State, to Use of Gilkeson v. Humbird

• Decision Date: 01 July 1880
• Citation: 54 Md. 327
• Parties: STATE OF MARYLAND, use of J. WILLIAM GILKESON, and others v. JOHN HUMBIRD, and others.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

54 Md. 327

STATE OF MARYLAND, use of J. WILLIAM GILKESON, and others v. JOHN HUMBIRD, and others.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

July 1, 1880

APPEAL from the Circuit Court for Allegany County.

Exception.--At the trial of this cause the plaintiff gave in evidence the bond of Richard M. Sprigg, as administrator of his mother, Jane D. Sprigg, and proved by John Humbird, one of the defendants, that his name signed to said bond was in his hand-writing, and that at the time of signing the same, he understood that he was signing said bond as one of the securities of Richard M. Sprigg as such administrator. The plaintiff also gave in evidence the second and final account of the said Richard M. Sprigg, as administrator as aforesaid, whereby it appeared, that after payment of all proper debts and charges against the estate of the said Jane D. Sprigg, and all costs and expenses of the administration, there was due to Joseph Sprigg, one of the children and legal representatives of the said Jane the distributive share of $655.12. The plaintiff further gave in evidence the assignment of the said Joseph Sprigg, whereby he conveyed all his right, title and interest in the estate of his mother, to J. William Gilkeson. The plaintiff also gave in evidence a mortgage from the said Richard M. Sprigg, and others, to the said John Humbird and Alfred Spates, which was executed to protect them from loss of every kind by reason of their liability as sureties on his administration bond. Other evidence was furnished by the plaintiff. The testimony was all taken as against Humbird, subject to exception. Humbird moved the Court to strike out as testimony in the case, the aforesaid bond and mortgage offered in evidence by the plaintiff, and the testimony of the said Humbird himself. The Court (MOTTER and PEARRE, J.,) granted the motion, and the plaintiff excepted. Judgment was entered for the defendants for costs, and the plaintiff appealed.

The cause was argued before BARTOL, C.J., BRENT, MILLER and ROBINSON, J., for the appellant, and submitted on brief for the appellees.

J H. Gordon, for the appellant.

Wm. M. Price and William Brace, for the appellees.

ROBINSON J., delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is a suit upon the administration bond of Richard M. Sprigg.

In the body of the bond, it purports to be signed and sealed by Richard M. Sprigg, Alfred Spates, J. H. Long and John Humbird.

It is signed by all these parties, and there is a seal opposite to each of the signatures of Richard M. Sprigg, Alfred Spates and J. H. Long, but there is no seal opposite to or in any manner attached to the signature of the appellee, Humbird. And the question is whether the plea of non est factum by him is a good plea?

A seal is essential to a deed or specialty, although it is not necessary that every one signing a deed should have a separate seal, nor is it necessary there should be as many seals as signatures. One may authorize another to sign and seal a deed in his behalf, or he may sign it and adopt the seal of one of the parties.

In order, therefore, to support this action, it must appear that the bond in question, was sealed by the appellee, Humbird,...