State Of Vt. v. Ford

• Decision Date: 14 May 2010
• Docket Number: No. 08-490.,08-490.
• Citation: 998 A.2d 684,2010 VT 39
• Parties: STATE of Vermontv.Justin FORD.
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court

998 A.2d 684

2010 VT 39

STATE of Vermontv.Justin FORD.

No. 08-490.

Supreme Court of Vermont.

May 14, 2010.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

William J. Porter, Orange County State's Attorney, Chelsea, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Matthew F. Valerio, Defender General, Anna Saxman, Deputy Defender General, and Dan Stevens, Legal Intern, Montpelier, for Defendant-Appellant.

Present: REIBER, C.J., DOOLEY, JOHNSON, SKOGLUND and BURGESS, JJ.

SKOGLUND, J.

¶ 1. Justin Ford appeals from the judgment of conviction rendered following his conditional pleas to possession of marijuana and possession of narcotics. The defendant claims that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress certain evidence seized from his house. We agree and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand.

¶ 2. Sometime in the early morning of March 20, 2008, an individual called 9-1-1, said his name was Stephen Ford, and said he had been in an accident and was trapped in his vehicle on the Hartford-Quechee Road in Hartford in Windsor County. Stephen Ford is the brother of defendant, Justin Ford. Nothing in the record established the time of the 9-1-1 call. Police and the local EMS squad responded and searched the area, but did not find a damaged car or Stephen Ford in the area. Subsequently, at around 5:20 a.m. on March 20, a Vermont state police trooper from the Middlesex barracks was contacted at her home by her dispatcher and directed to perform a welfare check on Stephen Ford at his last known address on Brook Street in Williamstown in Orange County.

¶ 3. The trooper arrived at the Brook Street address shortly before 6 a.m. and saw one car in the driveway buried by snow. She concluded that it had not been used for awhile. She saw no fresh tire tracks, nor did she see lights on in the house. The only tracks she saw were footprints leading to a basement door of the house adjacent to the driveway. From prior experience with Stephen Ford in an unrelated matter six months earlier, the trooper believed that he lived in the basement of the house. She approached the door and knocked on it a few times, announcing her presence. Hearing no response, the trooper decided to check the remainder of the house. She knew there was another entrance on the north side of the house, but because there was no path through the snow in that direction and because there was a snowmobile track leading around to the south side of the house, she proceeded along the track to the back of the house.

¶ 4. Upon reaching the back of the house, the trooper saw lights coming from the further of two basement windows. Stepping off the snowmobile trail, she approached the house, knocked on the nearer window and announced, “State Police, please come to the door.” She did not hear anything from inside, so she approached the lighted window. As she bent down to the window, she saw, through a gap between the curtains, several small marijuana plants growing in a glass aquarium under a bright grow-light. The trooper did not see anyone inside the room, so she halted her search and left the premises.

¶ 5. Based on what she had observed, the trooper obtained a search warrant for the house on Brook Street, which she thought was Stephen Ford's house. At around 3 p.m. that afternoon she and a number of other officers returned and searched the home, seizing a dozen marijuana plants, several oxycodone tablets, and other materials thought to be used in a drug-growing operation. While the search was progressing, the owner of the home-and mother of Justin Ford and Stephen Ford-contacted the trooper to ask why her home was being searched. The trooper informed her of the series of events leading to the search. The caller explained that defendant lived in the home and that Stephen had not lived there for some time. A further search of the home uncovered mail and other personal items addressed to defendant. Defendant was subsequently charged with two misdemeanor counts of possession of marijuana and possession of narcotics.

¶ 6. Before trial, defendant moved to suppress the physical evidence gathered in the afternoon search of his home. Defendant contested the search on the premise that the warrant authorizing the search was based on the trooper's warrantless early-morning entry onto the grounds of his home and her observations through his window, and thus, the evidence was obtained in violation of his constitutionally protected rights. In opposition, the State claimed that the trooper's entry onto defendant's property was lawful under the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement. At the evidentiary hearing, the trooper testified to the facts above. Based on this testimony, the trial court denied defendant's motion, finding that the search satisfied the requirements of the emergency aid exception as laid out in State v. Mountford, 171 Vt. 487, 769 A.2d 639 (2000). Subsequently, defendant entered into a conditional plea agreement, admitting guilt pending the outcome of this appeal.

