State Of Wis. v. Harris
| Decision Date | 14 July 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 2008AP810-CR.,2008AP810-CR. |
| Citation | 2010 WI 79,786 N.W.2d 409 |
| Parties | STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner,v.Landray M. HARRIS, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner there was oral argument by Rebecca Rapp St. John, assistant attorney general, with whom on the briefs was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general.
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief and oral argument by Michael K. Gould, assistant state public defender, Milwaukee.
An amicus curiae brief filed by Kathryn A. Holtz, Madison, and Victor Goode and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Baltimore, Md., on behalf of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.
¶ 1 Following his conviction and sentencing for drug-related crimes, Landray M. Harris moved for relief from his sentence on the grounds that the court made inappropriate comments reflecting racial and gender stereotypes during the sentencing hearing. The circuit court denied the motion, and in an unpublished opinion,1 the court of appeals reversed and held that the defendant was entitled to resentencing.
¶ 2 This case concerns the proper legal principles that govern review of a sentence when a defendant claims the circuit court imposed its sentence on the basis of race or gender. The court of appeals adopted, and Harris endorses, a new “reasonable observer” test which queries whether the circuit court's comments suggest to a reasonable observer that the court improperly relied on race or gender when imposing its sentence. The State maintains that a reasonable observer's perception of the court's comments is not indicative of whether the court improperly relied on race or gender.
¶ 3 We agree with the State and reject the reasonable observer test created by the court of appeals. Sentencing decisions are afforded a presumption of reasonability consistent with Wisconsin's strong public policy against interference with a circuit court's discretion. Our review of sentencing decisions is therefore limited to determining whether the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion. Discretion is erroneously exercised when a sentencing court actually relies on clearly irrelevant or improper factors, and the defendant bears the burden of proving such reliance by clear and convincing evidence. It is beyond dispute that race and gender are improper factors; they may not be relied upon-at all-in the imposition of a sentence.
¶ 4 After reviewing the sentencing transcript in context and as a whole, we conclude that Harris has not met his burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the circuit court actually relied on race or gender. The circuit court considered the proper factors-it evaluated the gravity of the offense, Harris's character, and the public's need for protection. The circuit court thoroughly explained its reasons for the sentence it imposed, and all of the potentially offensive comments flagged by both Harris and the court of
appeals bear a reasonable nexus to proper sentencing factors. Because Harris has not shown that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals.
¶ 5 On May 14, 2007, Landray M. Harris pled guilty to possession of cocaine with intent to deliver in violation of Wis. Stat. §§ 961.41(1m)(cm)2. and 939.05 (2005-06).2 On August 15, 2007, Harris had a sentencing hearing before the Honorable Joseph R. Wall of the Milwaukee County Circuit Court. The interaction between Harris and the court during this sentencing hearing forms the basis for the issues before us today, and will therefore be quoted at length.
¶ 6 The circuit court first discussed the presentence investigation report and other related matters with the attorneys. Among the items noted was a picture of Harris at a club with known gang members in which, as the court later noted, Harris appeared to be “throwing gang signs.” The court then began an extended discussion with Harris.
¶ 7 Harris stated that he was not intending to make a career out of selling drugs, although he admitted he had been doing it for a number of months. Harris said that he is quick to learn from his mistakes, that he knew what he was doing was wrong, and that he did not want to hurt his daughter. The circuit court inquired further regarding Harris's daughter, who was soon to turn two.
¶ 8 The conversation then turned to Harris's employment, and the following exchange ensued:
¶ 9 The court next inquired about the mother of Harris's daughter:
¶ 10 The court concluded its conversation with Harris by discussing Harris's alleged gang involvement-which Harris denied-and by noting his expensive clothing as reflected in the above-noted photograph, clothing which Harris admitted was partially financed by his drug dealing.
¶ 11 After a brief conversation with the attorneys regarding the pants Harris was wearing when arrested, which contained a “secret pocket” designed to store drugs, the court went into a lengthy discussion of sentencing factors. The court noted that it needed to consider the gravity of the offense, the background of the defendant, and the need to protect the public.
¶ 12 Regarding the gravity of the offense, the court concluded that the crime was serious. It emphasized the horrible and addictive nature of crack cocaine,
and how it destroys families and lives. The court discussed how this often affects women, whose drug addictions cause them to lose parental rights to their children. The court noted that “[t]he men are always out of the picture”; they are “on the street corners with Mr. Harris here smoking pot and throwing gang signs with their idiot buddies.” The court further emphasized how this drug drags individuals, families, and neighborhoods down.
¶ 13 The court also discussed how demand for cocaine affects people around the world, noting that the vast majority of our heroin comes from Afghanistan where our soldiers are serving and dying. The court then stated:
It's the same thing with cocaine. People Mr. Harris's age [are] enlisting in the Marines and Army and National Guard, putting their lives at stake while Mr. Harris sits at home, gets high while his baby mama works and goes to school. I swear there's a club where these women get together and congregate.
¶ 14 The court then examined Harris's character and background, which it called “completely unimpressive.” The court discussed Harris's drug dealing, and noted that Harris eschewed looking for a job even though good jobs were available. The court commented:
Well, they're getting high and it's much easier to get high than work and work hard eight hours a day and make the amount of money that they pay. These are jobs that will pay benefits; paid vacation, medical care for your daughter. I'm sure your wife already is providing that-not your wife, your baby mama is already providing that.
The court emphasized Harris's lack of any employment history, calling it “appalling for a 21 year old person.”
¶ 15 The court commented that Harris had not completed his education, and noted that despite the opportunity to get his GED through a government program, Harris simply stopped attending classes.
¶ 16 The court further noted that until he began selling drugs, Harris's mother was his source of income. The court quoted from the impressions of the agent who interviewed Harris for his presentence report (to which Harris was an hour late); the agent had written that Harris seemed to have “this absurd expectation that his mother should be supporting his marijuana habit,” and that Harris “is at a minimum a gang wannabe.”
¶ 17 Regarding Harris's daughter and his responsibility for her, the court discussed how dangerous the drug dealing business is, the likelihood of missing his daughter's childhood while in prison or dead, and how he was being a “terrible role model” for his daughter.
¶ 18 Next, the court discussed the need to protect the public. Harris seemed not to care about what was happening, the court found, and had not shown any inclination to change.
¶ 19 Finally, the court considered various goals related to sentencing: protecting the public, rehabilitation of the defendant, deterring the defendant from offending again, and deterrence of others.
¶ 20 The circuit court concluded that a strong message needed to be sent. It sentenced Harris to an initial period of confinement of two years, followed by extended supervision for three years.3
¶ 21 On March 7, 2008, Harris filed a motion for...
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