State v. Ackal, 54008
| Court | Supreme Court of Louisiana |
| Citation | 290 So.2d 882 |
| Docket Number | No. 54008,54008 |
| Parties | STATE of Louisiana v. Anthony ACKAL and Winston Teeter. |
| Decision Date | 18 February 1974 |
Page 882
v.
Anthony ACKAL and Winston Teeter.
Rehearing Denied March 22, 1974.
Page 884
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Knowles M. Tucker, Dist. Atty., Dracos D. Burke, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.
Richard V. Burnes, Gravel, Roy & Burnes, Alexandria, for defendants-appellants.
SANDERS, Chief Justice.
Defendants, Anthony Ackal and Winston Teeter, were tried jointly under a bill of information charging them with the unauthorized use of collateral security in violation of Louisiana Revised Statute 14:201. The defendants were convicted of attempted unauthorized use of collateral security. They were each sentenced to serve three years at hard labor, in the custody of the Department of Corrections.
The defendant, Anthony Ackal, appeals his conviction, relying upon 19 bills of exceptions.
The defendant, Winston Teeter, joined in this appeal, relying upon 13 bills of exceptions.
Teeter Mobile Homes is a close corporation, having its principal office in New Iberia. Winston Teeter is president of the corporation, owning 1700 shares. Anthony Ackal is the vice-president, with 200 shares. The remaining 100 shares are owned by Mrs. Winston Teeter, who serves as the corporation's secretary-treasurer.
On December 28, 1970, Carl Leonard purchased a mobile home from the Teeter Mobile Home Corporation. Mr. Leonard received a customer's order form and a notation of sale, but did not receive the formal bill of sale. Mr. Leonard requested the officers of the corporation to provide him with the bill of sale. His efforts proved fruitless.
On April 21, 1971, the two defendants went to the New Iberia Bank where they borrowed the sum of $2,272.97. Defendant, Teeter, in his capacity as president of the company, signed a demand promissory note. The note was endorsed by defendants, Teeter and Ackal, individually. As security for the loan, the defendants pledged the manufacturer's certificate of origin and the manufacturer's invoice on the mobile home that was supposedly earmarked for eventual sale to Carl Leonard. Mr. Ackal received the pledged papers, after signing a trust receipt. The papers were then notarized and sent to Mr. Leonard.
When the loan payments became delinquent, the officer of the bank inquired as to the payment or return of the collateral.
Page 885
When the defendants failed to produce the collateral, this prosecution resulted.BILL OF EXCEPTIONS NOS. 2 (ACKAL)
and 1 (TEETER)
These bills were reserved when the court overruled an objection made by defense counsel to the testimony of Mr. Hebert, an official of the Bank of New Iberia. Mr. Hebert was testifying to certain information contained on promissory notes signed by the defendants. The defense counsel objected on the grounds that the documents were the best evidence and that the testimony was inadmissible.
Parol evidence is inadmissible to vary the terms of a written instrument. LSA-C.C. 2276; Cardos v. Cristadoro, 228 La. 975, 84 So.2d 606 (1955); Neck v. Neck, La.App., 169 So.2d 401 (1964); Girard v. Donlon, La.App., 127 So.2d 761 (1961).
Parol evidence, however, is admissible to clarify a written agreement, when the evidence is not inconsistent with the written agreement. Hyatt v. Hartford Acc. and Indemn. Co., La.App., 225 So.2d 102, writ ref. 254 La. 841, 227 So.2d 590 (1969); See also: Heinz v. Tourne, La.App., 18 So.2d 46 (1944).
Prior to the present testimony, the note had been admitted in evidence. The testimony did no more than explain the banking transaction in more detail. In our opinion, the testimony was admissible.
BILLS OF EXCEPTIONS NOS. 4, 5, 7, 8, 11, 12
and (ACKAL) and 2, 4, 7 (TEETER)
These bills were reserved when the trial court overruled objections made to certain testimony concerning transactions of the defendant, which were similar to the ones for which the defendants were being tried.
Counsel for defendants objected to testimony concerning some 'twenty-one similar transactions' on the grounds that (1) they were offenses other than that of which defendants were charged in the bill of information, (2) the State had failed to first prove the crime charged, and (3) the witness was unurping the jury duty in concluding these actions were 'similar.'
