State, on Inf. of Murphy v. Brooks

• Decision Date: 27 March 1941
• Docket Number: 3 Div. 336
• Citation: 1 So.2d 370,241 Ala. 55
• Parties: STATE, on Inf. of MURPHY, et al. v. Brooks et al., Board of Revenue and Control.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

1 So.2d 370

241 Ala. 55

STATE, on Inf. of MURPHY, et al. v. Brooks et al., Board of Revenue and Control.

3 Div. 336

Supreme Court of Alabama

March 27, 1941

Murphy & Cook, of Andalusia, and Hill, Hill Whiting & Rives, of Montgomery, for appellants.

G.W.L Smith, of Brewton, and B.E. Jones and Hamilton & Jones all of Evergreen, for appellees.

PER CURIAM.

The published notice of the local act here in question (appearing in the dissenting opinion), was but a publication of the title of the Act. In Wallace v. Board of Revenue etc., 140 Ala. 491, 37 So. 321, 324, Section 106 was first construed and the Court reviewed the history of former provisions, the evils intended to be remedied and defined the "substance" of the proposed law to mean "its essential and material parts, its essence, or an abstract or compendium of its substance, such as would give the people fair information of what it was".

Our other decisions have followed in line with this initial authority and the holding has been that the "substance of the proposed law" means not merely the subject of it, but an intelligible abstract or synopsis of its material and substantial elements, though the substance may be stated without recital of any details which are subsidiary to the stated elements, which details the legislature is left free to supply.

Some of these authorities are reviewed in Commissioner's Court of Winston County v. County Highway Commission, 224 Ala. 247, 139 So. 356. Our decisions disclose that this Court has given a liberal interpretation of Section 106 of the Constitution to the end there should be no strict construction as to embarrass legislation. Gray v. Johnson, 235 Ala. 405, 179 So. 221. Each case must, of course, depend upon its own peculiar status.

Applying these well understood principles, we feel constrained to hold the notice here insufficient. It gives notice of the subject of the Act, what it relates to, but gives no further indication of its substance. No indication is given by the notice that the salaries of the respective members of the board are to be doubled, with compensation in part out of the road and bridge fund and the gasoline fund as well as the general fund, and their method of election changed as well as to some change in the method of filling vacancies; that authority is to be given the board to employ an additional deputy sheriff and fix his compensation as the board "may deem advisable"; that the board be given unlimited authority in expenditure of money of the county for establishing community houses, or similar projects including recreation parks; to expend funds for advertisement for new industries; to establish a contingent fund of $5,000 to be expended as the board deems advisable and for the best interest of the county; to purchase and install voting machines when authorized by general law and pay for advertisement of all local bills and appropriate funds for vocational education. Perhaps several mentioned matters may be said to relate to mere details and others concern powers possessed under general law.

We attempt no detailed review of the Act and its many provisions. As observed in the Winston County case, supra, we need not and do not say that any particular provision, standing alone, would invalidate the Act because not disclosed in the notice. But we do feel impelled to say that this notice gives no indication of the substance of the Act. There is no effort whatever to state in the notice an abstract, synopsis or compendium of the Act.

We have given a brief reference to the many provisions of the Act merely by way of illustration that the notice gives no indication that any of these material matters are embraced in the Act. Indeed it but gives notice of the subject of the Act and nothing more.

To uphold the Act as against the provisions of Section 106 of the Constitution would in our opinion brush aside the distinction between said Section and Section 45, which distinction has been so carefully noted and guarded through all our decisions and indeed is required by the very language of Section 106.

However distasteful may be the duty to perform, yet we are persuaded beyond all reasonable doubt that Section 106 of our Constitution was violated by the notice given and that the Act must be invalidated. The judgment of the trial court is accordingly reversed and one here rendered declaring said Act invalid and overruling the demurrer to the petition and the cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with the views herein expressed.

Reversed, rendered and remanded.

GARDNER, C.J., and BOULDIN, BROWN, and LIVINGSTON, JJ., concur.

THOMAS and FOSTER, JJ., dissent.

KNIGHT, J., not sitting.

THOMAS Justice (dissenting).

