State v. Adams

• Citation: 465 P.3d 176
• Decision Date: 12 June 2020
• Docket Number: No. 120,475,120,475
• Parties: STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Boe Wayne ADAMS, Appellant.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Kansas

465 P.3d 176

STATE of Kansas, Appellee,

v.Boe Wayne ADAMS, Appellant.

No. 120,475

Supreme Court of Kansas.

Opinion filed June 12, 2020.

Peter Maharry, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, was on the briefs for appellant.

Lesley A. Isherwood, assistant district attorney, Marc Bennett, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were on the brief for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by Wilson, J.:

Boe Wayne Adams appeals the denial of his postsentencing motion to withdraw his plea of guilty to premeditated first-degree murder, aggravated robbery, felony theft, forgery, and misdemeanor theft. The district court denied the motion after it found that the record conclusively showed Adams' plea was knowing and voluntarily made.

Before us, Adams asserts he has evidence to prove a mental illness that rendered his plea involuntary and that the district court erred in denying his motion without an evidentiary hearing. Adams also argues his counsel was ineffective because he did not protest before sentencing or have Adams undergo a mental health evaluation. Because we find Adams has not met his burden to show the manifest injustice necessary to overturn the district court's ruling and allow Adams to withdraw his plea or that his counsel was ineffective, we affirm the decision of the district court.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Boe Adams was charged in Sedgwick County District Court with premeditated first-degree murder, aggravated robbery, felony theft, forgery, and misdemeanor theft. At the earliest stages of his case, Adams requested that he be allowed to proceed pro se. Given the gravity of such a request, the district court brought him in for a special hearing before ruling on the motion to proceed pro se. At that hearing, the court informed Adams about the dangers of self-representation and even advised him that it is generally not a good idea. Adams acknowledged this but said, while he did not want his specific reasons for self-representation known to the court at that time, it was strictly a "manipulation tactic" against the State in response to plea negotiations. Adams felt that he had given the State an opportunity to reach a plea deal and a "reasonable conclusion to this case" but the State was holding out so it was his decision to respond by proceeding pro se.

At this same hearing, Adams told the court that he had represented himself in trial before and demonstrated some knowledge of legal proceedings by inquiring about a preliminary hearing, discussing his intent to file motions, and inquiring about depositions. After asking for more information regarding depositions, the court ascertained Adams' previous experience had been in Iowa. The court and Adams discussed some differences between Kansas and Iowa procedure. The court reiterated to Adams that self-representation could be a terrible decision, to which Adams replied, "Really the outcome is irrelevant to me. It's just a ... defense tactic to try to get this resolved." The court found that Adams' decision to self-represent was a knowing and informed decision. Adams was allowed to proceed pro se.

Adams eventually reached an agreement with the State which included a guilty plea. In conjunction with the plea agreement, Adams signed the Defendant's Acknowledgment of Rights and Entry of Plea, which states, "I know of no reason why my mental competence should be questioned. I have not taken any drugs or medication during the past 48 hours, except Remeron

(sp) [sic ]. Any such drugs or medications do not affect my ability to understand my rights or the consequences of this plea." The plea agreement also included a key provision important to Adams that "[t]he State will not oppose the defendant's request to serve a sentence imposed on him by the State of Iowa prior to serving his sentence imposed in this case."

The next time the court met with Adams, it was to go over the preliminary hearing waiver, jury trial waiver, and plea. At the court's request, the State recited the terms of the plea agreement. The court then confirmed with Adams that he understood each of those terms and that it was what he wanted to do. The court also specifically addressed the acknowledgment form and Adams' disclosure that he was taking Remeron

. The court confirmed that Adams was not taking any other medication, that the Remeron did not interfere or impede his ability to think and reason and make important decisions, and that he was satisfied that he was of the state of mind to fully understand and appreciate the proceedings. Adams expressly confirmed there was no reason of which he was aware for the court to refuse to accept his guilty pleas. Adams further confirmed that he felt like he had a "full and complete understanding of the nature of the charges" that he was pleading guilty to. Adams acknowledged he did not have any complaints about the way the court or the prosecution had treated him.

