State v. Adams, No. 21942

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
• Writing for the Court: LITTLEJOHN; LEWIS
• Citation: 279 S.C. 228,306 S.E.2d 208
• Docket Number: No. 21942
• Decision Date: 29 June 1983
• Parties: The STATE, Respondent, v. Sylvester Lewis ADAMS, Appellant.

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306 S.E.2d 208 279 S.C. 228 The STATE, Respondent,
v.
Sylvester Lewis ADAMS, Appellant. No. 21942. Supreme Court of South Carolina. June 29, 1983.

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[279 S.C. 230] David I. Bruck, of S.C. Com'n of Appellate Defense, Columbia, James W. Boyd, York, and Samuel B. Fewell, Jr., Rock Hill, for appellant.

Atty. Gen. T. Travis Medlock, Retired Atty. Gen. Daniel R. McLeod and Asst. Atty. Gen. Harold M. Coombs, Jr., Columbia, and Sol. William L. Ferguson, York, for respondent.

LITTLEJOHN, Justice:

This is an appeal from a criminal conviction on the charges of murder, kidnapping and housebreaking. The Appellant, Sylvester Lewis Adams (Adams), was sentenced to death. We affirm.

This case was tried previously. Upon appeal, a new trial was granted. See, State v. Adams, 277 S.C. 115, 283 S.E.2d 582 (1981).

On October 17, 1979, at approximately 3:00 p.m., Bryan Chambers, a sixteen year old with a slight learning disability, was taken from his home and strangled to death in a wooded area directly behind the house. Shortly thereafter, Bryan's mother received a phone call. The only words she could make out were "boy ... place ... money ...." Bryan's mother hung up on the caller not knowing at that time that her son was missing.

The evidence introduced at the trial relating to the abduction is as follows:

1) Forced entry into the house through the rear door with the use of a tire tool (or jack handle).

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2) A piece of tablecloth was torn from the dining room table and used to hold a sock in the victim's mouth.

3) Venetian blind cord, removed from the house, was used to bind his feet once he had been forced into the wooded area behind the house.

4) The strangulation was caused by placing a stick in [279 S.C. 231] the tablecloth (pulled down around his neck) and tightening it in the fashion of a tourniquet.

5) A butcher knife was missing from the victim's home and there was a deep cut above one of his ears consistent with a blow from such a knife.

James Jeter was a key state's witness. His testimony may be abbreviated as follows: The defendant (Adams) rode a bicycle into Jeter's backyard where he was raking leaves. Adams had a tire tool, a gun and a pair of gloves in his possession. Adams told Jeter he was going to break into the house next door to steal money.

After entering the house, Adams attempted to solicit Jeter's aid in removing a safe he had allegedly found there. Jeter refused. Adams then stated he would await Bryan's return home from school to get the combination.

Jeter spoke with Bryan in Bryan's front yard when he returned home a few minutes later. He did not warn Bryan that Adams was inside because he was afraid.

A short time later, Jeter saw Adams lead Bryan into the woods with something white tied around Bryan's neck. He appeared to be resisting Adams.

A search for Bryan was conducted by Jeter's father and Bryan's father (A.C. Mitchell) in the early evening. Jeter became concerned about his friend and asked Adams where he was. Adams told him Bryan was tied up in an abandoned house and he would be released when Bryan's parents gave him (Adams) some money. He also told Jeter he had attempted a ransom call but Bryan's mother had hung up on him before he could tell her where to deliver the money.

Bryan's body was found covered with brush by rescue workers the following day. The next day (two days after the killing), Jeter told the police for the first time what he knew about the incident.

A.C. Mitchell testified that on the evening of his son's death, when he and a neighbor were searching for Bryan with the aid of Bryan's small dog (which had been found trapped inside the washing machine of the boy's home), Adams had frightened them away from the area where Bryan's body was later found by appearing with his pit bulldog allegedly to aid in the search.

[279 S.C. 232] Adams raised seven (7) issues for review by this Court. We hold that none assert reversible error.

I.

Did the trial judge err in admitting for the jury's consideration exhibit identification tags which included written statements of police officers concerning issues of fact?

The following items were introduced into evidence by the prosecution and taken to the jury room during deliberations with identification tags prepared by the police attached:

(a) State's Exhibit No. 15,

Jack handle or tire tool;

(b) State's Exhibit No. 4,

Venetian blind cord container;

(c) State's Exhibit No. 16,

Photograph of the backdoor of the victim's home; and

(d) State's Exhibit No. 2,

Piece of torn table cloth.