¶ 7. On appeal from a denial of a motion to suppress, we review the trial court's findings of fact deferentially and reverse only if the findings are clearly erroneous. State v. Bryant, 2008 VT 39, ¶ 9, 183 Vt. 355, 950 A.2d 467. Under this standard, “we will uphold the court's factual findings unless, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, and excluding the effect of modifying evidence, there is no reasonable or credible evidence to support them.” State v. Rheaume, 2005 VT 106, ¶ 6, 179 Vt. 39, 889 A.2d 711 (quotation omitted). Whether the facts as found meet the proper standard justifying a particular police action is a question of law. State v. Mara, 2009 VT 96A, ¶ 6, 186 Vt. ----, 987 A.2d 939. We review legal issues de novo. Bryant, 2008 VT 39, ¶ 9, 183 Vt. 355, 950 A.2d 467.

¶ 8. Defendant first challenges the trial court's factual findings, arguing that the court erred when it found: (1) that the trooper had seen “recent footprints leading to the basement door”; (2) that it was apparent to the trooper that “someone had recently entered the basement door”; and (3) that it was “implied that there had been no information that [Stephen Ford] had been picked up by anybody and transported to a hospital.” In reviewing the trooper's testimony at the suppression hearing, we can find no evidence to support the finding that the footprints or entry into the residence were recent. The trooper's testimony referred only to footprints in the snow; she made no statements about how old or new the tracks may have been, when the last snow had fallen, or any other indicia of when the prints were made. The State argues that the court could make a logical inference that the tracks were “recent” from the trooper's testimony; however, we fail to see how such an inference can be drawn from testimony establishing only their existence. As to the second challenged finding, as above, we find nothing in the record to support the court's finding that “someone had recently entered the basement door.” These findings of the court are not supported by the evidence and are clearly erroneous and cannot be upheld. Defendant's third challenge is not to a finding so much as to a conclusion: “it's implied that there had been no information that [Stephen] had been picked up by anybody and transported to a hospital.” This is a reasonable, if immaterial, inference, based on the testimony that Stephen was not located on the Hartford-Quechee Road and the state police had dispatched the trooper to his last known address to look for him. Thus, we find no error in this finding.

¶ 9. Defendant's central argument on appeal is that the trooper's entry onto his property and the resulting discovery of the illegal items constituted a warrantless search of his home in violation of his rights under the Vermont Constitution.¹ Defendant claims that when the trooper walked around his house and peered into the lighted basement window, she invaded the curtilage of his home and effected a search without a warrant. Though defendant recognizes that warrantless searches are permissible under certain circumstances, he contends that this search failed to meet the criteria for the emergency aid exception, and thus, the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress.

¶ 10. Article 11 of the Vermont Constitution protects the people's right to be free from “unreasonable government intrusions into legitimate expectations of privacy.” Bryant, 2008 VT 39, ¶ 10, 183 Vt. 355, 950 A.2d 467 (quotation omitted). The home is “a repository of heightened privacy expectations,” and as such, it receives heightened protection under Article 11 Id. ¶ 12 (quotation omitted). Because some areas outside the physical confines of a house are so intimately tied to the “privacies of life,” we recognize the “same constitutional protection from unreasonable searches and seizures” for this so- called curtilage “as [for] the home itself.” State v. Rogers, 161 Vt. 236, 241, 638 A.2d 569, 572 (1993) (citing Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984)). An individual's interest in privacy is safeguarded from government intrusion by requiring “advance judicial approval” in the form of a warrant. Mountford, 171 Vt. at 489, 769 A.2d at 643 (quotation omitted). This detached review prevents law enforcement from “deciding on their own, without the approval of a neutral judicial officer, to invade a person's privacy” in the absence of “exceptional circumstances.” Id. (quotation omitted). When government agents conduct a warrantless search, the law presumes such an intrusion into an individual's privacy is unreasonable and a constitutional violation. Bryant, 2008 VT 39, ¶ 10, 183 Vt. 355, 950 A.2d 467. Indeed, such invasions are “permissible only pursuant to a few narrowly drawn and well-delineated exceptions.” Bauder, 2007 VT 16, ¶ 14, 181 Vt. 392, 924 A.2d 38; see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25-26, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20...