State v. Adams

• Decision Date: 10 September 2014
• Docket Number: No. 27445.,27445.
• Citation: 409 S.C. 641,763 S.E.2d 341
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: The STATE, Respondent, v. Alfred ADAMS, Petitioner. Appellate Case No. 2012–212779.

409 S.C. 641

763 S.E.2d 341

The STATE, Respondent

v. Alfred ADAMS, Petitioner.Appellate Case No. 2012–212779.

No. 27445.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Heard May 7, 2014.

Decided Sept. 10, 2014.

Appellate Defender Robert M. Pachak, of Columbia, for Petitioner.

Attorney General Alan M. Wilson, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, and Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General Deborah R.J. Shupe, all of Columbia, and Solicitor Scarlett Wilson, of Charleston, for Respondent.

Opinion

Justice KITTREDGE.

Believing Petitioner Alfred Adams was a drug dealer, officers from the North Charleston South Carolina Police Department (NCPD), acting without a warrant, placed a Global Positioning System (GPS)¹ device on a vehicle driven by Adams. After monitoring Adams' travel to Atlanta, Georgia, and upon his return to South Carolina, law enforcement stationed a drug canine unit on the interstate within the NCPD's jurisdiction, with instructions to conduct a traffic stop on Adams' vehicle. An officer conducted the requested traffic stop and discovered cocaine in Adams' possession, which resulted in Adams' arrest. Adams moved to suppress the drugs, arguing that the warrantless installation of the GPS device violated the Fourth Amendment. The trial court denied Adams' motion, finding no constitutional violation. The court of appeals found the warrantless installation of the GPS device violated the Fourth Amendment but determined that the exclusionary rule did not apply because “Adams's traffic violations were intervening criminal acts sufficient to cure the taint arising from unlawfully installing the [GPS] device and monitoring the vehicle.” State v. Adams, 397 S.C. 481, 489, 725 S.E.2d 523, 527–28 (Ct.App.2012). We reverse and remand.

I.

In 2008, a confidential informant approached the NCPD and informed officers that Adams was selling cocaine and heroin in the North Charleston area. The confidential informant informed officers that Adams purchased drugs from Atlanta and New York. After an investigation, officers installed a GPS device on the undercarriage of Adams' car, which was parked in a public garage in Charleston. Officers inexplicably did not obtain a warrant or court authorization for the installation of the GPS device. Thereafter, the officers monitored Adams' movements by way of the GPS data. Five days after installing the device, the GPS data indicated that Adams' vehicle was in Atlanta.

When Adams' vehicle was returning toward Charleston, investigators contacted Sergeant Timothy Blair and instructed him to position himself, along with a drug canine, at a rest area on Interstate 26 in North Charleston. Sergeant Blair, who was aware that Adams was a suspected drug dealer, was instructed be on the lookout for Adams and to conduct a traffic stop. Soon thereafter, Sergeant Blair observed Adams' vehicle and pulled onto the interstate behind it. A short time later, Adams committed an improper lane change. Sergeant Blair did not, however, initiate a traffic stop. Instead, Sergeant Blair continued to follow Adams, observed another traffic violation, and waited for Adams to drive near Charleston Southern University before turning on his blue lights and directing Adams to pull over.

This was no ordinary traffic stop. Sergeant Blair immediately called for backup and drew his weapon as he approached the vehicle. The backup officer, Officer James Greenawalt, arrived one or two minutes later. Sergeant Blair directed Greenawalt to remove Adams from the vehicle and run a license check. Meanwhile, Sergeant Blair used the dog to conduct a perimeter sniff of Adams' vehicle. The dog alerted to the driver's door of Adams' vehicle.

At this point, Sergeant Blair instructed Greenawalt to pat Adams down for weapons. In doing so, Greenawalt felt a “jagged, round object” near Adams' groin that he believed to be narcotics. Greenawalt retrieved the item, which was 141.62 grams of cocaine.

Adams was charged with trafficking cocaine and possession with the intent to distribute cocaine within proximity of a school.

II.

Prior to trial, Adams moved to suppress the seized evidence, contending that the installation and monitoring of the GPS device violated the Fourth Amendment and section 17–30–140 of the South Carolina Code (2014), which requires officers to obtain a court order prior to installing a mobile tracking device.

