State Police Dept. v. Hargrave
| Decision Date | 27 May 1968 |
| Docket Number | No. 1,No. 20573,20573,1 |
| Citation | 237 N.E.2d 269,142 Ind.App. 684 |
| Parties | STATE POLICE DEPARTMENT (Indiana), Robert A. O'Neal, as Superintendent of the State Police, Appellants, v. George E. HARGRAVE, d/b/a Hargrave Secret Service, Delbert C. Nugent, as Individuals and as Members of a Class, respectively and on Behalf of all other Persons Similarly Situated, Appellees |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
John J. Dillon, Atty. Gen., John T. Carmody, Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellants.
Richard L. Brown, Clifford M. DeWitt, Butler, Brown, Hahn & DeWitt, Indianapolis, for appellees.
This action comes to us from the Superior Court of Marion County, Room Number 5, wherein the Appellees, George E. Hargrave, d/b/a Hargrave Secret Service, and Delbert C. Nugent, an employee of Hargrave, as individuals and as members of a class, brought an action for declaratory judgment against the State Police Department of Indiana and Robert A. O'Neal, as the Superintendent thereof. The Plaintiffs' complaint prayed alternatively that the Acts of 1965, Ch. 350, Sec. 7, the same being Burns' Sec. 42--1223a which establishes a registration fee for unlicensed employees assisting a private detective in the conduct of his business, and the Acts of 1961, Ch. 163, Secs. 2, 11, and 17, the same being Burns' Sec. 42--1208, as amended by the Acts of 1965, Ch. 162, Sec. 1, which define a private detective business and the right to employ unlicensed assistants therein be declared unconstitutional as being indefinite, vague, and uncertain, and as creating an artificial classification or alternately, that said Acts be so interpreted as to exclude all those employees of Hargrave Secret Service not used in investigative work from the classification of unlicensed employees.
The defendants filed an affirmative answer as well as an answer admitting and denying, pursuant to Rule 1--3 of the Rules of the Supreme Court. After the issues were thus joined, the cause was submitted to the court for trial without the intervention of a jury.
The Court made the following entry and judgment.
'Come now the parties, and by counsel, and this cause being at issue is submitted to the Court for trial without the intervention of a jury, and the parties stipulate the following in open Court:
'1. That rhetorical paragraph 3 of Legal Paragraph I of plaintiff's complaint be amended in that reference be made to Sections 2, 11 and 17 specifically of said Act of 1961.
'2. That rhetorical paragraph 4 of Legal Paragraph I of plaintiff's complaint be amended to refer only to Acts of 1965, Chapter 350, Section 7, entitled 'An Act Fixing Fees, Penalties, Charges, Rates and Moneys Receivable by the State, Regulating Boards, Agencies, Departments, Bureaus and Commissions in the Exercise of the Regulatory Police Powers of the State, and Repealing all Laws in Conflict.'
'3. That the court may consider the entire Act known as the 'Detective License Law,' Acts of 1961, Chapter 163, Section 1, et seq, and all amendments thereto in order to make its finding upon the issues herein.
'4. That all exhibits of the parties be admitted by agreement of the parties without objection.
'And the Court, having heard the witnesses, and further evidence and the argument of counsel, and being duly advised in the premises, finds:
'(a) That a genuine controversy exists as to the rights and obligations of plaintiffs as to payment of fees under the aforesaid statutes of the State of Indiana and the right of the defendant State Police Department to regulate the affairs of the plaintiffs as concerns plaintiff's Hargraves employees hired for security guard purposes.
'(b) The Court further finds that plaintiff's Hargrave's employees engaged and employed solely as security guards, places plaintiff's Hargrave security guard division in that same class of business as those persons or corporations who operate industrial plant guard service business and persons or corporations, who provide their own personal industrial plant guard service for their own plant.
'(c) The Court further finds that an industrial plant comprises the fixtures, tools, machines, merchandise and apparatus which are necessary to carry on a trade or business, or may be defined as the organized physical equipment to produce any desired result for any department, or branch of art occupation, or business conducted as a means of livelihood or for profit.
'(d) The Court further finds that plant security means the protection or personal security of the aforedefined industrial plant and its premises from any harm, including but not limited to trespassers or from persons who would injure, destroy or take the property from the aforesaid premises without right or permission of the owner thereof.
