State v. Agdinaoay

Citation500 P.3d 408,150 Hawai‘i 223
Decision Date30 November 2021
Docket NumberSCWC-18-0000755
Parties STATE of Hawai‘i, Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Artemio Y. AGDINAOAY, Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant.
CourtSupreme Court of Hawai'i

William H. Jameson Jr., for petitioner

Donn Fudo, Honolulu, for respondent

McKENNA, WILSON, AND EDDINS, JJ., AND RECKTENWALD, C.J., DISSENTING, WITH WHOM NAKAYAMA, J., JOINS

OPINION OF THE COURT BY EDDINS, J.

The Family Court of the First Circuit sentenced Artemio Agdinaoay to 181 days of imprisonment after he pled no contest to violating a temporary restraining order. It also ordered Agdinaoay to complete a domestic violence intervention program (DVI).

Agdinaoay challenges the court's sentence, which the Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed. He argues the family court erred by sentencing him to both serve 181 days and complete DVI. Imposing DVI without probation, Agdinaoay argues, violates Hawai‘i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 706-624(2)(a) (Supp. 2017).

We hold that courts cannot impose imprisonment exceeding the statutory threshold for a probationary sentence and also conditions of probation. Because a misdemeanor defendant sentenced to imprisonment exceeding 180 days cannot also receive a probationary sentence - and DVI cannot be imposed except as a condition of probation - Agdinaoay's sentence was unlawful.

I.

After Agdinaoay pled no contest to Violation of a Temporary Restraining Order (VTRO), the family court convicted him of violating HRS § 586-4. That statute requires defendants convicted of VTRO to "undergo domestic violence intervention at any available domestic violence program as ordered by the court." HRS § 586-4(e).1

The court sentenced Agdinaoay to DVI. It also sentenced him to 181 days of imprisonment.

This sentence was illegal. Its illegality emerges from the confluence of two distinct conclusions. First, that DVI is not available to sentencing courts as a "standalone" sentencing option; it must be imposed with probation. And second, that a court cannot impose both probation and a sentence of greater than 180 days for a misdemeanor offense.

Agdinaoay's sentence was unlawful because it combined DVI – which we conclude is only available as a condition of probation - and imprisonment exceeding six months. See HRS § 706-624(2)(a). The trial court could have imposed a 181-day prison term. Or it could have imposed probation with DVI as a condition. But it could not mix and match as it did.

II.

Our first conclusion - that DVI is only available as part of a probation sentence - makes sense for three reasons.

First, the plain language of Chapter 706 shows that DVI is not available except as a condition of probation.

HRS Chapter 706 guides sentencing. It starts: "No sentence shall be imposed otherwise than in accordance with this chapter." HRS § 706-600 (emphasis added). The command is clear. Chapter 706 controls all sentencing dispositions, even those dictated by statutes outside its purview. See HRS § 701-102(3) ("The provisions of chapters 701 through 706 of the Code are applicable to offenses defined by other statutes, unless the Code otherwise provides."). Other statutes may supplement the penal code, for example by providing mandatory minimums, but Chapter 706's overarching sentencing framework still controls.2

Under HRS § 706-605, the court may sentence a convicted defendant to one or more of four dispositions: (1) probation; (2) payment of a fine; (3) imprisonment; and (4) community service.

Criminal sentences other than the four outlined in HRS § 706-605 defy Chapter 706.3 ,4 ,5

DVI is not one of the four authorized dispositions under HRS § 706-605. But there are several subsections of HRS § 706-624(2) that allow a court to impose DVI as a condition of probation . Under HRS § 706-624(2), a court imposing probation may order a defendant to: "[u]ndergo available medical or mental health assessment and treatment ...." HRS § 706-624(2)(j) ; "[c]omply with a service plan developed using current assessment tools" HRS § 706-624(2)(s) ; and "[s]atisfy other reasonable conditions as the court may impose." HRS § 706-624(2)(t).6 Read together, the absence of "DVI" as a "standalone" authorized disposition for convicted defendants under HRS § 706-605 and the express authorization of "mental health treatment" such as DVI as a discretionary condition of probation indicate that DVI is imposable only as a condition of probation.

Second, other sections of the Hawai‘i Penal Code treat DVI as a sentence that is imposed only alongside probation.

