labor and DOL in respect to DOL's likely future conduct; and (2) we are without power to award meaningful relief in respect to DOL's past decision to award Penobscot the 1983-85 grant. We discuss each of these points in turn.

1. Insofar as Maine Labor wants this court to issue an injunction or declaration prohibiting DOL from acting unlawfully in the future, it must show some reasonable likelihood of unlawful future behavior. See, e.g., United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89-90, 67 S.Ct. 556, 564, 91 L.Ed. 754 (1947) ("hypothetical threat is not enough" to warrant declaratory relief); Connecticut v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 674, 51 S.Ct. 286, 291, 75 L.Ed. 602 (1931) ("Injunction ... will not be granted against something merely feared as liable to occur at some indefinite time in the future."); Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482, 102 S.Ct. 1181, 1183, 71 L.Ed.2d 353 (1982) (per curiam) (to overcome mootness there "must be a 'reasonable expectation' or a 'demonstrated possibility' that some controversy will recur involving the same complaining party") (quoting Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149, 96 S.Ct. 347, 349, 46 L.Ed.2d 350 (1975) (per curiam) ). In this case, Maine Labor would have to show a likely future violation of either (a) DOL's own procedures, or (b) the governing statute. As far as DOL's procedures are concerned, DOL has now made changes specifying that the high scorer will not automatically receive the grant; rather, scores are "advisory ... and not binding on the grant officer"--i.e., the grant officer may take other factors into account. 49 Fed.Reg. 41118, 41120 (1984). Maine Labor has not shown us any DOL regulation that is violated by these new procedures; nor has it given us any reason to believe it likely that DOL will violate any "consultative" or other requirement contained in its regulations.

Maine Labor cannot show any likely future violation of the statute for two reasons. First, the record here does not suggest that DOL will give large or important advantages to incumbency. The facts of this case illustrate only a relatively minor advantage provided to the incumbent--an advantage reasonably described as given to one "in place" in order to prevent disruptions that grant beneficiaries, e.g., migrant workers, might otherwise suffer. Moreover, DOL has said that in the future it will give no bonus for incumbency. The 1985-87 grant award results are consistent with that promise, for in every case the highest scoring applicant was given the award. Thus, at most, Maine Labor has shown one past instance in which DOL gave a small advantage to incumbency in a very close case.

Second, we see nothing in the statute that prohibits DOL from taking some account in close cases of advantages that incumbents may have as service providers (such as less disruption or lower start-up costs). The statute to which Maine Labor points says simply that DOL's procedures must be "consistent with" the government's "standard procurement policies." Assuming purely for the sake of argument that there is some "standard procurement policy" that says "no advantage of any sort may ever be given any incumbent," this statute would not require literal compliance. Rather, both the language of the statute and its legislative history show that Congress wished to give DOL some flexibility in its procurement of services for migrant farmworkers. When the law was considered by a Senate-House Conference, the Senate version of the bill required the Secretary of Labor to use "standard competitive government procurement policies." H.Conf.Rep. No. 889, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 110 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 2705, 2732. The Conference added the words "procedures consistent with" as a prefix. Id. This addition gives DOL more flexibility and rules out literalism. Moreover, when it passed the new statute Congress expressly repealed a section of former law that said that DOL could not "assign any preferential weighting factor" to an incumbent. See former 29 U.S.C. Sec. 873(c)(1), repealed by Job...

To continue reading

Request your trial
11 cases
  • Am. Civil Liberties Union of Mass. v. U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit
    • 15 Enero 2013
    ...court's] order....”). This is also the rule in challenges to expired or exhausted government grants, see, e.g., Maine v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 770 F.2d 236, 239 (1st Cir.1985); Caldwell v. Caldwell, 545 F.3d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir.2008); Campesinos Unidos, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 803 F.2d ......
  • Katz v. McVeigh
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of New Hampshire
    • 15 Marzo 2013
    ...the plaintiffs failed to allege facts suggesting “a likelihood of future unlawful conduct on the defendant's part,” Maine v. Dep't of Labor, 770 F.2d 236, 238 (1st Cir.1985), this claim is also not ripe for adjudication, because its resolution “involves uncertain and contingent events that ......
  • Federal Sav. and Loan Ins. Corp. v. Locke
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas
    • 14 Junio 1989
    ...to other candidates. In such cases, the courts have uniformly found the challenges to be moot. See, e.g., Maine v. United States Dep't of Labor, 770 F.2d 236, 239 (1st Cir.1985); North Dakota Rural Dev. Corp. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 819 F.2d 199, 200 (8th Cir.1987); Campesinos Unid......
  • Lopez v. Garriga, 90-1422
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit
    • 7 Septiembre 1990
    ...(1st Cir.1989), or else he must show a likelihood of future unlawful conduct on the defendant's part. See Maine v. United States Dep't of Labor, 770 F.2d 236, 238 (1st Cir.1985); Lovell v. Brennan, 728 F.2d 560, 562 (1st Cir.1984). To gain a permanent injunction in the former case, the plai......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT