State v. $2,435 in United States Currency
| Docket Number | 23S-CR-72 |
| Decision Date | 31 October 2023 |
| Parties | State of Indiana, Appellant (Plaintiff below) v. $2,435 in United States Currency and Alucious Q. Kizer, Appellees (Defendants below). |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Argued: May 4, 2023
Appeal from the Allen Circuit Court No. 02C01-2109-MI-825 The Honorable Wendy W. Davis, Judge On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals No. 22A-CR-578
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Justin F. Roebel Supervising Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana Andrew A. Kobe Section Chief Criminal Appeals Office of the Indiana Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES Marie Miller Samuel B. Gedge Institute for Justice Arlington, Virginia
The Indiana Constitution guarantees the same right to a jury trial in a civil case as existed at common law when the current constitution was adopted in 1851. The question here is whether this jury-trial right applies in an action seeking to confiscate money under Indiana's civil forfeiture statute. Our historical survey leads us to conclude that it does. We thus affirm the trial court and remand for trial by jury.
Alucious Kizer fled from his car after police stopped him for a traffic violation. While running, Kizer discarded a veritable pharmacy of controlled substances-74 grams of methamphetamine, 67 grams of fentanyl, 12 grams of cocaine, 10 grams of crack cocaine, and 10 grams of synthetic cannabis. Officers also recovered a total of $2,435 in cash. The State later filed a complaint to forfeit the money, alleging that it had been "furnished or intended to be furnished" in exchange for a crime, that it had been "used to facilitate" a crime, or that it was "traceable as proceeds" of a crime. App. Vol. II, pp. 14-15. Kizer, pro se, denied the allegations and requested a jury trial. Id. at 24. The State, in turn, moved to strike Kizer's demand for a jury trial, arguing that no such right exists under either the state or federal constitution. Id. at 28-30. The trial court initially granted the State's motion but later vacated its order, concluding that the lack of guidance from Indiana's appellate courts warranted erring "on the side of awarding Defendants more rights and due process by honoring the right to jury trial in civil forfeiture cases, if timely requested." Order at 3. The State sought (and received) permission to bring an interlocutory appeal.
In a unanimous opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that this Court "has long held" that a complaint for the "forfeiture of illegal property is 'not a civil case under the common law when the Constitution was adopted'" and, so, the "parties are not entitled to trial by jury." State v. $2,435 in United States Currency, 194 N.E.3d 1227, 1229 (Ind.Ct.App. 2022) (quoting Campbell v. State, 171 Ind. 702, 708-09, 87 N.E. 212, 214-15 (1909)). Rather, the panel reasoned, by "'denying individuals the ability to profit from ill-gotten gain, an action for forfeiture resembles an equitable action for disgourgement or restitution.'" Id. (quoting Caudill v. State, 613 N.E.2d 433, 437 (Ind.Ct.App. 1993)).
Kizer, by counsel, petitioned for transfer, which we granted, thus vacating the Court of Appeals opinion. See Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).
"Whether certain claims are entitled to a trial by jury presents a pure question of law" to which we apply a de novo standard of review. Lucas v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 953 N.E.2d 457, 460 (Ind. 2011) (citing Cunningham v. State, 835 N.E.2d 1075, 1076 (Ind.Ct.App. 2005)).
Article 1, Section 20 of the Indiana Constitution ensures that in "all civil cases, the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate." Ind. Const. art. 1, § 20. This fundamental guarantee secures the right to a jury trial "as it existed at common law" at the time Indiana adopted its current constitution. Songer v. Civitas Bank, 771 N.E.2d 61, 63 (Ind. 2002) (emphasis added) (citing City of Crown Point v. Newcomer, 204 Ind. 589, 595, 185 N.E. 440, 443 (1933)). For cases or claims deemed equitable, by contrast, "it is a well-settled tenet that a party is not entitled to a jury trial."[1] Id. See also Ind. Trial Rule 38(A). To resolve the question before us, we first ask whether the cause of action existed in 1851.[2] If so, then history settles the matter. Gates v. City of Indianapolis, 991 N.E.2d 592, 593 (Ind.Ct.App. 2013). But if the cause of action did not exist in 1851, we must decide whether the claim is analogous to one at law or one in equity, as those terms were then understood. Id. at 594.
