State Of Wis. v. Jensen
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Wisconsin |
| Citation | 2010 WI 38,782 N.W.2d 415 |
| Docket Number | No. 2008AP552-CR.,2008AP552-CR. |
| Parties | STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent,v.Scott R. JENSEN, Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. |
| Decision Date | 20 May 2010 |
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by Robert H. Friebert, Matthew W. O'Neill, and Friebert, Finerty & St. John, S.C., Milwaukee, and R. Ryan Stoll and Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, LLP, Chicago, Ill., and oral argument by Robert H. Friebert.
For the plaintiff respondent the cause was argued by Brian W. Blanchard, district attorney, with whom on the brief was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general.
We review a decision of the court of appeals 1 affirming the circuit court's decision 2 denying Scott R. Jensen's (Jensen) motion to change the venue of his criminal trial to Waukesha County Circuit Court pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 971.19(12) (2007-08).3 The issue presented is whether Waukesha County Circuit Court is the proper venue for Jensen's trial because it is the “circuit court for the county where the defendant resides” pursuant to § 971.19(12), or whether Dane County Circuit Court, the circuit court for the county “where the crime was committed,” is the proper venue for his trial pursuant to § 971.19(1).
¶ 2 We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 971.19(12) establishes Waukesha County Circuit Court as the proper venue for Jensen's trial because the State's allegations against Jensen come within two categories of actions described in § 971.19(12). First, the State alleged that Jensen violated a law arising from or in relation “to the official functions of the subject of the investigation.” Second, the State alleged that Jensen violated a law “arising from or in relation to ... any matter that involves elections ... under chs. 5 to 12.” Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals decision affirming the circuit court's denial of Jensen's motion to change the venue of his trial to Waukesha County Circuit Court. Waukesha County Circuit Court is the proper venue for the action that the State has brought against Jensen.
¶ 3 On October 18, 2002, the State filed a complaint in Dane County Circuit Court charging Jensen with three counts of felony misconduct in public office as party to the crime, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 946.12(3) 4 and one misdemeanor count of intentional misuse of public positions for private benefit as party to the crime, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 19.45(2). The complaint alleged that the acts relating to Jensen's alleged violations occurred in Dane County.
¶ 4 Jensen moved to dismiss the complaint on various grounds. The circuit court denied his motion to dismiss, and in an interlocutory appeal, the court of appeals affirmed. State v. Jensen ( Jensen I ), 2004 WI App 89, ¶¶ 1-2, 272 Wis.2d 707, 681 N.W.2d 230. While the decision of the court of appeals was ultimately affirmed, we note that only four justices participated in the decision and there was no majority on all issues that the court of appeals decided; therefore, parts of the court of appeals decision were affirmed due to the equal split among the justices. See State v. Jensen ( Jensen II ), 2005 WI 31, ¶ 2, 279 Wis.2d 220, 694 N.W.2d 56 (per curiam).
¶ 5 Following a jury trial, Jensen was found guilty on all four counts. Jensen appealed each of the three felony convictions. The court of appeals concluded that the circuit court erred in instructing the jury and in excluding portions of Jensen's own testimony. State v. Jensen ( Jensen III ), 2007 WI App 256, ¶ 1, 306 Wis.2d 572, 743 N.W.2d 468. Accordingly, it remanded for a new trial. Id. ¶ 6 In February 2007, while Jensen's second appeal was pending, the legislature enacted Wis. Stat. § 971.19(12), which provides that defendants charged with certain violations of, and violations arising from or in relation to, the elections, ethics, and lobbying regulation laws are to be tried in the county where the defendant resides. See 2007 Wis. Act 1, § 205. On January 10, 2008, 2007 Wis. Act 1 went into effect. On that date, pursuant to § 971.19(12), Jensen moved the court to transfer his case from Dane County Circuit Court, where the misconduct is alleged to have occurred, to Waukesha County Circuit Court, where Jensen resides. The circuit court denied Jensen's motion, concluding that § 971.19(12) is clear and unambiguous and that it does not apply to the charges pending against Jensen. The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's decision denying Jensen's motion.
¶ 7 We granted review and now reverse.
¶ 8 To resolve the question presented, we must interpret and apply Wis. Stat. § 971.19(12). “ ‘The interpretation and application of a statute to an undisputed set of facts are questions of law that we review independently.’ ” Estate of Genrich v. OHIC Ins. Co., 2009 WI 67, ¶ 10, 318 Wis.2d 553, 769 N.W.2d 481 (quoting McNeil v. Hansen, 2007 WI 56, ¶ 7, 300 Wis.2d 358, 731 N.W.2d 273).
¶ 9 The parties offer competing interpretations of Wis. Stat. § 971.19(12). 5 The State contends that § 971.19(12) does not apply to the charges pending against Jensen; therefore, he must be retried in Dane County Circuit Court. Jensen contends that § 971.19(12) does apply to the charges pending against him, and pursuant to his change of venue motion, requires he be retried in Waukesha County Circuit Court. Before examining the language of the statute, it is instructive to examine each party's argument in detail.