When these exhibits were offered, counsel for Adams announced, "no objection" to Exhibit No. 16, and Exhibit No. 2. Objection to the introduction of Exhibit No. 15, jack handle, was solely on the ground that "one jack handle looks like another." Objection to Exhibit No. 4, venetian blind cord container, was solely on the ground that it had not been properly "linked up." Adams now argues that the information on the identification tags, when read together, presented to the jury a summary of the prosecution's theory of the case and impermissibly

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bolstered the credibility of the State's key witness. Normally, these objections would not be considered upon appeal, but inasmuch as this is a capital case, we accept all argument in favorem vitae, State v. Adams, supra.

The information on the identification tags was basically the same information to which the witnesses testified. Adams' own statement corroborates each tag. We hold that the tags were merely cumulative of testimony and other evidence introduced at trial and assert no error. See generally, State v. Blackburn, 271 S.C. 324, 247 S.E.2d 334 (1978), and State v. Funderburke, 251 S.C. 536, 164 S.E.2d 309 (1968).

II.

Did the trial judge err in admitting Adams' confession into evidence as violative of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment constitutional rights?

[279 S.C. 233] At trial, the State offered, and the trial judge admitted, a written confession signed by Adams four days after his arrest. The confession was corroborative of, and certainly not inconsistent with, other evidence pointing conclusively to the guilt of the accused.

At an appropriate time, the judge held an in camera hearing and found beyond a reasonable doubt that Adams was given his Miranda rights, understood the rights, and that the statement was freely and voluntarily given and signed. Since there was conflicting evidence as to the validity of the confession, the trial judge, in the last analysis, submitted the issue to the jury. The same objection was interposed at the first trial of the case. Upon appeal, this Court declined to invalidate the confession, stating the following:

We caution the court on remand to impress upon the jury that no confession may be considered by it unless found beyond reasonable doubt to have been given freely and voluntarily under the totality of the circumstances. State v. Harris, 212 S.C. 124, 46 S.E.2d 682 (1948), rev'd on other grounds, 338 U.S. 68, 69 S.Ct. 1354, 93 L.Ed. 1815 (1949). In addition, since the appellant was in custody at the time of his alleged confession, the jury must be convinced that he received and understood his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, as mandated by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). See State v. Pendergrass, 270 S.C. 1, 239 S.E.2d 750 (1977); State v. Doby, 273 S.C. 704, 258 S.E.2d 896 (1979), cert. denied 444 U.S. 1048, 100 S.Ct. 739, 62 L.Ed.2d 735 (1980).

Upon the second trial now here for review, the judge followed these instructions, telling the jury:

Mr. Foreman and ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I would instruct that before you may consider in evidence the statement or confession that was put into evidence, you must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was advised of his right to remain silent, advised that anything he said could be used in evidence against him, that he had a right to counsel, that if he could not afford counsel that one would be provided him without charge. If the defendant was so advised, you may [279 S.C. 234] only consider his admission if you find that he fully understood the warnings and nevertheless intelligently and knowingly elected to waive his rights.

* * *

And so I'll instruct you, Mr. Foreman and ladies and gentlemen of the jury, that you must find that the defendant was advised of his rights, which I referred to, and knowingly understood them, and you must find that he was so advised and that the State has proved that he was given those rights, that he understood them. You must be convinced of that beyond a reasonable doubt. And you the jury must additionally, before you would consider that statement or confession, find beyond a reasonable doubt that the same was given freely and voluntarily under the totality of the circumstances.

When the evidence relative to violation of constitutional rights is conflicting, someone has to determine the issue of admissibility.

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This factual matter is first for determination by the trial judge; in the last analysis, it is for determination by the jury. While either the trial judge or the jury might have made this determination differently, the evidence does not warrant the conclusion as argued by counsel for Adams that the confession should have been excluded as a matter of law. It is clearly inferable that Adams persisted in signing the confession, ignoring the admonition of his counsel.

A recitation of the details leading up to the confession would serve no purpose. Suffice it to say the evidence was in conflict and the trial judge properly admitted the same in evidence. Having properly been admitted in evidence at the guilt or innocence stage, the confession was properly before the jury at the sentencing phase of the bifurcated trial.

III.

Did the trial judge err in overruling Appellant's challenge for cause of a juror who stated that he would likely believe a police...