The question here is whether a claimant in an action brought under Indiana's civil forfeiture statute has a constitutional right to trial by jury.[3]In defending this right, Kizer traces civil actions to forfeit property "used in violation of law" to the colonial common-law courts, which drew on the English in rem procedure with trial by jury. Pet. to Trans. at 12-14.
The State, for its part, argues that, because in rem civil forfeitures in Indiana are a purely statutory procedure of relatively modern vintage, Kizer has no right to a jury trial. Appellant's Br. at 9. While acknowledging that some types of forfeiture existed in 1851, the State insists that civil forfeiture actions like the one here-an action seeking forfeiture of funds illegally obtained from criminal activity or intended for future use in criminal activity-never existed at common law when Indiana adopted its current constitution. Id. at 9 &n. 1. And even if Indiana's forfeiture statutes reflect a "codification of previously existing law," the State contends that "there is still no right to a jury trial because the essential features of an in rem forfeiture action are equitable" rather than legal. Id. at 10.
In resolving this dispute, our opinion proceeds in two parts. In Part I, we clarify the proper framework for analyzing claims to a jury trial under Article 1, Section 20. Part II applies this framework to address the merits of Kizer's claim.
The State insists that Kizer has no right to a jury trial because "[i]n rem civil forfeitures pursuant to Indiana's drug forfeiture laws are a special statutory procedure" intended exclusively for trial by the court. Resp. in Opp. to Trans. at 13; Appellant's Br. at 9 (citing I.C. §§ 34-24-1-3, -4). Kizer disagrees, arguing that the State's theory would effectively deprive Hoosiers of a jury trial when filing suit under any modern statutory scheme. Pet. to Trans. at 16.
We agree with Kizer.
In Midwest Security Life Insurance Co. v. Stroup, the beneficiaries of a health-insurance plan sued the plan's administrator for breach of contract and bad faith and sought a jury trial. 730 N.E.2d 163, 165 (Ind. 2000). The administrator argued that the claims were preempted by ERISA (the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974) and moved to strike the request for a jury trial. Id. The Court of Appeals agreed, holding that ERISA preempted the state-law claims and that, because ERISA embodied "a relatively recent statutory scheme" and "did not exist at common law," the plaintiffs "had no right to a jury trial to determine [their] benefits under the Plan." Midwest Sec. Life Ins. v. Stroup, 706 N.E.2d 201, 207 (Ind.Ct.App. 1999) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), vacated. On transfer, this Court agreed with the Court of Appeals on the preemption issue but expressly declined to "address whether a jury trial would be allowed for either the state law claims or for claims under ERISA." Stroup, 730 N.E.2d at 168-69.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Boehm wrote separately to address the plaintiffs' claim to a jury-trial right. The Court of Appeals' conclusion on that issue, he opined, took "an unduly restrictive view of Article I, Section 20." Id. at 169 (Boehm, J., concurring). Under such an approach, he emphasized, "parties filing suit under any statutory scheme that has been developed since 1852 would not be entitled to a jury trial because the cause of action did not exist at common law." Id. at 170. "The crucial inquiry" in his view was "not, as the Court of Appeals put it, whether a cause of action existed at common law" but, rather, "whether the cause of action is essentially legal or equitable, as those terms were used in 1852." Id. at 169.
Indiana courts have applied Justice Boehm's analytical framework in several cases. In Cunningham v. State, for example, the Court of Appeals considered whether the defendant was entitled to a jury trial for a traffic infraction. 835 N.E.2d 1075, 1076, 1077 (Ind.Ct.App. 2005). Given the absence of "1852 statutes governing speed zones," the court, using the "alternative path of analysis" urged by Justice Boehm in Stroup, determined "whether an action for a traffic infraction would have been considered equitable had it existed in 1852." Id. at 1078 (emphasis added). Because it "would not have been an equitable action," the court held that a jury right existed. Id. See also Gates, 991 N.E.2d at 595 (quoting Cunningham, 835 N.E.2d at 1078) (concluding "that the mandatory fines imposed in this case are akin to claims for money damages, which were 'exclusively legal actions in 1852'").
There are, to be sure, several (older) cases that support the State's theory. See, e.g., State ex rel Boeldt v. Crim. Ct. of Marion Cnty., 236 Ind. 290, 293, 139 N.E.2d 891, 893 (1957) (); State ex rel. Newkirk v. Sullivan...
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