State to Use of Employment Sec. Bd. v. Rucker

• Decision Date: 07 November 1956
• Docket Number: No. 207,207
• Citation: 211 Md. 153,126 A.2d 846
• Parties: STATE of Maryland, to Use of EMPLOYMENT SECURITY BOARD, etc. v. Lucy A. RUCKER and Bethlehem Steel Co., etc.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 153

211 Md. 153

126 A.2d 846

STATE of Maryland, to Use of EMPLOYMENT SECURITY BOARD, etc. v. Lucy A. RUCKER and Bethlehem Steel Co., etc.

No. 207.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Nov. 7, 1956.

James N. Phillips, Baltimore, and Bernard S. Melnicove, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen. (C. Ferdinand Sybert, Atty. Gen., on the brief), for appellant.

William A. Fisher, Jr., Baltimore (William D. Macmillan and Semmes, Bowen & Semmes, Baltimore, and Cravath, Swaine & Moore, New York City, on the brief), for appellees.

Before COLLINS, WILLIAM L. HENDERSON and HAMMOND, JJ., and GEORGE HENDERSON, Special Judge.

COLLINS, Judge.

This is an appeal from a judgment for the appellees in a case tried before the trial court without a jury.

The facts, as stipulated between the parties, are as follows. One of the appellees, Lucy A. Rucker, was employed by the Bethlehem Steel Company (Shipbuilding Division), (Bethlehem), the other appellee, on January 19, 1944, as a welder. Due to the reduction in the working force at Bethlehem on June 13, 1949, Lucy A. Rucker and other welders were laid off from work. On August 2, 1949, Bethlehem recalled certain welders to work. However, it failed to recall Lucy A. Rucker, who, by reason of her seniority, was entitled to be recalled under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement between Bethlehem and Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of America, C.I.O.

In accordance with the terms of such agreement, Lucy A. Rucker filed a grievance with Bethlehem in which she alleged that it had breached such agreement by failing to recall her to work on August 2, 1949, and her claim in that regard was submitted to arbitration before I. Robert Feinberg, an Impartial Umpire. On June 8, 1951, the Umpire rendered the following decision which, by the terms of said agreement, was final and binding upon the parties: 'The Company is directed to recall and reinstate Lucy Rucker and Margie Moore (assuming they would not have been laid off subsequent to the hearings, based upon seniority), and to pay them their regular rates of pay for the periods during which they would have been employed had they been recalled in accordance with their seniority from August 2, 1949, to date, less any sums earned by them elsewhere during those periods, and any unemployment insurance received by them for unemployment during those periods.'

If Bethlehem had recalled Lucy A. Rucker for work on August 2, 1949, she would have worked from that date through August 23, 1949, and from December 16th through December 30, 1949. For those periods when she would have worked, had she been recalled, Lucy A. Rucker had filed claims against the Department of Employment Security and stated that she was not then rendering services or receiving remuneration from any employer, and she received, as a result of those claims, unemployment compensation from the Department of Employment Security, the appellant, in the amount of $110.

Following the above decision of the Umpire, Bethlehem complied in full with such decision and paid Lucy A. Rucker an amount equal to the pay that she would have received from Bethlehem had she worked during the aforesaid periods when she should have been recalled, less such sums as she earned elsewhere, and less unemployment insurance compensation payments in the amount of $110 which she received as aforesaid. The plaintiff, appellant, has requested that Lucy A. Rucker and/or Bethlehem pay to the plaintiff, appellant, the said sum of $110 but they have failed and refused to do so.

Following the refusal of the appellees to pay, the appellant, as plaintiff, filed a declaration at law against the appellees, as defendants, in a special count alleging substantially the facts set out in the aforesaid stipulation and demanding $650 as damages. It was determined, as set forth in the above stipulation, that the claimant would not have had full time work throughout her claim period even if she had been recalled on August 2nd because there were short term layoffs after that date of persons with her seniority. It was therefore agreed by all the parties to this case that the back pay receivable by the claimant should be reduced to $110 instead of $650 as originally claimed. The appellant therefore claims $110 instead of the $650 as originally stated in the declaration. From a verdict rendered by the trial court for the defendants, appellees, for costs, the appellant appeals.

From the above stipulation it is evident that the $110 here in dispute was deducted by Bethlehem from Lucy A. Rucker. It is admitted by all the parties that Bethlehem has this amount at the present time. The Board paid the money for the account of Bethlehem. We must therefore hold that judgment should be rendered in favor of Lucy A. Rucker.

The question therefore before us is whether the appellant should recover the sum claimed from Bethlehem. Appellant relies strongly on the following provisions of the statute, Code 1951, Article 95A, Section 2: '* * * The Legislature, therefor, declares that in its considered judgment the public good, and the general welfare of the citizens of this State require the enactment of this measure, under the police powers of the State, for the compulsory setting aside of unemployment reserves to be used for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their own. * * *' Section 16(d): 'Any person who, by reason of the non-disclosure or misrepresentation by him or by another of a material fact (irrespective of whether such non-disclosure or misrepresentation was known or fraudulent) has received any sum as benefits under this Article while any conditions for the receipt of benefits imposed by this Article were not fulfilled in his case, or while he was disqualified from receiving benefits, shall, in the discretion of the Board, either be liable to have such sum deducted from any future benefits payable to him under this Article or shall be liable to repay to the Board for the unemployment compensation fund, a sum equal to the amount so received by him, and such sum shall be collectible in the manner provided in Section 14(f) of this Article for the collection of past-due contributions. * * *' Section 19(l): "Unemployment.' An individual shall be deemed 'unemployed' in any week during which he performs no services and with respect to which no wages are payable to him * * *.' Compare Employment Security Board v. Spiker, 194 Md. 351, 71 A.2d 299.

It is admitted by all parties that there was no known or fraudulent non-disclosure or misrepresentation by anyone in this case. It is not necessary that we decide whether appellant can recover from Bethlehem...