In 1998, the legislature extended the probation period for the misdemeanor domestic violence crimes7 from one year to a period "not exceeding two years." See HRS § 706-623(c). The legislative history reflects that the law changed because offenders needed more time to complete DVI as part of their probation sentences .8 If the legislature believed courts could impose DVI without probation, it would have been unnecessary to extend the length of probation so that offenders could complete DVI during probation.

The language of HRS § 709-906(5), the misdemeanor abuse of family or household members offense, also supports the conclusion that DVI is imposed only as part of a probationary term. If a person convicted under HRS § 709-906(5) does not complete DVI within a specified time frame, "[t]he court shall revoke [that] defendant's probation " unless good cause excuses the failure. HRS § 709-906(7) (emphasis added). This language reflects an assumption that only probationers will be ordered to complete DVI.

Third, several practical considerations also support our holding that DVI is available to sentencing courts only as a condition of probation. Chief among them is the court's inability to enforce a sentence of DVI without probation: if the defendant is not on probation and, by extension, subject to revocation of that probation, then there are no consequences to not starting, or not finishing, DVI. A contempt charge under HRS § 710-1077 does not work. See State v. Asuncion, 120 Hawai‘i 312, 327, 205 P.3d 577, 592 (App. 2009) (reversing criminal contempt conviction of defendant who violated a condition of his probation and explaining that "[w]hen the defendant fails to comply with [the conditions of the defendant's probation], HRS § 706–6259 provides the exclusive remedies for sanctioning the defendant's failure").10

Even if one accepts for the purpose of argument that DVI could be imposed without probation, a contempt charge under HRS § 710-1077 is not a viable means to punish a defendant who does not complete DVI. Under HRS § 710-1077(g), a person commits criminal contempt of court if the person "knowingly disobeys or resists the process, injunction, or other mandate of a court." A sentence is neither a process, nor an injunction, nor a mandate of the court. Courts do have "inherent equity, supervisory, and administrative powers as well as inherent power to control the litigation process before them." Enos v. Pac. Transfer & Warehouse, Inc., 79 Hawai‘i 452, 457, 903 P.2d 1273, 1278 (1995) (cleaned up). But these inherent powers to administer and manage the litigation process are not the source of courtssentencing authority. Chapter 706 is. As such, sentences are not processes, injunctions, or other mandates of a court. And, by extension, failure to complete a sentence is not criminal contempt.

Relying on the specter of a contempt charge to motivate defendants’ DVI completion also presents profound fairness and separation-of-powers problems.

Regarding the fairness problem: if failure to complete court-ordered DVI may give rise to a contempt charge punishable by up to one year in prison, defendants could receive combined terms of imprisonment far in excess of the maximum term for their underlying misdemeanor crime.11

Punishing failure to complete DVI with criminal contempt also presents a separation-of-powers problem. Under HRS § 710-1077(1)(g), a person commits criminal contempt of court if "[t]he person knowingly disobeys or resists the process, injunction, or other mandate of a court." The commentary to section 710-1077 makes clear that the purpose of the criminal contempt statute is safeguarding the court's authority. It defines criminal contempt as "conduct which brings the court into disrespect or which interferes with the administration of justice" (emphasis added). But if every knowing failure to timely complete a DVI sentence generates a criminal contempt charge under HRS § 710-1077(1)(g), the government could charge a defendant with contempt even "in the face of the ... court's determination that the [defendant] had not demonstrated any disrespect [to the court]." Jones,12 869 N.W.2d at 29. Cf. id. at 29 (noting that allowing criminal contempt charges for probation violations would "impinge on the district court's obligation and authority to sentence"). Construing Chapter 706 to allow for DVI only as a condition of probation avoids a separation-of-powers problem.13 It ensures that the government cannot use contempt charges to intrude on courts’ sentencing powers anytime a defendant sentenced to DVI fails to complete that sentence.

A second consideration which suggests that the Hawai‘i Penal Code allows for the imposition of DVI only as a condition of probation is the significant support available to probationers, but not other offenders. Only probationers can receive services from the Adult Client Services Branch (ACSB). ACSB's probation officers help ensure defendants’ success in complying with probation terms like DVI. A probation officer is "a helper, a monitor, and an enforcer." State v. Fields, 67 Haw. 268, 280, 686 P.2d 1379, 1388 (1984). Probation officers are required to "aid and guide" probationers and "to evaluate and report on [probationers’] progress toward integration into the community ...." Id. Cf. HRS § 806-73 (providing that a probation officer "shall use all suitable methods to aid the defendant and bring about an improvement in the defendant's conduct and condition").

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