State v. Adams
| Decision Date | 15 October 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 38 September Term, 2007.,38 September Term, 2007. |
| Citation | 958 A.2d 295,406 Md. 240 |
| Parties | STATE of Maryland v. Raymond Leon ADAMS. |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Cathleen C. Brockmeyer, Assistant Attorney General (Douglas F. Gansler, Attorney General of Maryland of Baltimore), on brief, for petitioner.
Bradford C. Peabody, Assistant Public Defender (Nancy S. Forster, Public Defender, of Baltimore), on brief, for respondent.
Gary E. Bair, Bennett & Bair, LLP, Greenbelt, for Brief of Amicus Curiae Families Against Injustice in Support of Respondent.
Argued before BELL, C.J., RAKER*, HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, JOHN C. ELDRIDGE, (Retired, specially assigned), ALAN M. WILNER, (Retired, specially assigned) and DALE R. CATHELL, (Retired, specially assigned), JJ.
On the night of 17 February 1979, Kathy P.1 and her sister, Teresa B., were walking to their car in the parking lot of the Prince George's Motor Lodge, after leaving the Cuckoo's Nest, a nearby bar. The Motor Lodge and the bar are in Prince George's County. A van approached and cornered the women between several parked cars. Three men got out of the van. One of them, later identified as Raymond Leon Adams, was carrying a gun. Adams, threatening to shoot the women, ordered them to get into the van. Adams grabbed Kathy P., struck her over her head, and, together with other men, pushed her into the van. The vehicle, with Kathy P. inside, sped off on Branch Avenue in the direction of the District of Columbia. Adams drove the van. It was stipulated at trial that it is between a mile and a mile and a half from the Prince George's Motor Lodge to the District of Columbia border.
Shortly after being forced into the van, Kathy P. was ordered to remove her jewelry and forcibly stripped of her clothing. One of the other male occupants in the van, later identified as William Raleigh Knight, raped her at gunpoint within minutes of the abduction.2 Shortly after the first rape, the van turned right off of Branch Avenue and went the wrong way on a one-way street. The van was involved in a minor accident with another vehicle. Kathy P. then endured a series of sexual attacks and rapes by several men. She estimated that approximately fifteen minutes elapsed between the kidnapping and this series of sexual attacks.3 Kathy P. said she asked her abductors whether they were still in Maryland. They responded that they were in Maryland, however, she testified that she did not believe them because they laughed while responding. Just over two hours after the abduction, Kathy P. was pushed out of the van in Prince George's County, Maryland. She knocked on the door of a nearby apartment and was able to contact the Prince George's County Police for assistance. Teresa B. identified the driver of the van as Adams and also identified the passenger in the van as William Raleigh Knight. Kathy P. identified Adams in a photo array shortly after the attack, as well as again several days later and yet again at trial. Adams also was identified by a District of Columbia police officer who stopped Adams while he was driving a van matching the description of the van used in the abduction and attacks. A search of the van revealed three used prophylactics, and a scarf and comb belonging to Kathy P. It was stipulated at trial that Kathy P. suffered physical injuries consistent with a sexual assault.
Adams was charged with kidnapping, robbery with a deadly weapon, six counts of first degree rape, and three counts of first degree sex offense. At his 1979 trial in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, Adams contended that the rapes occurred outside the State of Maryland, and thus Maryland did not have jurisdiction to try him for the crimes. The State presented two counter-arguments. First, the State contended that the evidence showed that the rapes, in fact, did occur in Maryland. Second, the State argued that, even assuming that the rapes occurred in the District of Columbia, the State could assert jurisdiction under Maryland Code (1957, 1971 Repl.Vol.), Article 27, § 465. Section 465 stated:
If a person is transported by any means, with the intent to violate this subheading [sexual offenses] and the intent is followed by actual violation of this subheading, the defendant may be tried in the appropriate court within whose jurisdiction the county lies where the transportation was offered, solicited, begun, continued or ended.
Maryland Code (1957, 1971 Repl.Vol.) Article 27, § 465.
Adams retorted that § 465 addressed the matter of venue, not the territorial jurisdiction, of a particular court.4 Adams further contended that Maryland had "no authority to legislate itself into having jurisdiction over acts that do not occur within the State." After several lengthy discussions of jurisdiction at different stages of the trial, the trial court denied Adams's motions and ruled that the question would be submitted to the jury. At that point, the following discussion took place:
At this juncture all that I know is it started out and it occurred in Maryland, and that is all I have in front of me. If someone gets up and says it occurred elsewhere I think that it is perfectly reasonable to let a jury make a — that is one of the issues a jury may have to determine.
If this case is ever appealed, or he is convicted and I make a subsequent ruling the statute applies out of state, and the Court of Appeals says I am wrong, or the jury says that it did happen in the District and I am wrong, that ends it right then and there.
Do you [to the State's Attorney] think that is a solution?
State's Attorney: I don't really know. It is a good procedure to get the jury to come back with specific findings of fact in a case like this, obviously, if this case is appealed to the Court of Appeals.
Court: How would the Court of Appeals know how the jury made a determination, based on what you told me? In other words, you want me to instruct them on the statute?
State's Attorney: Yes, sir.
Court: That if this defendant formed the intention to commit a sexual assault on this lady, and he formed that intention in the State of Maryland, and they so find, the fact that it happened in the District of Columbia makes no difference, that it could happen anywhere as long as he formed that intention, that is what you say the purpose of the statute is?
State's Attorney: That is correct, your Honor.
Court: All right. If they find it happened in the District.
Now suppose I agree with you and say you are absolutely right in your interpretation, then this case goes to the Court of Appeals and the Court of Appeals says this is not the law, didn't have any jurisdiction because it happened — they don't really know where it happened. How does the Court of Appeals know where it happened?
States Attorney: Special Instruction as to the statute.
Court: Well all right. But you think the statute is applicable. All right.
State's Attorney: Yes, sir.
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Unger v. State
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... ... Id. at 580-81, 357 A.2d 360 (citations omitted). Indeed, consistent with that interpretation of Article 23, criminal jury instructions were advisory. Compare Md. Rule 757 (1980) with Md. Rule 4-325 (1985). See State v. Adams, 406 Md. 240, 252-53, 958 A.2d 295 (2008) (trial court in 1979 criminal trial gave advisory jury instructions based on Article 23) ... In response to a due process challenge, the Court in Stevenson v. State, 289 Md. 167, 423 A.2d 558 (1980), held that Article 23 does not grant ... ...
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Webb v. State
... ... In other words, you must apply the law as I explain it to you in arriving at your verdict." 7 ... Maryland appellate courts have consistently rejected requests for plain error review of unobjected-to instructions. See, e.g., State v. Adams, 406 Md. 240, 322-23, 958 A.2d 295 (2008) (rejecting plain error review of advisory jury instructions, in part, because "the fact that an error was `plain' does not excuse waiver"); Stevenson v. State, 289 Md. 167, 172-73, 423 A.2d 558 (1980) (declining plain error review of advisory jury ... ...
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...and (b) must object on the record to the instruction immediately after jury instructions are given. Md. Rule 4-325(f). In State v. Adams, 406 Md. 240 (2008), overruled on other grounds by Unger v. State, 427 Md. 383 (2012), the Court of Appeals stated that, even a deficient reasonable doubt......
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