Adams confirmed that he believed pleading guilty to take advantage of the plea agreement was in his best interest. The court proceeded to go through each offense with Adams, being meticulous in its detail to make sure Adams understood each charge and agreed he was guilty of each. The court eventually accepted Adams' guilty plea, ordered a presentence investigation, and set a date for sentencing. At what should have been his sentencing hearing, the parties relayed that there was a delay in getting Adams' presentence investigation report, meaning his sentencing needed to be delayed. At that point, Adams requested that Gary Owens—his appointed counsel prior to proceeding pro se—be reappointed to the case so that he could represent Adams at the rescheduled sentencing hearing. The court granted Adams' request and reappointed Gary Owens.

At the sentencing hearing, Owens reiterated how Adams accepted full responsibility for the crimes and how his major concern was to communicate to everyone concerned that his codefendant was not aware of his plans, did not assist him prior to the murder, and that Adams both lied to and threatened his codefendant after the murder. Owens stressed that Adams wanted to make sure the court and the district attorney's office were aware that he was taking full responsibility and he went pro se as part of his plans and desires to make this process as quick as possible out of concern for the codefendant and all parties involved. The court sentenced Adams according to the terms of the plea agreement, including that he be allowed to serve his Iowa time before serving his Kansas time.

Adams subsequently filed a motion to withdraw his plea. The district court denied the motion as the case was on appeal. After the resolution of that appeal, Adams later filed a motion under K.S.A. 60-1507 alleging ineffective assistance of counsel as well as another motion to withdraw his plea. In these motions, he asserts that he suffers from paranoid schizophrenia

and that at the time of his plea he was not on any medication for it, that it was his attorney's responsibility to raise these issues and have him evaluated, and that he acted irrationally in representing himself because he had voices telling him what to do. Adams further asserted that this history of unmedicated schizophrenia can be verified by his records from the Iowa Department of Corrections as well as a new evaluation by the Kansas Department of Corrections.

The district court—coincidentally, the same judge who presided over Adams' original proceedings—appointed new counsel and held a preliminary hearing on these motions. After hearing arguments from counsel, the court took up the issue of the ineffective assistance of counsel first, noting that it had an independent memory of this case and Adams. It noted that Owens was not on the case long enough to do anything or be ineffective in any way before Adams requested to represent himself. Further, even after Owens had been reappointed, it was simply for sentencing after a plea had been negotiated and accepted by Adams. There was no basis for Owens to argue against the plea agreement and no evidence in the record that Owens was ineffective.

The court then turned to the motion to withdraw the plea and Adams' own mental competency. The court noted:

"In attacking that issue, or at least approaching that issue, I'm going to assume that for purposes of my analysis that if the Court proceeded with an evidentiary hearing, that consistent with the records that [Adams' counsel] has obtained that Defendant most likely could find an expert that would say he is suffering from some sort of a schizoaffective disorder

and that he potentially wasn't fully medicated during relevant periods of time ... that, in and of itself, would not be a sufficient reason to allow Mr. Adams to withdraw his plea.

"The question would become whether Mr. Adams in that state was incapable of making knowing and voluntary decisions. And in that respect the Court does have a memory of Mr. Adams appearing. My memory is that Mr. Adams was not exhibiting any outward signs of a mental disorder. I don't profess to be an expert in the area [of] mental health. I do have experience presiding over competency hearings where defendants do suffer from mental conditions that render them incompetent, and in that respect I didn't notice anything about Mr. Adams' affect, his hygiene, his appearance, his ability to stay focused, his ability to communicate with the Court, none of that exhibited—or indicated that Mr. Adams was suffering from any sort of mental incapacity or problems that affected his ability to make decisions and understand the consequences of those decisions."

The court recited in detail its interactions with Adams, noting throughout the case Adams was acting effectively and competently and there was no evidence in the record to show he was incompetent or that his decisions were anything other than knowing and voluntary. The district court relied on this established record to rule that Adams had not shown...