This trial occurred before the decision of this Court in State v. Prieur, La., 277 So.2d 126 (1973), became final. Hence, the notice requirements of that decision for the use of the evidence of other offenses are inapplicable. Nonetheless, prior to trial, the State gave notice of its intention to produce evidence of 11 other loan transactions involving similar conduct to establish intent and system, or method of operation.
Intent in an essential ingredient of the crime. LSA-R.S. 14:201, which defines the crime, provides:
'Proof of any of the acts set forth in this Section shall be considered prima facie evidence of criminal intent. The state may proceed further and prove criminal intent by any competent evidence in its possession.'
The general statute regulating proof of intent, LSA-R.S. 15:446, provides:
'When knowledge or intent forms an essential part of the inquiry, testimony may be offered of such acts, conduct or declarations of the accused as tend to establish such knowledge or intent and where the offense is one of a system, evidence is admissible to prove the continuity of the offense, and the commission of similar offenses for the purpose of showing guilty knowledge and intent, but not to prove the offense charged.'
Under the statute, the evidence of the other transactions was admissible to prove intent and system, that is, the method of operation used by the defendants in securing loans and disposing of the collateral. See State v. Morris, 259 La. 1001, 254 So.2d 444, cert. den. 406 U.S. 959, 92 S.Ct. 2066, 32 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972); State v. Spencer, 257 La. 672, 243 So.2d 793 (1971).
Page 886
The remaining objections are likewise without merit. The circumstance that the crime charged was not proved before allowing testimony of other transactions raises no serious question. The court does not normally control the order of the State's proof. LSA-C.Cr.P. 773; State v. Cryer,262 La. 575, 263 So.2d 895 (1972); State v. Shaffer, 260 La. 605, 257 So.2d 121 (1971).
The reference to the other transactions as similar was factually correct. Moreover, the jury...
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State v. Drew, No. 61121
...v. Russell, 352 So.2d 1289 (La.1977); State v. George, 346 So.2d 694 (La.1977); State v. Owens, 301 So.2d 591 (La.1974); State v. Ackal, 290 So.2d 882 (La.1974). In the instant case, testimony at trial linked each of the items introduced in evidence to either defendant or his co-participant......
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State v. de la Beckwith, No. 58586
...charged or an essential element thereof is a question of law presented which this court can review. State v. Jack, supra; State v. Ackal, 290 So.2d 882 (La.1974). In his brief, defendant contends that there was no evidence that he had Knowledge (an essential element of the crime) of the bom......
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State v. George, No. 59047
...be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a clear showing of abuse of discretion. State v. Owens, 301 So.2d 591 (La.1974); State v. Ackal, 290 So.2d 882 (La.1974). Whatever defendant's reasons may have been for possessing a firearm prior to the date of the offense, neither defendant's commis......
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State v. King, Nos. 60732 and 60733
...v. Russell, 352 So.2d 1289 (La.1977); State v. George, 346 So.2d 694 (La.1977); State v. Owens, 301 So.2d 591 (La.1974); State v. Ackal, 290 So.2d 882 (La.1974). In the instant case, the testimony of Deputy Fuselier that he had seen defendant and Pichler on the day of the burglary corrobora......
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State v. Drew, 61121
...v. Russell, 352 So.2d 1289 (La.1977); State v. George, 346 So.2d 694 (La.1977); State v. Owens, 301 So.2d 591 (La.1974); State v. Ackal, 290 So.2d 882 (La.1974). In the instant case, testimony at trial linked each of the items introduced in evidence to either defendant or his co-participant......
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State v. de la Beckwith, 58586
...charged or an essential element thereof is a question of law presented which this court can review. State v. Jack, supra; State v. Ackal, 290 So.2d 882 (La.1974). In his brief, defendant contends that there was no evidence that he had Knowledge (an essential element of the crime) of the bom......
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State v. George, 59047
...be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a clear showing of abuse of discretion. State v. Owens, 301 So.2d 591 (La.1974); State v. Ackal, 290 So.2d 882 (La.1974). Whatever defendant's reasons may have been for possessing a firearm prior to the date of the offense, neither defendant's commis......
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State v. King, s. 60732 and 60733
...v. Russell, 352 So.2d 1289 (La.1977); State v. George, 346 So.2d 694 (La.1977); State v. Owens, 301 So.2d 591 (La.1974); State v. Ackal, 290 So.2d 882 (La.1974). In the instant case, the testimony of Deputy Fuselier that he had seen defendant and Pichler on the day of the burglary corrobora......