State Personnel Bd. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com.

• Decision Date: 08 August 1985
• Docket Number: S.F. 24716
• Citation: 39 Cal.3d 422,217 Cal.Rptr. 16,703 P.2d 354
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 703 P.2d 354, 44 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1050, 37 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 35,480 STATE PERSONNEL BOARD et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. FAIR EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSING COMMISSION, et al., Defendants and Appellants; Richard Arthur AMON et al., Real Parties in Interest and Respondents.

Page 16

217 Cal.Rptr. 16

39 Cal.3d 422, 703 P.2d 354, 44 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1050,

37 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 35,480

STATE PERSONNEL BOARD et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. FAIR EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSING COMMISSION, et al., Defendants and Appellants Richard Arthur AMON et al., Real Parties in Interest and Respondents.

S.F. 24716.

Supreme Court of California In Bank.

Aug. 8, 1985.

As Modified Sept. 19, 1985.

Rogers, Joseph, O'Donnell & Quinn, Marjorie E. Cox, David A. Garcia, Steve Owyang, San Francisco, Joy Fisher, Sacramento, Mark Guerra, Marjorie Gelb, Prudence Poppink, Robert Barnes, McCutchen, Doyle, Brown & Enersen, James L. Hunt, Ray L. Wong and Richard D. Zimmerman, San Francisco, for defendants and appellants.

Dennis M. Sullivan, Jeffrey Sloan, Sacramento, Andrea L. Biren, Christina Hall and Kramer & Hall, San Francisco, as amici curiae on behalf of defendants and appellants.

John K. Van de Kamp and George Deukmejian, Attys. Gen., N. Eugene Hill, Asst. Atty. Gen., Carol Hunter and Talmadge R. Jones, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiffs and respondents.

Joan Messing Graff, Linda J. Krieger and Patricia Shiu, San Francisco, for real parties in interest and respondents.

BROUSSARD, Justice.

This case presents the question whether the agencies charged with carrying out the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov.Code, § 12900 et seq.) ¹ may constitutionally exercise jurisdiction over state civil service employees.

Real parties in interest are applicants for state civil service employment who claim they were denied positions because of discrimination on the basis of physical handicap. They have sought to have their claims investigated and adjudicated by the Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH or Department) and the Fair Employment and Housing Commission- To resolve this jurisdictional dispute we must decide whether the Legislature intended to include civil service employees within the coverage of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA or the Act) and, if so, whether the Legislature acted unconstitutionally in so including them.

                (FEHC or Commission).  In opposition to their claims, respondent State Personnel Board has secured an injunction prohibiting [703 P.2d 356] DFEH and FEHC from processing real parties' complaints--as well as the complaints of all civil service employees and applicants throughout the state.  The State Personnel Board (the Board) asserts that article VII of the California Constitution affords it exclusive jurisdiction over all aspects of the examination and selection of civil service employees. 2  The Board claims that its jurisdiction cannot be shared concurrently with DFEH and FEHC without a "fragmentation and fractionalization of the merit selection process."
                

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In response to an announcement published by the Board in 1977, real parties in interest Richard Amon, Frederick Pade and Edith Williams applied for positions as traffic officer cadets with the California Highway Patrol. Having passed all written and oral examinations, and having been placed on the eligible list, they underwent a required physical examination. Each was subsequently disqualified on the basis of the Board's medical standards for the position. Amon was disqualified because of mild deuteranopia (i.e., mild colorblindness); Pade because of early changes in his thoracic spine characteristic of hypertrophic osteoarthritis; and Williams because she had undergone intestinal bypass surgery to alleviate a weight problem.

Amon, Pade and Williams each sent letters protesting their disqualification, and the Board treated their protests as "medical appeals" rather than as complaints of discrimination on the basis of physical handicap. ³ Pade and Williams pursued their appeals to a hearing, where the Board upheld their disqualifications. Amon did not pursue his protest in proceedings before the Board.

Each of the real parties also filed timely complaints with the DFEH. After investigation, DFEH found cause to believe that the Board and the California Highway Patrol had committed an unfair employment practice. It issued accusations charging the Board and the Highway Patrol with discrimination on the basis of physical handicap.