This is an action in the nature of quo warranto for testing the constitutionality of the local act creating a Board of Revenue and Control of Conecuh County, Ala. Local Acts 1939, p. 349 et seq.

The complaint alleged that the defendant Brooks has usurped, intruded into and unlawfully holds without warrant or authority of law the office of Chairman of the Board of Revenue and Control of Conecuh County, Ala., and claims to be clothed with the power and privileges of said office and is exercising powers and functions of same; and that the other named defendants have each usurped, intruded into and unlawfully hold without warrant or authority of law the office of member of the Board of Revenue and Control of Conecuh County, Ala., and claim to be clothed with the powers and privileged of said office and each of them is exercising the powers and functions of same; that each of said offices is a public civil office of the state which purports to be created and established by the Act of the Legislature approved Sept. 19th, 1939, but it is charged that said Act of the Legislature was not legally and constitutionally enacted but violates the Constitution of Alabama.

At the time of filing the complaint, the informant John Murphy gave security for costs which was duly approved. R.T. Murphy, defendant, answered the complaint, admitting the allegations of fact, but neither admitting or denying the conclusion of law that the Act of the Legislature was not legally and constitutionally enacted. The other defendants demurred to the complaint and later filed a plea to jurisdiction and motion to dismiss, which pleading was sought to be amended. The plaintiff filed a motion to strike this plea to the jurisdiction or motion to dismiss as amended and demurred to the plea to jurisdiction and motion to dismiss. The cause was submitted for decision on the motion filed by plaintiff to strike the plea to jurisdiction and motion to dismiss as amended. That motion was overruled by the court. The cause was submitted on the demurrer by plaintiff to the plea to the jurisdiction and motion to dismiss, and that demurrer was sustained. Thereupon the cause was submitted on the demurrer filed by defendants to the original complaint; and that demurrer was sustained, the complaint dismissed and plaintiff was taxed with the costs for which execution was directed to issue. From that judgment, plaintiff appealed to this court and for review of the holding of the lower court.

The essential issue of the constitutionality vel non of the Act approved Sept. 19th, 1939, Local Acts 1939, p. 349, is presented for decision by reason of the sustaining of the defendant's demurrer to the original complaint, and the holding of the trial court that the act was duly enacted and offended neither Section 106 nor Section 45 of the Constitution. That is to say, the constitutionality of the act depends upon whether the published notice given of the proposed local act stated the substance of the proposed law as required by Section 106 and did not transcend the requirements of Section 45 of the Constitution. Skinner's Alabama Constitution, pp. 257, 495.

The published notice, as appears from the Legislative Journals, is as follows:

"Notice is hereby given of intention to apply to the 1939 regular session of the legislature of Alabama for passage of a local law for Conecuh County, in substance as follows:

"A bill to be entitled an act to create a Board of Revenue and Control of Conecuh County, Alabama, and to abolish the existing Board of Revenue of said County; to prescribe the powers, duties and authority of said Board of Revenue and Control, and the limitations thereon; to fix the qualifications of members of said Board; to fix their compensation, and the manner of payment; to provide for the filling of vacancies on said board; to designate the members thereof and fix their terms of office; to provide for the election of their successors and to fix their terms of office; to provide the effective date of said act, and to repeal all laws and parts of laws, general, special or local, in conflict."

The Board of Revenue of Conecuh County in existence at the time of the enactment of this 1939 statute was established by a Local Act approved Aug. 27, 1927, Local Acts 1927, p. 241. Section 10 of said act was amended in 1931, Local Acts 1931, p. 31, and again in 1932, Local Acts 1932, p. 42. Appellant insists that material and important changes in the pre-existing law in Conecuh County wrought by the act approved Sept. 19, 1939, were first to increase the salaries of the members of the board from a per diem and mileage which combined never exceed $75 per month, Local Acts 1932, p. 42, to a salary of $150 per month, Section 3, Local Acts 1939, p. 349; and, second, to change the mode of election of its members, so that they should be "elected by the voters of the entire county", Section 24, Local Acts 1939, p. 353, instead of "by the qualified electors of said district", Section 2, Local Acts 1927, p. 242.

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