State v. Adams
| Decision Date | 28 July 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 4964.,4964. |
| Citation | 397 S.C. 481,725 S.E.2d 523 |
| Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
| Parties | The STATE, Respondent, v. Alfred ADAMS, Appellant. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appellate Defender Robert M. Pachak, of Columbia, for Appellant.
Attorney General Alan Wilson, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, and Assistant Attorney General Deborah R.J. Shupe, all of Columbia; and Solicitor Donald V. Myers, of Lexington, for Respondent.
Alfred Adams appeals his conviction for trafficking cocaine. He argues the trial court erred in refusing to suppress drugs found on his person during a traffic stop. We affirm.
In July 2008, the North Charleston Police Department (the Department) learned that Adams was involved in a shooting and attempted robbery associated with a drug deal. Based on further investigation, the Department believed Adams was a drug dealer whose source of supply was in Atlanta, Georgia. The Department consequently installed a tracking device 1 on Adams's vehicle while the vehicle was parked in a public parking garage. The Department did not seek a warrant or judicial order before installing the device.
Five days later, the Department learned from the device that Adams's vehicle traveled to Atlanta, remained in that area for less than an hour, and began returning toward Charleston on Interstate 26.2 Around 11:55 p.m., the Department contacted Sergeant Timothy Blair, who was accompanied by his drug dog and sitting in his cruiser at a rest area off of the interstate. The Department instructed Sergeant Blair to “be on the lookout” for the vehicle and stop it if it violated any traffic laws. As Sergeant Blair entered the interstate, he spotted the vehicle and observed it change lanes twice without using a turn signal. Sergeant Blair initiated a traffic stop at 11:57 p.m., and the vehicle pulled into a gas station.
Sergeant Blair approached the driver's side of the vehicle without his drug dog. Adams was driving, and Sergeant Blair advised him of the violations. At that time, Adams Sergeant Blair asked Adams to keep his hands visible and noticed another vehicle turn into the gas station as he initiated the stop. Sergeant Blair was worried the second vehicle was a “ trail vehicle” because the driver was watching the traffic stop, acting “kind of panicky, looking back and forth,” and “fidgeting with his jacket.” Sergeant Blair requested backup out of concern for his safety.
Officer James Greenawalt arrived approximately three minutes later. He removed Adams from the vehicle and began a license check. Meanwhile, Sergeant Blair used his dog to conduct a perimeter sniff of the vehicle. During this period, Adams repeatedly attempted to talk to the officers, and his eyes “were looking in other directions like trying to make a way for escape.” The dog alerted at the driver's door and then on the driver's seat and center console. 3
After the dog alerted, Officer Greenawalt began to pat down Adams for weapons. In doing so, he felt a “jagged, round object” in Adams's groin area that his training and experience led him to believe was drugs. He placed Adams in handcuffs and retrieved the item, which was 141.62 grams of packaged cocaine. The license check was not complete when the dog alerted and ensuing pat-down occurred. The drugs were found a little less than 8 minutes after Adams was pulled over. Adams was never issued a citation for the traffic violations.
A Charleston County grand jury indicted Adams for trafficking cocaine. During pretrial motions, Adams moved to suppress the drugs, alleging the Department failed to obtain a warrant or court order before installing the tracking device pursuant to the Fourth Amendment and section 17–30–140 of the South Carolina Code (Supp.2011). The trial court agreed that the Department violated the statute. However, the court held the violation did not warrant suppression of the evidence without a corresponding constitutional violation. Relying on United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 103 S.Ct. 1081, 75 L.Ed.2d 55 (1983), the court held that the use of the tracking device was not a search. Moreover, the court held the traffic stop, pat-down, and retrieval of the drugs did not violate Adams's Fourth Amendment rights. Thus, the court found no constitutional violation occurred, and the motion to suppress was denied.
Adams was found guilty and sentenced to twenty-five years' imprisonment and a $50,000 fine. This appeal followed.
Did the trial court err in denying Adams's motion to suppress?
State v. Wright, 391 S.C. 436, 442, 706 S.E.2d 324, 326 (2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In Fourth Amendment search and seizure cases, Id.(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Adams argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the drugs were obtained in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.4 Specifically, he maintains the Department's use of the tracking device constituted an unlawful search because the Department did not obtain a prior warrant.5 We agree that the Department conducted an unlawfulsearch by installing the tracking device on Adams's vehicle and monitoring the vehicle's movements without obtaining a prior warrant. However, this unlawful search did not require suppression of the drugs.
“The Fourth Amendment provides in relevant part that ‘[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.’ ” United States v. Jones, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 945, 949, 181 L.Ed.2d 911 (2012) (alteration in quotation). “[S]earches and seizures conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well delineated exceptions.” Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 372, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In United States v. Jones, the United States Supreme Court held that “the Government's installation of a GPS device on a target's vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle's movements, constitutes a ‘search.’ ” 132 S.Ct. at 949. The Court characterized the government's conduct as the “physical[ ] occup[ation of] private property for the purpose of obtaining information.” Id. The Court reasoned, “such a physical intrusion would have been considered a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was adopted.” Id.
Here, the tracking device was installed while Adams's vehicle was parked in a public parking garage, and the device was used to monitor the vehicle's movements while it was on public streets and highways. Under Jones, the Department's installation of the device on Adams's vehicle and use of that device to monitor the vehicle's movements constituted a “search.” 6 Therefore, the Department's failure to obtain a warrant made that search unreasonable and resulted in a violation of Adams's constitutional rights.7 Nevertheless, we must still determine whether that violation required suppression of the drugs seized from Adams's person. For the reasons below, we find it did not.
Although the installation of the tracking device on Adams's vehicle and monitoring of the vehicle's movements without a prior warrant constituted an unlawful search, the State argues as an additional sustaining ground that the exclusionary rule does not require suppression of the drugs found on Adams's person. The State maintains Adams's traffic violations were intervening criminal acts sufficient to cure the taint arising from unlawfully installing the device and monitoring the vehicle.8 We agree.
The exclusionary rule prohibits the admission of evidence that is the fruit of an unlawful search. Specifically, it prohibits the admission of evidence (1) directly acquired during an unlawful search and (2) later discovered and derivative of the unlawful search.9Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 536–37, 108 S.Ct. 2529, 101 L.Ed.2d 472 (1988); see also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). However, under our case law the exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence obtained during a search or seizure conducted pursuant to an “intervening illegal act.” State v. Nelson, 336 S.C. 186, 194, 519 S.E.2d 786, 790 (1999); see also In re Jeremiah W., 361 S.C. 620, 624–25, 606 S.E.2d 766, 768 (2004).
In State v. Nelson, a police officer driving behind the defendant flashed his high beams to get the defendant's attention without intending to initiate a traffic stop. 336 S.C. at 189, 519 S.E.2d at 787. The defendant then ran a stop sign and sped through a neighborhood, and the officer initiated a traffic stop, with which the defendant complied. Id. When the officer approached the defendant's vehicle, he smelled alcohol and the defendant refused to participate in a field sobriety test. Id. The defendant was arrested for driving under the influence. Id. Our supreme court held that even if the officer acted unlawfully in initially attempting to get the defendant's attention, the evidence seized as a result of the subsequent...
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State v. Adams
...to cure the taint arising from unlawfully installing the [GPS] device and monitoring the vehicle.” State v. Adams, 397 S.C. 481, 489, 725 S.E.2d 523, 527–28 (Ct.App.2012). We reverse and remand.I.In 2008, a confidential informant approached the NCPD and informed officers that Adams was sell......