A hearing was noticed in Pade's case, but before it could be held the Board filed this action in superior court to enjoin DFEH and FEHC from exercising jurisdiction over real parties' claims. The court entered a judgment permanently enjoining DFEH and FEHC "from initiating, accepting, or issuing any further investigations, complaints, accusations, notices of hearing, subpoenas, or other administrative or legal process in these or any other cases involving Subsequent to the trial court's judgment in this case, we issued a decision in the unrelated case of Pacific Legal Foundation v. Brown (1981) 29 Cal.3d 168, 172 Cal.Rptr. 487, 624 P.2d 1215. In Pacific Legal Foundation we rejected the "exclusive jurisdiction" interpretation of article VII relied on by the trial court here. For the reasons discussed below, the implications of our decision in Pacific Legal Foundation lead us to reject the Board's assertion of exclusive jurisdiction over civil service discrimination complaints. Accordingly, after determining that the Legislature intended the FEHA to cover state civil service employees, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and dissolve the injunction entered against DFEH and FEHC.

                state agencies or agencies within the state civil service system under article VII."   The court based its decision on article[703 P.2d 357]  VII of our Constitution, which it interpreted as granting to the Board "exclusive jurisdiction" over all matters involving state civil service employees
                

I.

The FEHA is a comprehensive scheme for the realization of the state's public policy "to protect and safeguard the right and opportunity of all persons to seek, obtain, and hold employment without discrimination or abridgment on account of race, religious creed, color, national origin, ancestry, physical handicap, ⁴ medical condition, ⁵ marital status, sex or age." ( § 12920.) To carry out this policy, the Act creates two administrative bodies--the DFEH, which performs investigatory, conciliatory and prosecutorial functions in relation to discrimination complaints, and the five-member FEHC, which performs adjudicatory and rule-making functions. ( §§ 12930, 12935.) A person who claims to have suffered discrimination in employment may file a complaint with the DFEH, which is then empowered to investigate, take depositions, issue subpoenas and engage in discovery procedures. The DFEH can issue a "right to sue" letter, which allows the complainant to pursue a private court action under the FEHA. ( § 12965, subd. (b).) Alternatively, the DFEH can issue a written accusation if it determines that the complaint is valid and cannot be resolved through conciliation. ( § 12965, subd. (a).) The DFEH acts as prosecutor on the accusation (which is the equivalent of a civil complaint) and argues the complainant's case before the FEHC.

                [39 Cal.3d 429] The FEHC has a number of remedial powers.  It can issue cease and desist orders and can order reinstatement, hiring, promotion, and back pay.  ( § 12970, subd.   [703 P.2d 358]  (a).)  The question whether the FEHC can award compensatory and punitive damages was reserved by us in Commodore Home Systems v. Superior Court (1982) 32 Cal.3d 211, 215, 185 Cal.Rptr. 270, 649 P.2d 912, where we held that such damages may be awarded by a superior court in a private action under the FEHA.  Once the FEHC issues an order, it is reviewable in superior court.  (Code Civ.Proc., § 1094.5.)
                

The FEHC has several functions besides adjudication, which include promulgating rules and regulations to implement the Act, providing technical assistance, and gathering statistical data on the public employment workforce in the state. ( §§ 12935, 19702.5.)

From this brief overview, we turn to the question whether civil service employees are included within the framework of the Act. To determine the Legislature's intent on this question we first turn to the language of the FEHA itself. The Act clearly manifests an intent to include both public and private employers within its scope. Section 12926, subdivision (c) defines the term "employer" as follows: " 'Employer,' except as hereinafter provided, includes any person regularly employing five or more persons, or any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly; the state or any political or civil subdivision thereof and cities." Thus, as recognized by the Courts of Appeal in Hallon v. Pierce (1967) 257 Cal.App.2d 468, 475, 64 Cal.Rptr. 808, and Northern Inyo Hospital v. Fair Employment Practice Commission (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 14, 23, 112 Cal.Rptr. 872, the Act, by its terms, covers all employees of the "state."

The Board nevertheless argues that the reference to "state" within the definition of employer was merely intended by the Legislature to refer to those state agencies employing workers who are exempt from the civil service. This permits the Board to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over civil service employees, and DFEH and FEHC to exercise jurisdiction over exempt, noncivil service employees. ⁶

In view of the unambiguous statement of legislative intent embodied in the definition of "employer," we cannot accept the partition of that definition urged by the Board. It is inconceivable that the Legislature could have silently excluded 130,000 civil servants from its contemplation when it provided that "state" employees would be covered by the Act.

Further evidence of legislative intent to include the civil service within the coverage of the Act is inferred from the Act's recordkeeping and reporting requirements. Section 12946 requires employers to retain employment applications and other records for a period of two years. The Board is specifically mentioned in this...