'(e) The Court further finds that those employees of plaintiff Hargrave who are hired and work solely as security guards are not unlicensed employees who assist the plaintiff in that portion of his business as a private detective, that is conducted in the State of Indiana.
'(f) The Court further finds that plaintiff Hargrave furnishes such security guards for hire solely to industrial plants for plant security and not as persons engaged in the private detective business, and that such security guard service is separable and divisible from the private detective service operated by the plaintiff.
'(g) The Court further finds that the application of Indiana Acts 1965, Chapter 350, Section 7, (Burns Indiana Annotated Statutes, Section 42--1223(a) Detective License Fees) to plaintiff's Hargrave operation of a security guard service is invalid, unlawful and discriminatory in the light of Acts 1965, Chapter 162, entitled 'An Act to Amend the Detective License Law,' which amendment adds the proviso to Acts 1961, Chapter 163, Section 2, (Burns 42--1208) 'Provided that the furnishing of a guard or guards for hire solely to industrial plants for plant security shall not be considered as private detective business.
'(h) The Court further finds that the language in Acts 1961, Chapter 163, Section 2, as amended by Acts 1965, Chapter 162, 'Provided, that the furnishing of a guard or guards for hire solely to industrial plants for plant security shall not be considered as private detective business' does not mean persons engaged only in the business of industrial plant security, but means that if any individual employee of a business is engaged in industrial plant or security guard service--that particular individual, (guard) is not in the private detective business.
'(i) The Court further finds that the statutes as set out in plaintiff's complaint are constitutional and valid, but that the interpretation and application of the Indiana State Police Department is in error, and so far as such interpretation and application are in conflict with his finding, and decree, the interpretation and application are void and invalid.
'IT IS THEREFORE, ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED by the Court as follows:
'That a genuine controversy exists as to the rights and obligations of plaintiffs as to payment of fees under the aforesaid statutes of the State of Indiana and the right of the defendant State Police Department to regulate the affairs of the plaintiffs as concerns plaintiff's Hargraves employees hired for security purposes.
'That plaintiff's Hargrave employees engaged and employed solely as security guards, places plaintiff's security guard division in that same class of business as those persons or corporations who operate industrial plant guard service business and those persons or corporations who provide their own personal industrial plant guard service for their own plant.
'That an industrial plant comprises the fixtures, tools, machines, merchandise and apparatus which are necessary to carry on a trade or business, or may be defined as the organized physical equipment to produce any desired result for any department or branch of art occupation, or business conducted as a means of livelihood or for profit.
'The Court further orders that plant security means the protection or personal security of the aforedefined industrial plant and its premises from any harm, including but not limited to trespassers or from persons who would injure, destroy or take the property from the aforesaid premises without right or permission of the owner thereof.
'That those employees of plaintiff Hargrave who are hired and work solely as security guards are not unlicensed employees who assist the plaintiff in that portion of his business as a private detective, that is conducted in the State of Indiana.
'That plaintiff Hargrave furnishes such security guards for hire solely to industrial plans (sic) for plant security and not as persons engaged in the private detective business, and that such security guard service is separable and divisible from the private detective service operated by the plaintiff.
'That the application of Indiana Acts 1965, Chapter 350, Section 7, (Burns Indiana Annotated Statutes, Section 42--1223(a) Detective License Fees) to plaintiff's Hargrave operation of a security guard service is invalid, unlawful and discriminatory in the light of Acts 1965, Chapter 162, entitled 'An Act to Amend the Detective License Law,' which amendment adds the proviso to Acts 1961, Chapter 163, Section 2, (Burns 42--1208) 'Provided, that the furnishing of a guard or guards for hire solely to industrial plants for plant security shall not be considered as private detective business.
'That the language in Acts 1961, Chapter 163, Section 2, as amended by Acts 1965, Chapter 162 'Provided, that the furnishing of a guard or guards for hire solely to industrial plants for plant security shall not be considered as private detective business' does not mean persons engaged only in the business of industrial plant security, but means that if any individual employee of a business is engaged in industrial plant or security guard service--that particular...
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...primarily in the manufacture or assembly of goods or the processing of raw materials, or both.' State Police Department v. Hargrave, 142 Ind.App. 684, 693, 237 N.E.2d 269, 274 (1968). The Pennsylvania Court used the following language in defining the term industrial 'By on stretch of the im......