State v. Aalim
| Decision Date | 22 December 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 2015–0677.,2015–0677. |
| Citation | 2016 Ohio 8278,150 Ohio St.3d 463,83 N.E.3d 862 |
| Parties | The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. AALIM, Appellant. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Mathias H. Heck Jr., Montgomery County Prosecuting Attorney, and Andrew T. French, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Amanda J. Powell and Charlyn Bohland, Assistant Public Defenders, for appellant.
Rickell L. Howard, Ohio Director of Litigation and Policy, urging reversal for amicus curiae Children's Law Center, Inc.
Maritza S. Nelson, Law Office of Maritza S. Nelson, L.L.C., urging reversal for amici curiae Juvenile Justice Coalition, League of Women Voters of Ohio, and Ohio Association of Child Caring Agencies.
Kimberly P. Jordan, Director, urging reversal for amicus curiae Justice for Children Project, Moritz College of Law Clinical Programs.
D.K. Wehner, urging reversal for amicus curiae Law Office of the Public Defender, Montgomery County, Ohio.
David L. Strait, Assistant Public Defender, urging reversal for amicus curiae Franklin County Public Defender.
Melissa Lindsay, Staff Attorney, urging reversal for amicus curiae Family & Youth Law Center, Capital University Law School.
Dorianne Mason, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Justice & Policy Center.
Michele Temmel, urging reversal for amicus curiae Office of the Hamilton County Public Defender.
Beatrice Jessie Hill, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Judge Ben C. Green Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law, urging reversal for amicus curiae Schubert Center for Child Studies.
Marsha L. Levick, urging reversal for amicus curiae Juvenile Law Center.
Nadia N. Seeratan, urging reversal for amicus curiae National Juvenile Defender Center.
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Eric E. Murphy, State Solicitor, Michael J. Hendershot, Chief Deputy Solicitor, and Stephen P. Carney, Deputy Solicitor, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Attorney General.
{¶ 1} In this case we are asked whether certain provisions of the Revised Code that make the transfer of juveniles to adult court mandatory in specific circumstances violate constitutional due-process and equal-protection provisions. We hold that the mandatory transfer of juveniles without providing for the protection of a discretionary determination by the juvenile-court judge violates juveniles' right to due process.
{¶ 2} In December 2013, a complaint was filed in the Juvenile Division of the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, alleging that appellant, Matthew I. Aalim, engaged in conduct that would be considered aggravated robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.01(A)(1) if committed by an adult. The complaint also contained a firearm specification. Appellee, the state of Ohio, filed a motion to transfer Aalim, requesting that the juvenile court relinquish jurisdiction and transfer him to the general division of the common pleas court to be tried as an adult pursuant to R.C. 2152.10(A)(2)(b) and 2152.12(A)(1)(b), which provide for the mandatory transfer of juveniles to adult court in certain circumstances.
{¶ 3} After conducting a hearing, the juvenile court found that Aalim was 16 years old at the time of the alleged offense and that there was probable cause to believe that he committed the conduct alleged in the complaint, including the firearm specification. The juvenile court automatically transferred the case to the general division of the common pleas court as the statute required. An indictment was issued charging Aalim with two counts of aggravated robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.01(A)(1) with accompanying firearm specifications.1
{¶ 4} Aalim filed a motion to dismiss the indictment and transfer his case back to juvenile court, arguing that the mandatory transfer of juveniles pursuant to R.C. 2152.10(A)(2)(b) and 2152.12(A)(1)(b) violates their rights to due process and equal protection as well as the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments under both the United States and Ohio Constitutions. The trial court overruled the motion, and Aalim entered pleas of no contest to the two counts of aggravated robbery. The court accepted the pleas, dismissed the firearm specifications consistently with a plea agreement that the parties had reached, and sentenced Aalim to concurrent prison terms of four years on each count.
{¶ 5} The Second District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment, rejecting Aalim's challenges to the mandatory-transfer statutes. Rejecting Aalim's due-process argument, the court of appeals relied on a previous decision to hold that the mandatory-transfer scheme of R.C. 2152.12 comports with fundamental concepts of due process. 2015-Ohio-892, 2015 WL 1123001, ¶ 7–9, citing State v. Brookshire, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25853, 2014-Ohio-1971, 2014 WL 1887703, ¶ 30. It also rejected Aalim's equal-protection argument, concluding that the singling out of juveniles aged 16 and 17 charged with serious offenses is rationally related to the legitimate governmental purpose of protecting society and reducing violent crime by juveniles. Id. at ¶ 13–17, citing State v. Anderson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25689, 2014-Ohio-4245, 2014 WL 4792558, ¶ 72–75.2
{¶ 6} We accepted jurisdiction over two propositions of law, which ask us to hold that R.C. 2152.10(A)(2)(b) and 2152.12(A)(1)(b) violate juveniles' rights to due process and equal protection as guaranteed by the United States and Ohio Constitutions. See 143 Ohio St.3d 1498, 2015-Ohio-4468, 39 N.E.3d 1270.
{¶ 7} R.C. 2152.10(A) sets forth which juvenile cases are subject to mandatory transfer and provides:
Aggravated robbery is a category-two offense, R.C. 2152.02(CC)(1), and Aalim was 16 years old at the time the offense was committed. Because he was also charged with a firearm specification, automatic transfer was required. R.C. 2152.10(A)(2)(b). A juvenile court must transfer automatically under these circumstances if "there is probable cause to believe that the child committed the act charged." R.C. 2152.12(A)(1)(b)(ii).
{¶ 8} To prevail on a facial constitutional challenge to a statute, the challenging party must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute is unconstitutional. State v. Romage, 138 Ohio St.3d 390, 2014-Ohio-783, 7 N.E.3d 1156, ¶ 7, citing State v. Warner, 55 Ohio St.3d 31, 43, 564 N.E.2d 18 (1990), citing State ex rel. Dickman v. Defenbacher,
164 Ohio St. 142, 128 N.E.2d 59 (1955), paragraph one of the syllabus. Statutes are presumed constitutional, and we have stated that for a statute to be facially unconstitutional, it must be unconstitutional in all applications. Id., citing Oliver v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co. Ltd. Partnership, 123 Ohio St.3d 278, 2009-Ohio-5030, 915 N.E.2d 1205, ¶ 13.
{¶ 9} Aalim presents facial due-process and equal-protection challenges to the mandatory-transfer statutes. His arguments regarding due process are (1) that fundamental fairness requires that every juvenile receive an opportunity to demonstrate a capacity to change, (2) that youth must always be considered as a mitigating—not aggravating—factor, (3) that the irrebuttable presumption of transfer contained in the statutes is fundamentally unfair, and (4) that juveniles have a substantive due-process right to have their youth and its attendant characteristics taken into account at every stage of the proceedings (including transfer).
{¶ 10} In support of his equal-protection claim, Aalim argues (1) that the mandatory-transfer statutes create classes of similarly situated juveniles who are treated differently based solely on their ages, (2) that a juvenile's status as a juvenile is a suspect class for purposes of equal-protection analysis, and (3) that the age-based distinctions in the mandatory-transfer statutes are not rationally related to the purpose of juvenile-delinquency proceedings.
{¶ 11} The state counters that the only process due to juveniles is codified in the mandatory-transfer statutes as a special measure created for certain specified circumstances. The state also argues that Aalim's equal-protection challenge fails because the statutes do not infringe on substantive rights or affect a suspect class and are rationally related to a legitimate government interest.
{¶ 12} The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution states: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall...
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