State v. Adams

• Decision Date: 18 September 1912
• Citation: 22 Idaho 485,126 P. 401
• Parties: STATE Respondent, v. W. H. ADAMS, Appellant
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

126 P. 401

22 Idaho 485

STATE Respondent, v. W. H. ADAMS, Appellant

Supreme Court of Idaho

September 18, 1912

LOCAL OPTION LAW-UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF INTOXICATING LIQUOR-POSSESSION PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF UNLAWFUL PURPOSE.

(Syllabus by the court.)

1. In a prosecution for maintaining a common nuisance by keeping intoxicating liquors in a prohibition district at any place other than a private dwelling-house, the possession of such liquors by one not having a lawful authority to sell or dispose of the same is prima facie evidence that such liquors are kept for sale or disposition in violation of law, and the proof of such possession at any place other than in a private dwelling-house shifts the burden of proof to the defendant to show that his possession was lawful.

2. An instruction which tells the jury that, "If, therefore you should find from the evidence in this case, beyond a reasonable doubt, that intoxicating liquors were found at the place of business of the above-named defendant as alleged in the complaint, the burden of proof is on the defendant to prove that such intoxicating liquors were kept and used for a lawful purpose, and in the absence of any such proof on the part of the defendant showing that such intoxicating liquors if any liquor was found at his place of business, was kept and used for a lawful purpose, then, in that event, you should find the defendant guilty," is erroneous, and prejudicial to a defendant, in that it takes from the jury the right to consider and weigh the evidence for themselves and determine its credibility and the circumstances involved in the case and accompanying the possession of such intoxicating liquor.

3. Where a statute, such as sec. 3, chap. 15, of the 1911 Session Laws (1911 Sess. Laws, p. 32), provides that when the possession of intoxicating liquors is shown, such fact is "prima facie evidence that such intoxicating liquors are kept for sale," the statute means that such prima facie presumption or prima facie evidence is sufficient to go to the jury to prove such facts, and that such possession will be sufficient to support a verdict on that particular fact but it does not mean that such evidence is conclusive and binding upon the jury, and that it is their duty to bring in a verdict against the defendant where such a prima facie case only is made, and it is error to instruct a jury that under such circumstances they should bring in a verdict of guilty.

4. A statute providing that the proof of a certain fact shall constitute prima facie evidence of the existence of a certain other fact, merely shifts the burden of proof onto the adverse party, and, in the absence of proof to the contrary leaves the presumption both of fact and law against such party.

APPEAL from the District Court of the Ninth Judicial District for Fremont County. Hon. James G. Gwinn, Judge.

Prosecution for maintaining a nuisance in keeping liquors for sale or disposal at defendant's place of business in a prohibition district. Verdict and judgment of conviction. Defendant appealed. Reversed.

Judgment reversed, and a new trial granted.

N. D. Jackson, for Appellant.

The charge as given takes from the jury the right to determine whether the liquor was kept for the purpose of sale; it reads into the act the word "conclusive" where the words "prima facie" are found. (State v. Liquors, etc., 80 Me. 57, 12 A. 795; Bailey v. State, 161 Ala. 75, 49 So. 886; Chaffee v. U.S. 18 Wall. (U. S.) 516, 21 L.Ed. 908; Jones v. State, 51 Ohio St. 331, 38 N.E. 79.)

D. C. McDougall, Attorney General, O. M. Van Duyn and J. H. Peterson, Assistants, for Respondent, file no brief.

AILSHIE, J. Stewart, C. J., and Sullivan, J., concur.

OPINION

AILSHIE, J.

This appeal involves the correctness of an instruction given by the court on the request of the state. The prosecution is had under what is called the search and seizure amendment to the local option law, secs. 2 and 3, chap. 15, of the 1911 Session Laws (1911 Sess. Laws, p. 32). In the first part of the instruction, the court gave to the jury the substance of secs. 2 and 3 of the local option law, and advised them that the statute provided that finding intoxicating liquors in the possession of a person at a place other than a private dwelling-house shall be deemed sufficient to authorize a verdict of conviction for such offense in the absence of evidence showing that such liquors were in the possession of the person for a lawful purpose, and the instruction closed with the following sentence: "If therefore, you should find from the evidence in this case, beyond a reasonable doubt, that intoxicating liquors were found at the...