State Sav. Bank v. Albertson
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
| Writing for the Court | BRANTLY, C.J. |
| Citation | State Sav. Bank v. Albertson, 39 Mont. 414, 102 P. 692 (Mont. 1909) |
| Decision Date | 03 July 1909 |
| Parties | STATE SAVINGS BANK v. ALBERTSON et al. |
Appeal from District Court, Silver Bow County; Jeremiah J. Lynch Judge.
Action by the State Savings Bank against Henry Albertson and another on a note. From a judgment for plaintiff, and from an order denying defendants' motion for a new trial, defendants appeal. Affirmed.
John J McHatton, for appellants.
Jesse B. Roote and McBride & McBride, for respondent.
Appeal from a judgment in favor of plaintiff and from an order denying defendants' motion for a new trial. The complaint contains two counts. The first alleges that Fred. M. Ferrell John J. Ferrell, Henry Albertson, and George Kendall were between December 24, 1900, and May 27, 1901, copartners doing business under the firm names of the Fred. M. Ferrell Company and the John J. Ferrell Brokerage Company; that on January 2, 1901, they caused to be executed and delivered to the plaintiff a promissory note for the sum of $4,000, signed " ," and "John J. Ferrell Brokerage Co.," the payment of which was guaranteed by indorsement by Fred. M. Ferrell and John J. Ferrell; and that there is due and unpaid thereon the whole of the principal sum, with interest at the rate of 10 per cent. per annum, as stipulated therein, since April 4, 1902. In the second count the same allegations are made as to the copartnerships of the defendants, and it is then alleged that the plaintiff between the dates named loaned and advanced to, and for the use of, the copartnerships, on account of overdrafts, moneys to the amount of $12,240.34, no part of which has been paid, except the sum of $5,956.35, leaving a balance due and unpaid of $6,283.99, with interest at 8 per cent. per annum, the stipulated rate, since May 24, 1901. Judgment is demanded for the amount of these balances, with interest. The defendants Ferrell filed a general demurrer, and as to them the cause is not yet at issue. Defendants Albertson and Kendall filed a joint answer. They deny generally that they were at any time associated with the defendants Ferrell as copartners or ever transacted any business with them under the copartnerships mentioned or otherwise; that they executed and delivered, or caused to be executed and delivered, the promissory note as alleged by plaintiff; that the plaintiff advanced the moneys to them, or for their use and benefit, by way of overdraft, or that they are indebted to the plaintiff in any amount, by promissory note or otherwise. They allege by way of special defense to the first count that on or about December 24, 1900, they advanced to the defendants Ferrell certain moneys to enable them to conduct the business in which they were then engaged upon the agreement and understanding that they were to receive a certain portion of the profits thereof if any were made; that they never had any other connection with the said Ferrells; that they never had knowledge that that the plaintiff had loaned any moneys to the Ferrells; that, at the time the loan of money was made upon the promissory note as alleged by plaintiff, it knew that the Ferrells were the only members of the copartnerships; and that the plaintiff accepted their note and the guaranty indorsed thereon, giving credit to them exclusively. They then continue: Substantially the same special allegations are made in answer to the second count, except as to the personal guaranty by the Ferrells. The reply admits that the plaintiff took security for payment both of the note and the amount of the overdraft, but denies generally all the other allegations. The verdict and judgment were for the amounts demanded, with interest. Pending the motion for a new trial, Kendall died, and F. J. Morse, administratrix upon his estate, was substituted as defendant in his stead. Of the great number of errors assigned, only a few are of sufficient importance to demand special notice.
1. At the beginning of the trial, on April 11, 1908, counsel for appellants moved the court to dismiss the action on the ground that it had not been prosecuted with reasonable diligence. Upon the denial of this motion the first assignment is made. It is properly conceded that such a motion is addressed to the discretion of the trial court, and that its action thereon will not be disturbed in the absence of an apparent abuse of power in that behalf. The rule is generally recognized that the courts have the power independently of such a provision as is found in our Code (Rev. Codes, § 6714) or a rule of court to dismiss an action whenever it appears that the plaintiff has, without sufficient excuse, failed to prosecute it to final judgment. Depuy v. Shear, 29 Cal. 238; People v. Jefferds, 126 Cal. 296, 56 P. 704; Colorado Eastern Ry. Co. v. Union P. R. Co., 94 F. 312, 36 C. C. A. 263; Ashley v. May, 5 Ark. 408; 14 Cyc. 444. The power being a discretionary one, the burden is upon the appellant to show an abuse of it. In Grigsby v. Napa County, 36 Cal. 585, 95 Am. Dec. 213, it was said: Nothing further appears in the transcript than that the motion was made and denied. Evidently counsel relied solely upon the fact, apparent from the files and records of the district court and within the knowledge of the court, that the action had been pending since the filing of the complaint on July 31, 1903, and deemed the lapse of time sufficient to move the court's discretion. Mere lapse of time is not sufficient in itself to justify a dismissal. Since counsel relied solely upon the knowledge of the court upon which to guide its discretion, it had the right to take into consideration any fact known to it, which in its opinion furnished a sufficient reason for denying the motion. If the record revealed the fact that the defendants had acquiesced in or caused the delay--and so far as we are informed it did--this was a matter which the court should not have overlooked. In any event, there is nothing before us to show that the court acted arbitrarily. Hence a case is not presented calling for interference by this court.
2. The second contention requiring notice is that the plaintiff should not have been allowed to...
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