State Pub. Utilities Comm'n v. Monarch Refrigerating Co.

• Decision Date: 22 April 1915
• Docket Number: No. 9912.,9912.
• Citation: 267 Ill. 528,108 N.E. 716
• Parties: STATE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION v. MONARCH REFRIGERATING CO.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

267 Ill. 528

108 N.E. 716

STATE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION

v.MONARCH REFRIGERATING CO.

No. 9912.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

April 22, 1915.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Sangamon County; James A. Creighton, Judge.

Proceeding by the State Public Utilities Commission against the Monarch Refrigerating Company. From an order of the circuit court, affirming an order of the Commission finding the company to be a public utility and requiring it to file with the Commission and keep open for public inspection a schedule showing all rates and other charges and classifications for services performed by it in connection with its intrastate business, the company appeals. Affirmed.Mancha Bruggemeyer, of Chicago, for appellant.

Everett Jennings, of Chicago (Timothy F. Mullen, of Chicago, and George M. Morgan, of Springfield, of counsel), for appellee.

CRAIG, J.

This is an appeal from an order of the circuit court of Sangamon county affirming the order of the state Public Utilities Commission finding that appellant is a public utility within the meaning of and subject to the provisions of an act providing for the regulation of public utilities, approved June 30, 1913 (Laws of 1913, p. 460), and requiring appellant to file with the Commission and keep open for public inspection a schedule showing all rates and other charges and classifications for services performed by it in connection with its intrastate business, as provided by article 4 of the act, and particularly by sections 33 and 34 of said article, and a certain ruling of the Public Utilities Commission known as ‘Conference Ruling No. 12,’ made July 2, 1914. No copy of conference ruling No. 12 is contained in the record and the reasonableness of such ruling is not before us.

Appellant's contention is (1) that the Public Utilities Commission erred in assuming appellant's business is a public utility, and hence subject to regulation under the act creating said Commission; (2) that the act nowhere by reasonable intendment includes appellant's said business, and that the Legislature did not grant said Commission the power to enter the order complained of; (3) that such powers as the Commission has under the said act of 1913, relating to public utilities, are limited to fixing rates, reasonable in their nature, applicable to all who fall into the same class, which principle is wholly ignored in said order, and therefore it is unreasonable, if not unlawful, and the circuit court erred in affirming the same; (4) that the act of June 30, 1913, is invalid, as to appellant's said business, for the reason that it attempts to define, as well as regulate, without disclosing said intention in the title of the act, in violation of the Constitution. The decision of these questions necessarily depends upon the nature of the business conducted by appellant and the construction that is to be given to the various provisions of the act in question.

It appears, from the testimony of the secretary of appellant given before the Commission, that the Monarch Refrigerating Company is a corporation organized under the laws of Illinois, doing a general warehouse business in the city of Chicago. It has operated for about 20 years a plant equipped and used to produce and furnish cold storage for fruits, vegetables, and food and dairy products, such as poultry, eggs, cheese, butter, etc., which it receives and stores for persons residing in this state and also for shippers and producers of Iowa, Wisconsin, and other states. The goods stored are subject either to the order of the persons by whom they are stored or to such other persons as may be designated by them, the return or redelivery of the goods stored being made wholly within the state of Illinois. Its plant covers several acres of ground and has a capacity for about 4,500 car loads of goods. It is divided into several parts or departments, with rooms in which different degrees of temperature are maintained in order to accommodate the requirements of the various food products consigned to it for storage. All goods are stored subject to the order of the owner. The ownership of the goods often changes after they are stored, and sometimes changes even in the course of transit to the city of Chicago, so that appellant has no means of knowing what disposition will ultimately be made of the goods, or their final destination, at the time they are stored with it.