¶ 10 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.19(12) applies to “violation[s] of any other law arising from or in relation to the official functions of the subject of the investigation.” The State argues that “the investigation” must be a Government Accountability Board investigation. Because Jensen has never been the subject of an investigation conducted by the Government Accountability Board, the State contends that this portion of the statute does not apply to him.
¶ 11 The last portion of Wis. Stat. § 971.19(12) applies to violations of any other law arising from or in relation to “any matter that involves elections, ethics, or lobbying regulation.” The State contends that “regulation” modifies “elections,” “ethics,” and “lobbying.” Pointing to the Government Accountability Board's ability to promulgate administrative regulations interpreting or implementing the laws regulating the conduct and administration of elections under Wis. Stat. § 5.05(1)(f), the State argues that this portion of § 971.19(12) applies only to violations arising from or in relation to administrative regulations promulgated by the Government Accountability Board. Because Jensen was not charged with a violation of any such regulation, the State contends that this portion of the statute does not apply to him.
¶ 12 Jensen contends that the phrase “the subject of the investigation” should not be construed to mean “the subject of the [Government Accountability Board] investigation.” Instead, Jensen contends that this phrase applies to investigations by the Government Accountability Board, the former Elections Board,6 the former Ethics Board, or those undertaken independently by district attorneys. Jensen was the subject of an investigation by the former Elections Board and by the district attorney. Accordingly, because Jensen's pending charges allege a violation of a law “arising from or in relation to” his “official functions” and he was “the subject of the investigation,” Wis. Stat. § 971.19(12) requires him to be tried in Waukesha County Circuit Court.
¶ 13 Jensen further contends that the term “regulation” in the phrase “any matter that involves elections, ethics, or lobbying regulation” does not refer to administrative rule-making. Instead, the term “lobbying regulation” is a term of art referring to subch. III of ch. 13, which subchapter is entitled the “Regulation of Lobbying.” Jensen argues that the allegations against him fall squarely within the statute because he was charged with the violation of “any other law arising from or in relation to” any matter involving “elections ... under chs. 5 to 12.”
¶ 14 Statutory interpretation begins with the language of the statute. State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶ 45, 271 Wis.2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. If the meaning of the words in the statute is plain, the analysis goes no further. Id. Statutes must be interpreted reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable results. Id., ¶ 46. And, where possible, an interpretation must give effect to every word in the statute to avoid surplusage. Id.
¶ 15 Context and purpose are important in discerning the plain meaning of a statute. Id., ¶ 48. As such, statutory language is interpreted in the context in which it is used, in relation to the surrounding and closely-related statutes. Id., ¶ 46. “Some statutes contain explicit statements of legislative purpose....” Id., ¶ 49. In construing a statute, we favor a construction that fulfills the purpose of the statute over one that defeats that purpose. Cnty. of Dane v. LIRC, 2009 WI 9, ¶ 34, 315 Wis.2d 293, 759 N.W.2d 571. Finally, we do not resort to legislative history in interpreting a statute if the statute's meaning is plain; however, legislative history may be used “to confirm or verify a plain-meaning interpretation.” Kalal, 271 Wis.2d 633, ¶ 51, 681 N.W.2d 110.
¶ 16 Generally, a “[c]riminal action[ ] shall be tried in the county where the crime was committed, except as otherwise provided.” Wis. Stat. § 971.19(1). In 2007 Wis. Act 1, the legislature created an exception to the general venue provision. The legislature enacted § 971.19(12), a new rule of criminal procedure, to establish venue in criminal actions involving violations of, and violations arising from or in relation to, the elections, ethics, and lobbying regulation laws. ...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Manitowoc Co. v. Lanning, 2015AP1530
...to show that the restrain is unreasonable.").35 Brief of Plaintiff–Respondent–Petitioner The Manitowoc Company, Inc. at 39.36 State v. Jensen, 2010 WI 38, ¶ 29, 324 Wis. 2d 586, 782 N.W.2d 415 (noting in its interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 971.19(12) that "a phrase modified by the word 'any'......
-
Schill v. Wis. Rapids Sch. Dist., 2008AP967-AC.
...Wis.2d 707, 681 N.W.2d 230, subsequent appeal at State v. Jensen, 2009 WI App 26, 316 Wis.2d 377, 762 N.W.2d 833, rev'd State v. Jensen, 2010 WI 38, 324 Wis.2d 586, 782 N.W.2d 415. 32. Lead op., ¶ 141. 33. Lead op., ¶ 29. 34. The three justices who participate in the lead opinion and Justic......
-
Bostco LLC v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist.
...instructive in determining a term's meaning.” State v. Soto, 2012 WI 93, ¶ 20, 343 Wis.2d 43, 817 N.W.2d 848 (citing State v. Jensen, 2010 WI 38, ¶ 15, 324 Wis.2d 586, 782 N.W.2d 415). The purpose of the legislation also may be useful in ascertaining a statute's meaning. Sheboygan Cnty. Dep......
-
State v. Thurber, 2015AP161–CR.
...testimony are not in dispute. Applying undisputed facts to the language of a statute is a matter of law we review de novo. State v. Jensen, 2010 WI 38, ¶ 8, 324 Wis.2d 586, 782 N.W.2d 415. Few Wisconsin cases address § 971.23(7m)(a) from the perspective of precluding testimony of a defense ......