State Trust Co. v. Sheldon

• Decision Date: 25 April 1896
• Citation: 68 Vt. 259,35 A. 177
• Parties: STATE TRUST CO. v. SHELDON et al.
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court

35 A. 177

68 Vt. 259

STATE TRUST CO.

v. SHELDON et al.

Supreme Court of Vermont Rutland.

April 25, 1896.

Exceptions from Rutland county court;. Thompson, Judge.

Assumpsit on a note by the State Trust Company against John A. Sheldon and others. From a judgment for plaintiff on demurrer to rejoinder being sustained, defendants except. Affirmed.

F. D. White and C. A. Prouty, for plaintiff.

J. C. Baker and Edward Dana, for defendants.

THOMPSON, J. As a part of the promises, and undertaking in the declaration mentioned, and at the time of making the same, the defendants agreed, in writing, to waive the statute of limitations in respect to such, promises. and undertaking. Relying upon this agreement, the plaintiff did not bring its action until more than six years from the time that it accrued. The question presented by the pleadings is whether the defendants are estopped by their agreement from pleading the statute of limitations in bar of plaintiff's action. It is urged that the agreement to waive the statute is void because, by private agreement, it seeks to avoid a statute, and is against public policy. The general rule is that no contract or agreement can modify a law, but the exception is that, where no principle of public policy is violated, parties are at liberty to forego the protection of the law. Statutory provisions designed for the benefit of individuals may be waived, but, where the enactment is to secure general objects of policy or morals, no consent will render a noncompliance with the statute effectual. The statute limiting the time within which action shall be brought is for the benefit and repose of inviduals, and not to secure general objects of policy or morals. Its protection may therefore be waived, in legal form, by those who are entitled to it; and such waiver, when acted upon, becomes an estoppel to plead the statute. Sedg. St & Const. Law (2d Ed.) 86, 87; Quick v. Corlies, 30 N. J. Law, 11; Burton v. Stevens, 24 Vt 131; Gay's Estate v. Hassom, 04 Vt 495, 24 Atl. 715; Random v. Toby, 11 How. 493. When such waiver is made, it is continuous, unless by its terms it is limited to a specified time. There was no such limitation in the waiver of the defendants. We therefore hold that they are estopped from pleading the statute of limitations in bar of plaintiff's action. Judgment affirmed, and cause remanded for assessment of damages.