State v. Acklin

• Decision Date: 25 May 1976
• Citation: 368 A.2d 212,171 Conn. 105
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Paul ACKLIN. STATE of Connecticut. v. Curtis WRIGHT.

Page 212

368 A.2d 212

171 Conn. 105

STATE of Connecticut v. Paul ACKLIN.

STATE of Connecticut. v. Curtis WRIGHT.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

May 25, 1976.

Thomas Corradino, New Haven, for appellant (defendant Paul acklin).

Max F. Brunswick, New Haven, for appellant (defendant Curtis Wright).

Ernest J. Diette, Jr., Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, was Arnold Markle, State's Atty., for appellee (state).

Before HOUSE, C.J., and LOISELLE, BOGDANSKI, LONGO and BARBER, JJ.

BARBER, Associate Justice.

The defendants in these two cases were tried together to a jury and found guilty of the crimes of conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree, in violation of § 53a-48 of the General Statutes, robbery in the first degree, in violation of § 53a-134(a)(2) of the General Statutes, and having a weapon in a motor vehicle, in violation o § 29-28 of the General Statutes. Although all the claims presented in their separate appeals are not identical, the principal issues raised are the same. Both defendants claim that the court erred in denying their motions to suppress evidence seized at the time of their arrest and in allowing the state to introduce into evidence strands of rope and two ski masks which were not used in the commission of the crimes charged in the informations. In addition, the defendant Acklin claims the court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the conspiracy charge. Our disposition of these three claims renders unnecessary any discussion of the defendants' other numerous assignments of error.

A brief summary of the facts will serve to place the defendants' claims in context. On March 21, 1974, at about 5:25 p.m., three black males, one of whom was armed with a handgun, held up Sam's Market, a New Haven grocery store, taking cash, several packages of cigarettes and a receipt for goods recently purchased by the proprietors of the store from a wholesale concern. An eleven-year-old youth in the vicinity at the time observed three black males getting into a blue Mustang automobile with a black racing stripe across its trunk. At about 6 p.m., two New Haven police officers observed a vehicle meeting this description, with three black males in it, followed it until it stopped, and then approached the occupants for questioning. The driver of the blue Mustang, the defendant Acklin, was frisked by the investigating officer and a handgun was discovered on his person. Acklin and the other two occupants of the Mustang, the defendant Wright and Joseph Miller, were then placed under arrest. A search of the persons of Acklin, Wright, and Miller, and of the automobile, disclosed a black sack containing money and the receipt taken from the grocery store, several packages of cigarettes, ammunition for the handgun, several stands of rope and two stocking masks. At the defendants' trial, Miller was called by the state and testified that he and the two defendants had planned and perpetrated the robbery.

I

Prior to their trial, both defendants moved to suppress all the physical evidence seized at the time of their arrest, claiming that there had been no probable cause or speedy information to support that arrest. Before the evidence in question was admitted, the court (Saden, J.) held an evidentiary hearing on the motion which revealed the following pertinent facts in addition to those already summarized: At the time of the robbery, Officers Michael DiLullo and Edward Napolitano of the New Haven police department were patrolling in an unmarked police vehicle. At about 5:26 p.m., the officers received a bulletin over their car radio describing the robbery, the blue Mustang and the suspects. The bulletin also warned that the suspects were armed and urged caution in dealing with them. Approximately thirty minutes later, the officers noted the defendants' automobile on Orchard Street, approximately three or four miles from the scene of the robbery. There was nothing suspicious about the automobile or the manner in which it was being driven, other than the fact that it matched the description given in the bulletin. The officers followed the Mustang until it stopped, then pulled up behind it, turned on red flashing lights, and cautiously approached it. Officer DiLullo approached the driver, Acklin, displayed his police shield, informed Acklin that he was a police officer and told Acklin to get out of the car. Acklin was not told he was under arrest at this time, nor did DiLullo intend to arrest anyone. DiLullo 'patted down' Acklin and discovered the handgun. Officer Napolitano then ordered Wright and Miller out of the car and all three occupants were thereafter 'contained.' When the defendants and Miller were outside of the Mustang, Officer Napolitano saw, in plain view on the front floor, a knife, sheath and strands of rope. Acklin, Wright and Miller were then searched and, when uniformed police arrived, the Mustang was searched. As a result of these searches a second knife, a box of ammunition five packs of cigarettes, the black sack containing money and the wholesale receipt, and two stocking masks were discovered and seized in addition to Acklin's handgun and the knife and ropes seen on the floor of the car.

