State v. Addison, 2008-945
| Decision Date | 30 April 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 2008-945,2008-945 |
| Citation | 167 N.H. 562,116 A.3d 551 |
| Parties | The STATE of New Hampshire v. Michael ADDISON (Capital Murder–Proportionality Review) |
| Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
167 N.H. 562
116 A.3d 551
The STATE of New Hampshire
v.
Michael ADDISON (Capital Murder–Proportionality Review)
No. 2008-945
Supreme Court of New Hampshire.
Argued: January 15, 2015
Opinion Issued: April 30, 2015
Joseph A. Foster, attorney general (Jeffery A. Strelzin, senior assistant attorney general, and John J. Kennedy, assistant attorney general, on the brief, and Mr. Strelzin orally), for the State.
David M. Rothstein, deputy director public defender, and Christopher M. Johnson, chief appellate defender, of Concord, on the brief, and Mr. Rothstein orally, for the defendant.
PER CURIAM.
In 2008, the defendant, Michael Addison, was convicted of the 2006 capital murder of Manchester Police Officer Michael Briggs and sentenced to death. We subsequently affirmed the defendant's conviction for capital murder, concluding that his sentence was not imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor, and that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's findings of aggravating circumstances. State v. Addison (Capital Murder), 165 N.H. 381, 412, 87 A.3d 1 (2013) ; see RSA 630:5, X–XII (2007). At this final stage of our mandatory review, we are required by statute to address "[w]hether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant." RSA 630:5, XI(c). We conclude that the defendant's sentence is neither excessive nor disproportionate and, accordingly, affirm his sentence of death.
In State v. Addison, 160 N.H. 732, 7 A.3d 1225 (2010) (hereinafter, Proportionality Framework ), we set forth the parameters
and mechanics of comparative proportionality review under RSA 630:5, XI(c). After reviewing the relevant jurisprudential background and the specific language of RSA 630:5, XI(c), we held that "a death penalty is ‘excessive or disproportionate’ if it is aberrant from, or substantially out of line with, a pattern of jury verdicts
which demonstrate that juries generally do not impose death in similar cases." Proportionality Framework, 160 N.H. at 761, 7 A.3d 1225. "This appellate monitoring function serves to ensure that defendants will not incur a death sentence that is arbitrary and capricious, or wanton and freakish, in relation to penalties imposed by juries in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant." Id.
We construed the procedural and substantive boundaries of "similar cases" as limited to those cases in which the defendant committed the same kind of capital murder; a separate sentencing hearing occurred; the jury found predicate aggravating factors; and the penalty imposed was either death or life imprisonment without possibility of parole. Id. at 769, 7 A.3d 1225. As to the mechanics of comparative proportionality review, we adopted a precedent-seeking approach, under which we would examine each case in the inventory of similar cases "considering both the crime and the defendant." Id. at 772, 7 A.3d 1225 (quotation omitted).
In doing so, we will determine whether a germane jury pattern emerges demonstrating that the defendant's death sentence is excessive or disproportionate; that is, whether juries generally do not impose a death sentence in capital murder cases similar to the defendant's case. This process is not limited to a comparison of the aggravating and mitigating factors between the defendant's case and each case in the inventory, or a calculation of the number of death and life imprisonment verdicts. Rather, we will review the particular facts underlying the substantive characteristics of the case (the nature and circumstances of the capital murder, the aggravating factors, and any mitigating factors). These characteristics found by the jury establish the unique footprint of the case within which the jury considered the particular circumstances of the crime and the character and background of the particular defendant to decide whether to impose the death penalty or life imprisonment without possibility of parole.
Id. (citation omitted).
Noting that our ability to conduct comparative proportionality review in this case is complicated by the practical reality that no other defendant has been convicted of a capital crime and sentenced to death in this state since the legislature adopted the current death penalty statute in 1977, we concluded that we would consider published opinions from out-of-state cases "to the extent such comparison would be meaningful." Id. at 779, 7 A.3d 1225. Because the defendant in any comparison case must have killed a law enforcement officer acting in the line of duty, the capital murder case of State v. Brooks is not included in the inventory of similar cases. See
State v. Brooks, 164 N.H. 272, 275–76, 56 A.3d 1245 (2012) (defendant convicted of capital murder involving solicitation, capital murder in the course of kidnapping, first degree murder as an accomplice, and conspiracy to commit capital murder).
Comparative proportionality review is not a constitutional mandate, but, rather, is a creature of statute. See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 45–46, 104 S.Ct. 871, 79 L.Ed.2d 29 (1984). Our mandatory appellate review
"serves as a check against the random or arbitrary imposition of the death penalty.
In particular, the proportionality review substantially eliminates the possibility that a person will be sentenced to die by the action of an aberrant jury. If a time comes when juries generally do not impose the death sentence in a certain kind of murder case, the appellate review procedures assure that no defendant convicted under such circumstances will suffer a sentence of death."
Proportionality Framework , 160 N.H. at 744, 7 A.3d 1225 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia , 428 U.S. 153, 206, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) ). Our task under proportionality review "[is] not to determine whether the capital case before [us] in some way [is], on a scale of moral blameworthiness, roughly equivalent to all other capital cases and, absent such rough equivalence, to reverse the sentence." Id. at 761, 7 A.3d 1225 (quotation omitted). "Nor [is] that review considered to require that the capital case before the court must affirmatively be shown, on such a scale, to have been quantitatively different from all other cases in which the death penalty was not imposed and, absent such an affirmative showing, to reverse the sentence." Id. (quotation omitted). Rather, the question before us is whether the death penalty imposed in this case is "aberrational ... with respect to similar cases." Id. (quotation omitted).
Comparative proportionality review is a question of law that we decide de novo. Id. at 775, 7 A.3d 1225. Neither party bears the burden of proof. Id. We conduct our review in accordance with the analysis adopted in the Proportionality Framework decision, with additional modification and clarification as explained below.
The defendant asserts that we should reassess three areas of the Proportionality Framework decision, including: (1) the limitation on reviewing only cases which resulted in a published opinion; (2) the reliance upon mitigating factors in comparison cases; and (3) the rejection of the "quantitative analysis" approach. As to the published decision limitation, the defendant suggests that, if we have enough information to conduct a comparison, unpublished opinions should not be excluded from the comparison universe. The State "does not categorically reject the notion that
this Court might look to sources other than published out-of-state opinions," asserting that "[w]hile a decision that has not been designated for publication may not carry legal precedence, the underlying facts recounted in the opinion are no less valuable in conducting a comparative proportionality review." We agree with the parties and will consider unpublished opinions accessible on either the Westlaw or Lexis legal databases, to the extent that such opinions contain sufficient information that they are meaningful for purposes of comparative proportionality review.
Regarding mitigating factors in comparison cases, the defendant asks us to "reassess the use of mitigating evidence as a comparative tool" because "[n]either the published opinions that serve as the Court's primary sources for information, nor newspaper articles, typically include detailed summaries of mitigating evidence." He argues that comparing mitigating factors requires sufficient information to permit this court to assess the correlation between different categories of mitigating factors and either a life or death sentence, and that it is "not possible to consistently obtain the details of the mitigation evidence presented in the majority of out-of-state capital murder cases from either published opinions or other sources." The State disagrees, arguing that "[t]he defendant's effort to jettison mitigation evidence from the proportionality analysis should be rejected" because doing so would be contrary to the statutory
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