In response, the State first contended that there was no constitutional violation, relying on United States v. Knotts for the proposition that “[a] person travelling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another.”460 U.S. 276, 281, 103 S.Ct. 1081, 75 L.Ed.2d 55 (1983). Second, the State admitted that the officers did not obtain court authorization pursuant to section 17–30–140. In fact, the officers did not even know about the statute's existence. The State nevertheless claimed that, even if the officers violated the statute, suppression was not warranted absent a constitutional violation.

The trial court found that officers violated section 17–30–140 by not obtaining a court order prior to installing the GPS device. Clearly disturbed by the State's failure to comply with section 17–30–140, the trial court remarked: “Start following the statute or at some point in time, [the evidence is] going to be suppressed.”

Ultimately, however, the trial court found no constitutional violation and concluded that the statutory violation alone did not warrant suppression of the drug evidence.

The case proceeded to a bench trial. The trial court found Adams guilty of trafficking cocaine and sentenced him to twenty-five years in prison and a $50,000 fine.²

Adams appealed to the court of appeals, during the pendency of which, the United States Supreme Court issued United States v. Jones, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 945, 181 L.Ed.2d 911 (2012). In Jones, the Supreme Court held that “the Government's [warrantless] installation of a GPS device on a target's vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle's movements, constitutes a ‘search.’ ” 132 S.Ct. at 949. While the Supreme Court's holding of a Fourth Amendment violation was unanimous, the majority's rationale was based on a theory of trespass, characterizing the government's conduct as the physical occupation of private property for the purpose of obtaining incriminating evidence. Id.

Relying on Jones, the court of appeals found that the failure to obtain a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment. Adams, 397 S.C. at 488–89, 725 S.E.2d at 527. However, the court of appeals held that the exclusionary rule did not apply because “Adams's traffic violations were intervening criminal acts sufficient to cure the taint arising from unlawfully installing the device and monitoring the vehicle.” Id. at 489, 725 S.E.2d at 527.

We issued a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals' decision. The State has not challenged the court of appeals' holding that officers violated the Fourth Amendment. Thus, the only question before this Court is whether suppression may be avoided by the intervening criminal acts doctrine, or some other alternative sustaining ground.

III.

“In criminal cases, this Court only reviews errors of law.”

State v. Gamble, 405 S.C. 409, 415, 747 S.E.2d 784, 787 (2013) (citing State v. Jacobs, 393 S.C. 584, 586, 713 S.E.2d 621, 622 (2011) ). “On appeals from a motion to suppress based on Fourth Amendment grounds, this Court applies a deferential standard of review and will reverse if there is clear error.” State v. Tindall, 388 S.C. 518, 521, 698 S.E.2d 203, 205 (2010) (citing State v. Khingratsaiphon, 352 S.C. 62, 70, 572 S.E.2d 456, 459 (2002) ). However, this Court reviews questions of law de novo. State v. Whitner, 399 S.C. 547, 552, 732 S.E.2d 861, 863 (2012) (citations omitted).

A.

Adams contends that the court of appeals erred in finding that his traffic violations were intervening criminal acts that dissipated the taint from the unlawful search and concluding the facts did not warrant suppression. We agree.

The exclusionary rule “is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.”United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974). The remedy of exclusion “compel[s] respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way—by removing the incentive to disregard it.” Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960) (citation omitted). However, “[t]he fact that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred ... does not necessarily mean that the exclusionary rule applies.” Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 140, 129 S.Ct. 695, 172 L.Ed.2d 496 (2009) (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 223, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) ). To that end, courts have recognized several exceptions to the exclusionary rule,³ two of which are implicated in this case—the attenuation/intervening act doctrine and the good-faith reliance exception. We turn first to the court of appeals' holding that suppression was not warranted because Adams' traffic violations were intervening criminal acts.

“Generally, evidence derived from an illegal search or arrest is deemed fruit of the poisonous tree and is inadmissible.” United States v. Najjar, 300 F.3d 466, 477 (4th Cir.2002) (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484–85, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) ). “ However, not all evidence conceivably derived from an illegal search need be suppressed if it is somehow attenuated enough from the violation to dissipate the taint.” Id. “To determine whether the derivative evidence has been purged of the taint of the unlawful search, we [may] consider several factors, including: (1) the amount of time between the illegal action and the acquisition of the...