State v. $93,917.50 & 376 gambling devices
| Decision Date | 19 December 2014 |
| Docket Number | 1130437. |
| Citation | 171 So.3d 10 |
| Parties | STATE of Alabama v. $93,917.50 and 376 gambling devices et al. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Luther Strange, atty. gen., and Andrew Brasher, deputy atty. gen., and Mark A. Starrett, asst. atty. gen., for appellant.
John M. Bolton III and Charlanna W. Spencer of Hill, Hill, Carter, Franco, Cole & Black, P.C., Montgomery, for appellee Greenetrack, Inc.
The State of Alabama appeals from an order dismissing the underlying forfeiture action, filed by it pursuant to Ala.Code 1975, § 13A–12–30, seeking condemnation of certain gaming devices, currency, and other property. We reverse and remand.
On June 1, 2011, the State executed a search warrant and seized certain gaming devices, currency, and other property from the premises of Greenetrack, Inc. (“Greenetrack”). On June 7, 2011, Greenetrack filed in the Greene Circuit Court, pursuant to Rule 3.13, Ala. R.Crim. P., a “Motion for Return of Seized Property.”1 This motion was referred to Jefferson Circuit Court Judge Houston L. Brown, who had previously been appointed as a “special circuit judge” for certain gaming-related cases in Greene County.2
On June 22, 2011, the State initiated the instant action—filed separately from the proceedings on the Rule 3.13 motion—by electronically filing in the Greene Circuit Court a petition seeking the forfeiture and condemnation of the gambling devices, currency, and property that had been seized from Greenetrack and that were the subject of Greenetrack's Rule 3.13 motion. The petition alleged in its style that the devices, currency, and property listed had been “in possession of” Greenetrack. The filings included a summons directed to Greenetrack, which indicates that service by certified mail was initiated; the case-action summary indicates that service by certified mail was issued that day. The signature portion of the petition appeared as follows:
As can be seen from the above, the remainder of each line following the “/s/” was blank.
The certificate of service indicated that the petition had been served by mail on several attorneys, including the attorneys who had filed Greenetrack's Rule 3.13 motion. The signature portion of the certificate of service read as follows:
Again, the remainder of the line following the “/s/” was blank.
Two days later, on June 24, 2011, the State filed an “Amended Petition for Forfeiture and Condemnation.” The signature portion of the amended petition appears substantially the same as that in the June 22 petition and also lacked any text on each line following the “/s/.” The certificate of service, which, again, lacked any text on the line following the “/s/,” indicated that the amended petition had been served by mail on the same attorneys identified in the original petition and on two additional attorneys. Further, the amended petition in its style again listed Greenetrack as the party the devices, currency, and property listed in the petition had been “in possession of”; the petition added “c/o Luther Winn” and a different address following Greenetrack's listing as a party.3 The summons was directed to Greenetrack “c/o Luther Winn”; it further indicated that service by certified mail was initiated, and the case-action summary indicates that the petition was sent by certified mail to Winn on June 24.
The case-action summary indicates that “notice” was sent to Greenetrack on July 1, 2011, and lists “service by certified mai[l] on [July 5, 2011,]” for both Greenetrack and Winn.
On July 6, 2011, Judge Brown held a hearing in the Rule 3.13 proceeding. According to the record in the instant action, at that hearing, Judge Brown noted that the June 22 petition in the case underlying this appeal appeared to lack signatures. That day, the State electronically filed a “Second Amended Petition for Forfeiture and Condemnation.” The signature portion of this second amended petition contained typewritten names following the
“/s/,” reading as follows:
Similarly, the signature portion of the certificate of service attached to the petition appeared as follows:
The certificate of service lists the same counsel as did the June 24 amended petition. No summons accompanying the second amended petition appears in the record.
On August 3, 2011, Judge Brown entered an order on Greenetrack's Rule 3.13 motion directing the State to return to Greenetrack all the property seized by the State from Greenetrack's premises. The State appealed, and this Court in State v. Greenetrack, Inc., 154 So.3d 940 (Ala.2014), reversed Judge Brown's decision.
In the meantime, it appears in the instant case that on August 30, 2011, the State hand-filed summonses with the circuit court clerk directed to Greenetrack “c/o William Lee” and to Greenetrack “c/o Luther Winn.” Notations by the process server indicate that the summonses were personally served on August 30, 2011. With these were copies of the June 22 original petition, the June 24 amended petition, and the July 6 second amended petition. In all three petitions, typewritten names followed the “/s/” on the signature lines:
The certificates of service for each read as follows:
On September 30, 2011, Greenetrack filed a motion in the trial court styled as “Respondent Greenetrack's Motion to Strike and Dismiss State's Petition for Forfeiture, Amended Petition For Forfeiture, and Falsely Altered Petitions.” An amended motion was filed on October 18, 2011. The amended motion, among other things, contended that the original petition and the amended petition were due to be stricken because they lacked signatures as required by Rule 11(a), Ala. R. Civ. P. (), and Rule 30(G), Ala. R. Jud. Admin. (setting forth what constitutes an electronic signature), and were thus nullities. Greenetrack further argued that, if the trial court concluded that the August 30 filings were deemed to have initiated the forfeiture action, then the action should be deemed untimely because 14 weeks had elapsed since the execution of the search warrant.4
The State filed a response to Greenetrack's amended motion contending, among other things, that the failure to include a typewritten name after the “/s/” in the original petition and the amended petition was merely a scrivener's error. The State further argued that electronically filing the complaint under the Alafile5 system user name and password for the State's counsel itself constituted an electronic signature.6
On December 17, 2013, the trial court held a hearing on Greenetrack's motions. In an order dated January 15, 2014, the trial court dismissed “the State's Petition for Forfeiture, as amended.” The State appeals.
The State contends that the trial court erred in holding that the June 22 original petition and the June 24 amended petition were due to be stricken under Rule 11(a), Ala. R. Civ. P.
Rule 11(a) provides, in pertinent part:
There is no dispute that the electronic-signature provision of Rule 30(G), Ala. R. Jud. Admin., is applicable in this case. That rule provides, in pertinent part:
The State contends on appeal that both the original petition and the amended petition comply with Rule 11(a) and Rule 30(G). Specifically, it argues that the “/s/” in the original and amended petitions was simply “placed above Reagan's name, rather than directly...
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