As we understand the record, the business of appellant consists largely, if not entirely, of receiving and storing in its warehouses the several food products above mentioned until such time as there shall be a demand for the same on the market, so that, in a sense, the goods are often in transit while in the possession of appellant. It is also apparent from the record and our common knowledge of such matters that the goods which are stored and handled by appellant are what is known as perishable, and that storage plants similar to that conducted by appellant are indispensable to the proper handling and shipment of such commodities as the business of the country is now conducted. As appellant at present conducts its business, each transaction is a matter of private agreement between the parties, the rate charged being pretty well established by custom and practice and based upon the character of the services rendered and the requirements of the different commodities left with it for storage, those requiring a lower degree of temperature being required to pay a higher rate of storage. There is also a difference in the charges, according to the quantity of goods in each consignment and the season.

Section 10 of the act in question provides, in part, as follows:

‘The term ‘public utility,’ when used in this act, means and includes every corporation, company, association, joint stock company or association, firm, partnership or individual, their lessees, trustees, or receivers appointed by any court whatsoever (except, however, such public utilities as are or may hereafter be owned or operated by any municipality), that now or hereafter: (a) May own, control, operate or manage, within the state, directly or indirectly for public use, any plant, equipment or property used or to be used for or in connection with the transportation of persons or property or the transmission of telegraph or telephone messages between points within this state; or for the production, storage, transmission, sale, delivery or furnishing of heat, cold, light, power, electricity or water; or for the conveyance of oil or gas by pipe line; or for the storage or warehousing of goods; or for the conduct of the business of a wharfinger; or that (b) may own or control any franchise, license, permit or right to engage in any such business.'

It is further provided in section 10 that:

‘The term ‘warehouse,’ when used in this act, includes all elevators or storehouses where grain is stored for a compensation, whether the property stored be kept separate or not.'

And that:

‘The term ‘transportation of property,’ when used in this act, includes any service in connection with the receipt, carriage, delivery, elevation, transfer in transit, ventilation, refrigeration, icing, storage and handling of the property transported.'

Laws of 1913, pp. 465-467.

That the Legislature has the power to control and regulate businesses of the character of that conducted by appellant cannot be seriously questioned. By section 1 of article 13 of the Constitution of this state it is provided that:

‘All elevators or storehouses where grain or other property is stored for a compensation, whether the property stored be kept separate or not, are declared to be public warehouses.’

In Hannah v. People, 198 Ill. 77, 64 N. E. 776, we pointed out that the framers of the Constitution deemed the adequate protection for the producers and shippers of grain and other commodities from the wrongs, frauds, and impositions that might be practiced upon them by those engaged in the business of providing storage for their products of such importance that the same was made a matter of a special constitutional provision. In Mayer v. Springer, 192 Ill. 270, 61 N. E. 348, in construing this provision of the Constitution, we held that, while the state has made no attempt to regulate purely private business and affairs, this section of the Constitution did bring under legislative control, as to rates of storage and other provision for the protection of the producers and shippers, all those public agencies, such as warehouses, where the business of receiving grain or property in store for the public for a compensation is carried on. And in Chicago Dock Co. v. Garrity, 115 Ill. 155, 3 N. E. 448, we held that property becomes clothed with public interest whenever it is used in such a manner as to affect the community at large, and that, when one devotes his property to a use in which the public has an interest, he must submit to be controlled and regulated by the public in such use for the common good, to the extent of the interest that he has thus created for the public in the use of his property. As to what is meant by the word ‘public,’ when used in this connection, it is very difficult to define or explain it in any simpler language than by the use of the word ‘public’ itself.

The Century Dictionary thus defines the word ‘public’:

‘Of or belonging to the people at large; relating to or affecting the whole people of a state, nation or community; * * * not limited or restricted to any particular class of the community.’

The New International Dictionary defines it:

‘Of or pertaining to the people; relating to or affecting a nation, state or community at large.’

In 32 Cyc. 748, one of its meanings is given as:

‘Open to all the people; shared in or to be shared or participated in or enjoyed by the people at large; not limited or restricted to any particular class of the community.’

Used in this latter sense, it would not include those isolated instances in which a...