The defendants contend that Officers DiLullo and Napolitano had no right to investigate the occupants of the Mustang automobile and to 'frisk' Acklin, since the officers had not observed the vehicle being operated in a suspicious manner, nor did they have firsthand information linking the blue Mustang and its occupants with the robbery. Therefore, they argue, the evidence seized from the defendants and their automobile constitutes inadmissible 'fruit' of the officers' unlawful actions; Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-86, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441; and the trial court erred in permitting it to be introduced at trial.

We have on recent occasions considered challenges to the validity of a stop or search of an automobile. See, e.g., State v. Love, 169 Conn. 596, 363 A.2d 1035; State v. Cari, 163 Conn. 174, 186-87, 303 A.2d 7; State v. Cobuzzi, 161 Conn. 371, 288 A.2d 439, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1017, 92 S.Ct. 677, 30 L.Ed.2d 664. Our decision in State v. Watson, 165 Conn. 577, 584-85, 345 A.2d 532, 537, is, in large measure, dispositive of the defendants' claims: 'Police have the right to stop for investigation short of arrest 'where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot.' Terry v. Ohio, (392 U.S. 1, 30, 33, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1884, 20 L.Ed.2d 889). Furthermore, in Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1923, 32 L.Ed.2d 612, the court held that '(a) brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time.' Effective crime prevention and detection underlie the recognition that a police officer may, in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest. '(I)n justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.' Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. 21, 88 S.Ct. 1880. An officer must act on more than a mere hunch. These facts upon which the stop is predicated and the suspicion which they arouse, in addition to forming the basis for a lawful stop, limit the scope of the officer's initial actions following the stop. Carpenter v. Sigler, 419 F.2d 169, 171 (8th Cir.); see Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. 29, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889. The results of the initial stop may arouse further suspicion or may dispel the questions in the officer's mind. If the latter is the case, the stop may go no further and the detained individual must be free to go. If, on the contrary, the officer's suspicions are confirmed or are further aroused, the stop may be prolonged and the scope enlarged as required by the circumstances.'

In the present case, Officers DiLullo and Napolitano were certainly 'able to point to specific and articulable facts' to justify an investigation of the defendants and their automobile-the automobile and the defendants fit the description of the men and automobile sought in connection with a robbery which had occurred only one-half hour before the investigation. In light of the similarity between the vehicle sought and the vehicle occupied by the defendants, the fact that the defendants were operating the vehicle in an orderly manner is of little, if any, significance.

Nor is it significant that Officers DiLullo and Napolitano, in investigating the defendants, were acting upon a police bulletin rather than firsthand information. Police action may be justified by the collective knowledge of the law enforcement organization. State v. Romano, 165 Conn. 239, 246, 332 A.2d 64; State v. Cobuzzi, supra, 377; see United States ex rel. LaBelle v. LaVallee, 517 F.2d 750, 753 (2d Cir.). The police bulletin describing the suspects and automobile sought in connection with the robbery constituted speedy information, inferentially from an informant who was an eyewitness to or victim of a crime. There is nothing in the record or briefs to indicate that the defendants made any claim or introduced any evidence at the pretrial hearing casting doubt upon the reliability of the source of the information contained in the police radio bulletin. Cf. Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 91 S.Ct. 1031, 28 L.Ed.2d 306. 'It is enough that the police officer initiating the chain of communication either had firsthand knowledge or received his information from some person-normally the putative victim or an eye witness-who it seems...